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This paper forms part of a forthcoming comparative study of the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, which examines the main strengths and 
weaknesses of the German and Dutch economies. The main purpose of this study is to 
learn from experiences abroad. Mutual lessons can point out necessary policy adjust-
ments that enhance future competitiveness, with the paramount objective to safeguard 
national wealth and wellbeing. To this aim, strong and weak elements of the current 
situation in both countries are analyzed, as well as the main future trends that 
correspond with potential threats and opportunities for economic growth. Attention is 
not only focused on the available production factors, but also, and above all, on the role 
of institutions in relation to economic performance. Institutions are defined as the set of 
rules that provide a framework for production, exchange and distribution. Consequently, 
they range from legal rules to informal agreements. 
  One of the aspects relevant for economic performance is the behaviour and position 
of the different stakeholders that constitute a firm or are directly related to a firm, and 
the governance structures that control relationships between stakeholders. Well-known 
categories of stakeholders are shareholders, creditors, and managers, yet employees, 
suppliers and consumers are stakeholders as well. The behaviour and position of stake-
holders affect national welfare through firm performance, for instance with respect to 
investment strategies, the structure of finance and the adoption of new technologies. In 
turn, stakeholder behaviour is influenced by various institutional arrangements. Hence, 
the core questions addressed in this paper are the following. Which institutions influ-
ence the position and behaviour of stakeholders in a business enterprise in Germany and 
the Netherlands? In what way do these institutions and corresponding behaviour affect 
firm performance? What lessons can be drawn from the comparison about options to 
adjust or strengthen national institutional arrangements? 
  To address these questions, first of all the main concepts, an analytical framework 
and a short overview of the booming literature on stakeholder relationships is presented 
in Section 2.
1 To clarify these issues, the discussion in Section 2 focuses on two main 
models of stakeholder relationships, the Anglo-American model and the German model. 
                                                           
     
1 See Bishop (1994), Blair (1995), Boot (1994), van Damme (1995), Edwards and Fischer (1994), 
Elston (1994), Guptara (1995), Hart (1995), Jenkinson and Mayer (1992), de Jong (1991), Kaen and 
Sherman (1993), Kester (1992), Moerland (1995), Monks and Minow (1995), Nickell (1995), OECD 
(1995a), Pound (1995), Prowse (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Winter (1994), Yafeh and Yosha (1995). 
 
  Concerning Germany and the Netherlands, more detail and nuance is added in the 
subsequent sections, which delve deeper into the institutional arrangements and the 
performance of the enterprise sector in the two countries. Section 3 addresses the 




relationships between managers, shareholders, and creditors. Section 4 focuses on the 
interaction between management and employees. Section 5 gives an assessment of the 
mutual lessons that can be learned from the German and Dutch institutions affecting 









For several reasons the words `shareholder' and `stakeholder' feature prominently in 
current public discussions. The (near) demise of a few large companies has put the issue 
of corporate governance on the public agenda. Deregulation, technological 
developments and emerging regions in the world economy raised interest in the 
performance and competitiveness of enterprises and the impact of a nation's institutional 
characteristics on the internal organisation of companies and the relations between 
companies. In particular in the United Kingdom, the introduction of the concept of a 
stakeholder society by the Labour Party brought the subject higher on the political 
agenda. 
  At times a heated debate takes place between proponents of the `shareholder view' 
and the `stakeholder view' on the perceived objectives of a company's management. 
According to the shareholder view companies `should' be run in the interest of their 
shareholders, whereas the stakeholder view emphasizes that managers `should' promote 
the interests of all stakeholders in the company. Opponents of the shareholder view state 
that `... We doubt whether shareholders have either incentive or capacity to provide such 
monitoring. We doubt whether shareholder priority is an appropriate rule for the large 
corporation in any event. ...' (Kay and Silberston, 1995:  94). Proponents of the 
shareholder view criticize the stakeholder position: `... The stakeholder approach is 
simply to dissolve this problem in a general mushiness. Everyone is supposed to 
promote the interests of everyone else and no-one is really accountable for anything. ...' 
(Brittan, 1996). 
  The aims of this section are to analyze this controversy from the perspective of 
economic theory and meanwhile to develop a framework to compare governance 
structures among countries. Governance structures can be defined as institutional 
arrangements which are designed to control relationships between stakeholders and 
affect the actions of different stakeholders. The core of the analysis is that national 
institutions differ in the extent to which they promote relationship-specific investments 
in stakeholder relationships. Differences in national institutional characteristics imply 
that the behaviour of managers, who aim at maximization of the equity value of the 
company, diverges regarding the incorporation of the interests of stakeholders in their 
decisions. The crucial argument is that certain institutions to a larger extent support the 
commitment of managers and other stakeholders to invest in relationship-specific assets. 
The analysis argues that in countries typified by these institutions, it is rational for 
managers to take the interests of stakeholders into account and to invest in long-term 
relationships. In contrast, in countries where the institutional arrangements are different, 
a perspective emerges in which investments in long-term relationships with stakeholders 
are less important. In this institutional environment management acts according to the 
shareholder view. Hence, both views do not follow from different behaviourial objec-
tives of managers, but indicate that the emphasis of management shifts under different 
institutional arrangements. 
  The superiority of one of both types of institutions cannot be established, because 
institutional systems involve a trade-off between commitment and flexibility. 
Institutions that support commitment, reduce flexibility by making stakeholders more 
dependent on the continuity of their relationship. Institutions that promote competition 




its distinct strengths and weaknesses. In this view, institutional design implies 
administrating a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. This points at the 
importance of an adequate institutional balance. This balance is neither unique nor 
constant over time, but depends on the current economic environment and future 
economic trends. 
  The organization of the remainder of this section is as follows. First, Section 2.1 
explains the analytical framework. Next, Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 address three types of 
relationships in more detail, viz. relationships between managers and financiers, 
relationships between two companies, and relationships between management and 
employees, respectively. Each of these three sections is organized in a similar way. 
Reviewed are: the relevant economic agents, their goals and motivations, and the 
institutions which govern the relationships between these agents.  
  Subsequently, Section 2.5 presents two stylized models of relationships between 
economic agents, the Anglo-American model and the German model. For both models 
the main institutions which characterize the three types of governance are presented. 
Next, Section 2.6 assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the two models. In con-
clusion, Section 2.7 explains the use of the analytical framework in subsequent sections 
for the comparison of institutions in the field of stakeholder relationships between Ger-
many and The Netherlands. 
 
2.1 The impact of institutions on stakeholder relationships 
 
This section provides a theoretical frame of reference to analyze the impact of 
institutions on stakeholder relationships. It starts by delineating the main features of a 
stakeholder relationship. Subsequently, it addresses the reasons why contracts can never 
be comprehensive. Incomplete contracts and opportunism of economic agents give rise 
to the hold-up problem, which states that if agents cannot be committed to keep to an 
agreement, relationship-specific investments are curbed. Ownership and governance 
institutions constitute two alternatives to reduce the hold-up problem. Hence, solving 
the hold-up problem through governance institutions provides a rationale for 
investments in stakeholder relationships. By consequence, different sets of national 
institutions may promote a `stakeholder society' or a `shareholder society'.  
  This section ends with a taxonomy of governance institutions, which sets the stage 
for the analysis of Anglo-American, German and Dutch governance institutions in 
following sections. 
 
Relationship-specific investments characterize stakeholders 
 
Providing services to a firm and receiving part of the firm's revenues in return does not 
make an economic agent a stakeholder. A construction worker hires out his working 
abilities to a specific firm, gets paid the amount mutually agreed upon and moves to 
another firm after the job has been done. In this case the agreement between the worker 
and the firm constitutes a market exchange of working ability for money. Analogously, a 
market transaction in which a down-stream enterprise purchases a product from a 
supplier, as such involves no stakeholder relationship. Rather, a distinctive feature of a 
stakeholder relationship concerns investment in assets that are specific to the 
relationship with the firm. In other words, a stakeholder has invested in relationship-
specific assets that are at risk in the enterprise (Blair, 1995). 
  If substantial relationship-specific investments have been made by contracting 




fraction of the value of the asset which is lost if the asset is excluded from its major use 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:  307). If two parties both make relationship-specific 
investments their assets are co-specialized, i.e. the two assets are most productive when 
used together and are of little value separately. In this way, stakeholder relationships 
cause a mutual dependency between the participants in a business enterprise. The return 
on the relationship-specific investment of a particular stakeholder depends on the 
actions of other participants in the firm.  
  Reviewing a company's diverse types of investments shows that, although being a 
legal contracting entity by itself, a company is composed of different stakeholders and 
on top of that is related to several external groups of stakeholders. The main types of 
possible stakeholders are managers, as the main decision-making unit within the firm; 
employees, as the providers of human capital; shareholders, as the owners of the firm's 
equity; creditors as the suppliers of debt finance; up-stream firms as suppliers of 
intermediate goods; competing firms for instance in case of a research joint venture; and 
consumers who may have a long-term purchasing relationship with a specific firm. 
 
Bounded rationality and uncertainty imply that contracts are incomplete  
 
Because they have invested in relationship-specific assets, stakeholders are interested in 
the continuity of the operations of the firm and the prosperity of its activities. However, 
continuity and prosperity can mean different things to different stakeholders, who may 
have conflicting interests. For instance, if a firm gets into financial trouble and continu-
ation of the operations of the firm will further increase the probability of default on a 
loan, creditors will prefer quick liquidation (Blair, 1995: 25). In contrast, if share prices 
already plummeted because of the initial financial difficulties, shareholders will have 
little to lose by pursuing some very risky strategies that have some probability of strong 
recovery. In this case the interests of creditors and shareholders are antagonistic. In 
general, departing from different goals and different types of investments, stakeholders 
can have partly conflicting and partly corresponding interests in the company.  
  Transaction Cost Economics
1 explains why bounded rationality makes it infeasible 
to align diverging interests and avoid conflicts by designing comprehensive contracts 
between the various stakeholders, i.e. contracts that specify all parties' obligations in all 
possible future states of the world to the full (Hart, 1995: 22-23; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: Ch. 5; MacLeod, 1995: 20). Because people are boundedly rational designing a 
contract is costly and therefore contracts are always incomplete. Bounded rationality 
manifests itself in several ways: foresight is imperfect and contracting parties face 
difficulties to develop a common language to unambiguously define the terms of the 
contract and to write a contract that is interpretable and perfectly enforceable in court. 
  Contracts are always incomplete, because bounded rationality generates contracting 
costs. Depending on the degree of incompleteness three types of contracts are relevant, 
viz. formal contracts, relational contracts and implicit contracts. Formal contracts are 
most appropriate for situations where property rights are secure, bargaining and 
enforcement costs are relatively low and future contingencies easy to oversee. 
According to the Coase theorem, in these cases ownership rights will be traded until the 
emerging pattern of ownership is efficient, i.e. until all costs, including transaction costs, 
are minimized (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 38). In more complex situations where 
formal contracts are too costly, relational contracting is a functional alternative. Instead 
of specifying many details of the relationship, parties formulate more incomplete written 
contracts in which they agree on general objectives, bounds on actions to be taken, 




frequently governed by relational contracts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 131). An even 
less formal type of contracts are implicit contracts. Implicit contracts pertain to 
unarticulated shared expectations of partners concerning their relationship. Values and 
norms embedded in corporate culture can be considered as being governed by implicit 
contracts. 
 
Incomplete contracts and opportunism may create the hold-up problem 
 
Incomplete contracts cannot be fully enforced. Therefore, openings remain for 
opportunistic behaviour of contracting parties. Williamson (1985) defines opportunism 
as `self-interest seeking with guile'. According to Williamson, opportunism refers to the 
`incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse'.  
  Investment in relationship-specific assets is vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour. 
This may create the hold-up problem. Once the relationship-specific investment has 
been made, the investing party can be forced to accept a worsening in the terms of the 
relationship, because the fact that the investment cannot be put to an alternative use 
without substantial losses reduces the investing party's ex-post bargaining power. By 
consequence, the investing party has been held up (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 136, 
307). If the party that benefits from the investment cannot convince the investing party 
of its commitment to the initial agreement, the fear of becoming vulnerable to ex-post 
reneging on initial agreements can induce the investing party to abstain from profitable 
investments. Hence, welfare improving value creation has been curbed. 
  An example of the hold-up problem concerns investment in relationship-specific 
equipment by a supplier and a procuring firm (Hart, 1995: 27). Ex ante, the parties agree 
on a division of costs and revenues of an investment to be made by the supplier in 
machinery and technology, which is tailored to the requirements of the procuring firm. 
The supplier runs the risk that after it has made the investment, the procuring firm uses 
its ex-post higher bargaining power to force down the price of products delivered by the 
supplier. Therefore, it will be less inclined to engage in relationship-specific investment. 
Depending on the division of costs and revenues in the initial agreement, ex-post the 
balance may also turn out to the disadvantage of the procuring firm, for instance if it 
becomes highly dependent on the products delivered by the supplier. This example 
illustrates the crucial features of the hold-up problem: assets are relationship-specific or 
co-specialized, ex-ante bargaining power differs from ex-post bargaining power and no 
credible commitment can be given that parties will stick to the initial agreement, 
because contracts are incomplete and parties may act opportunistically. 
 
Ownership solves the hold-up problem but eliminates market incentives 
 
Two main types of solutions exist that reduce the hold-up problem. The first is the 
ownership solution, which implies that the relationship-specific assets fall under 
common ownership. From an economic point of view, two crucial aspects of ownership 
are the right on residual returns and the right of residual control (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 289-293). Both these aspects follow from the incompleteness of contracts, since 
in a world of comprehensive contracts the complete allocation of revenues and the full 
division of control rights would be specified contractually. 
  The right on residual returns specifies that in general owners exert a residual claim 
on the operating revenues of a firm. From its operating revenues the firm has to pay 




suppliers. The remaining profits can be used to pay dividends to owners or to finance 
investments, which raise future revenues of the firm and in that way indirectly benefit 
owners as well. However, if revenues fall short of wages, interest payments and costs of 
supplies, the company will not pay any dividends and losses will reduce the owners' 
wealth. 
  The right of residual control of an asset entails the right to make any decisions 
concerning the asset's use after all legal and contractual obligations have been fulfilled. 
Hence, residual control of a firm's assets is permitted only in so far as control is not 
restricted by law or other contracts. Consolidating the right of residual control is the 
reason why ownership solves the hold-up problem: if the user controls the relationship-
specific asset the incentive to renege on the initial arrangement vanishes.  
  In terms of the supplier-user example the ownership solution implies vertical 
integration, i.e. the procuring firm acquires the supplier (Hart, 1995:  33). Vertical 
integration increases the incentives of the procuring firm to invest in technological 
know-how and product development with the acquired firm (the former supplier), since 
there is no risk that these will be expropriated after the investment has been completed. 
These investments are fully under the procuring firm's control. 
  A disadvantage of the ownership solution to the hold-up problem is that market 
incentives are eliminated. Because of vertical integration, incentives of the acquired 
firm's management to invest in relationship-specific assets decrease because the 
procuring firm receives the revenues of these investments. The absence of market 
incentives may also raise X-inefficiencies and lower productivity of the acquired firm.  
  Finally, the ownership solution is not always feasible. In particular, potential hold-up 
problems in relationships between management and employees have to be solved in a 
different way. The right of residual control on work effort can never be acquired, simply 
because a firm cannot own a worker.  
 
Institutions may support commitment and reduce the hold-up problem 
 
To preserve market incentives or in the case that the ownership solution is not feasible, 
the hold-up problem can also be tackled by a second solution that consists of 
governance institutions designed to commit parties to keep to initial agreements. 
Institutions may enhance monitoring capabilities of parties, reallocate revenues so as to 
align incentives between parties, increase co-decision powers of parties, and support 
long-term relationships between agents. For instance, representation of block 
shareholders on the board of directors improves the effectivity of direct shareholder 
monitoring of management and reduces the scope for managerial opportunism. 
Management share ownership closer aligns management and shareholder incentives. 
Employee co-determination rights enable employees to monitor management and to 
partly control managerial decisions that might hamper relationship-specific investment 
by employees.  
  The existence of long-term relational or implicit contracts helps to reduce the hold-
up problem because these contracts strengthen long-term relationships, which makes 
reputation more important as a control mechanism. For instance, if a procuring firm 
reneges on an initial agreement with a supplier, the supplier can threat not to invest in 
future relationship-specific assets any more. Reneging by the procuring firm is a signal 
to other suppliers as well not to engage in a future consultative-cooperative arrangement 
with that firm. Hence, the reputation of the user is harmed and it forgoes the benefits of 
dedicated supplier relationships.  




A `shareholder society' and a `stakeholder society' 
 
The following line of reasoning shows how institutional characteristics may lead to the 
emergence of a `shareholder society' or a `stakeholder society'. Take two countries, A 
and B, in which two different sets of institutions have evolved. In each country 
managers are hired to maximize the equity value of the company, which equals the 
discounted sum of future profits. Future revenues from relationship-specific investments 
increase future profits and thus raise the equity value of the company. At the same time 
investments in stakeholder relationships reduce short-term external flexibility, which 
may lower the value of the company in case of external shocks. The set of institutions of 
country A are better able to reduce the hold-up problem than the corresponding 
institutions in country B. As a consequence, management and other stakeholders in 
country A to a larger extent invest in relationship-specific assets compared to country B. 
Since stakeholder relationships feature more prominently in country A than in country 
B, country A gets the characteristics of a `stakeholder society', whereas country B 
becomes a `shareholder society'.  
  Note that in country A management incorporates the interests of other stakeholders in 
its decisions because the country's institutional characteristics encourage stakeholder 
relations, not because management adheres to some general and probably irrational 
objective like `everyone is supposed to promote the interests of everyone else'. 
Management's objectives are identical to those of managers in country B. Country A's 
management to the best of its knowledge controls the value creating features of 
relationship-specific investments and the benefits of these investments for the company. 
In that respect, relationship-specific investment decisions do not differ from decisions to 
invest in physical capital or technology research and development. 
  In country B it is equally rational for management to largely disregard relationship-
specific investments as it is for country A's managers to take stakeholder interests into 
account. The larger stock of relationship-specific assets may be welfare improving for 
country A. However, the associated long-term characteristics may reduce short-term 
external flexibility and adaptability to new challenges in country A compared to country 
B. Therefore, a priori none of the institutional systems is superior, but a trade-off 
between commitment and flexibility exists. 
  The arguments presented here provide a theoretical frame of reference. In real-world 
situations a variety of different institutions as well as various imperfections blur the 
sharp distinction given here. For instance, imperfections may lead to rigidities in 
country A and to overly short-sighted behaviour in country B. However, the theoretical 
framework is a useful point of reference to compare specific institutions that are used to 
govern stakeholder relationships. To set the stage for the more detailed description of 
specific institutions in Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, this section finishes by further 




Governance structures are defined as institutional arrangements that are designed to 
control relationships between stakeholders and affect the actions of different 
stakeholders. Hence, governance structures range from detailed formal contracts to 
market transactions. An example of an institution that is part of a governance structure is 
the annual statement of accounts of a company. To overcome information asymmetries 





  The specific design of institutional arrangements is influenced by the institutional 
environment in which they operate (Williamson, 1985). The institutional environment of 
governance structures consists of the regulatory framework set by the national or 
supranational government, which influences the existence and efficacy of different types 
of governance structures. To illustrate the effect of the institutional environment 
(national legislation) on the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional arrangements 
(governance structures) in the previous example: requirements concerning the contents 
of the financial statement laid down in national legislation, strongly influence this 
instrument's effectiveness from the perspective of the shareholder. For instance, the 
effectiveness is reduced if national legislation allows a company not to disclose all 
reserves in its financial statement, because then the precise value of the company is 
difficult to establish by shareholders. 
  In the following sections the analysis of stakeholder relationships and associated 
governance structures is subdivided into three categories, viz. corporate governance, 
contractual governance, and work governance (see 0).
2 These governance structures are 
                                                           
     
2 Customers may also have a stakeholder relationship with a firm if they highly value the quality of the 
firm's products and prefer to buy a replacement set or related products from the same company. Moreover, 
firms can invest to intensify their customer relations, for instance through after sales services. However, in 
order not to broaden the subject too much, this type of stakeholder relationship is not taken into 
consideration here, which explains the dashed lines in 0. 
        Figure 1  Stakeholder relationships and governance structures 
0
 




two-sided because relationship-specific investments of both parties are at stake and both 
parties influence each others behaviour.  
 Corporate governance focuses on the relationships between financiers and managers. 
Two groups of financiers, shareholders and creditors, can act on the basis of partly 
different views on the purpose of the company and can apply different governance 
institutions to have management comply to these goals. Contractual governance con-
cerns the associations between different companies.
3 Examples are cooperative 
agreements between suppliers and procuring companies in industrial groups or research 
joint ventures among competitors. Work governance concentrates on the relationships 
between management and employees. Monitoring among management and employees 
is also a two-sided matter. Not only do managers monitor the work effort of employees, 
but their relationship-specific investments give employees an interest in monitoring the 
performance of management as well. Therefore, with respect to work governance the 
focus will be on co-determination arrangements and remuneration practices, and the 
way these institutions stimulate work effort, worker motivation and worker quality.  
  As will be illustrated in Section 2.6 and 2.7, governance institutions balance the 
interests of stakeholders. Moreover, these sections make clear that the three types of 
governance structures are partly interrelated. 
 
2.2 Corporate governance: financiers and managers  
 
In the literature the concept of corporate governance ranges from the influence of 
shareholders on board decisions on the one hand to all institutions that pertain to 
stakeholder relationships in the enterprise sector on the other hand (see for instance 
Blair, 1995). As indicated in Section 2.1 and 0, here corporate governance is confined to 
stakeholder relationships between providers of capital to the firm and the management 
of firms. Corporate governance institutions affect the intensity of relationship-specific 
investments of managers and financiers. From this perspective the purpose of corporate 
governance institutions is to make management accountable to financiers and to give 
them proper incentives to take the goals set by the providers of capital into account, 
while preserving managerial autonomy to formulate strategies that enhance the 
performance of the company. To clarify the discussion, 0 acts as a point of reference. In 
0 rectangles contain the relevant agents and their goals and the arrows represent 
corporate governance institutions among these agents. 
 
                                                           
     
3 The concept of contractual governance in relation to corporate governance has been introduced by 





Objectives of shareholders, creditors and managers  
 
What are the objectives of capital providers and in what way do these relate to the 
objectives of managers? An important factor in this respect is that, from a risk-taking 
perspective, the interests of the two categories of providers of outside financial capital, 
shareholders and creditors, are divergent (Prowse, 1994). In an efficient stock market, 
which discounts all information, shareholders receive the highest return on their 
investment if the value of the firm's equity is maximized. Creditors aim at maximizing 
the probability to be repaid in full and to receive the amount of interest agreed upon. 
Hence, creditors are best off if the firm pursues a strategy which minimizes the probabil-
ity for bankruptcy. Shareholders have a residual claim on the profits of the firm. They 
benefit from successful high-risk strategies by receiving higher dividends or rising share 
prices, while the costs of bankruptcy in case of total failure of a high-risk strategy are 
divided between shareholders and creditors. Therefore, shareholders will be more 
inclined to engage in risk-taking activities than creditors. 
  Managers are hired to run the company. The objective of managers is to maximize 
shareholder returns, in other words to maximize the value of equity (Monks and Minow, 
1995: 41). To properly carry out their task, managers need a considerable degree of 
        Figure 2  Corporate governance: agents, goals and governance structures 
0
 




autonomy. They have to take risks and take advantage of opportunities when they arise 
(Blair 1995:  32). However, too high a degree of managerial discretion can provide 
opportunities to managers to perform activities which are not aimed at value 
maximization, but which raise their salaries, their power or their status. Activities with a 
potential for managerial empire building are investment in large offices, in staff depart-
ments or in R&D activities, launching of over-extensive advertising campaigns or 
acquisitions (Prowse, 1994; Yafeh and Yosha, 1995). According to Jensen (1988), 
managers often waste free cash flow on these activities. Free cash flow concerns 
earnings of the company that exceed the funds needed for investments by the company 
in projects with a positive net present value. Instead of spending it on empire-building 
activities, free cash flow should be returned to shareholders by paying out dividends.  
  As another way to pursue their own goals, managers can entrench themselves in the 
company by writing contracts or making investments specific to their ability and 
presence. These investments makes it costly to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989). Examples are golden parachute contracts, binding of valuable employees to 
managers instead of to the company, or excessive expansion of current lines-of-business 
and aversion to new activities if current operations correspond best to the management 
abilities of the incumbent management.  
  Managers may perform myopic behaviour by aiming at a high current share price to 
reduce the threat of a takeover and subsequent replacement (Nickell, 1995). Finally, 
apart from promoting their own interests, managers may be biased towards survival of 
the company, while from a broader economic perspective it can be more useful to shift 
resources towards other industries (Kaen and Sherman, 1993). 




Corporate governance: shareholders and managers 
 
In a single owner firm both the right of residual control and the right on residual returns
2 
are in the hands of the entrepreneur who fully owns the firm. The separation between 
equity ownership and management control changes the ownership structure of a firm. 
Shareholders are only entitled to those ownership rights which are associated with the 
ownership of equity, like receiving dividends. Hence they have the right on residual 
returns. Moreover, shareholders have limited liability, which reduces their residual risks 
because losses can never exceed the amount invested in the company. However, by law 
the right of residual control and use of the property of the enterprise has been delegated 
to management.  
  Although the advantages of the separation between the right of residual control and 
the right on residual returns are well known, it does create a hold-up problem (Hart, 
1995: 64).
4 If the manager controls the use of a company's assets, while shareholders 
receive most of the returns from operating these assets, less incentives exist for the 
manager to substantially improve operations. The manager might invest shareholders' 
capital in projects that require little managerial effort or in projects that increase the 
power or status of managers instead of the performance of the company. In contrast, 
shareholders' incentives to invest in detailed knowledge of a company's strategies and to 
directly communicate strategic recommendations to management are low in companies 
with widely dispersed equity capital. 
  Three options exist for shareholders who disagree with the way a company is 
managed: exit, voice and replacement (see also 0). Exit simply comes down to selling 
the company's shares on the stock market. Exit by the owners of a substantial part of the 
firm's equity initiates a fall in the share price, which acts as a signal to managers to 
improve performance. The exit option is useful if the stock market functions effectively. 
Therefore, liquidity of the market has to be sufficient, market prices have to adequately 
reveal the value of equity and insider trading must be countered. Liquidity and 
importance of the stock market are higher if little restrictive regulation on the issuance 
of shares exists, if information disclosure is sufficient to establish market transparency, 
and if taxation does not discourage share holdings or share trading (Prowse, 1994: 24-
28). Adequate representation of equity value by stock market prices can be raised by 
accounting rules which require a company's financial information to properly reflect 
shareholder value. Insider dealing can be curbed by strong legislation combined with 
effective control. 
                                                           
     
4 Separation between ownership and management enables a company to hire professional managers who 
are more knowledgable on management issues than an owner-manager. Moreover, it facilitates attracting 




 Using  voice, the second option, means that shareholders approach managers directly 
and inform managers about their opinions on the appropriate way to run the company 
either informally or at the general meeting of shareholders. Influencing management by 
voice is relatively easy for a single shareholder or a small group of shareholders who 
own a considerable part of the firm's equity capital. Their limited number makes it 
simple to contact management directly, to learn about its plans and policies and to 
supervise the performance of the company. Moreover, the size of their concentrated 
shareholdings provides a strong incentive to devote time and resources to monitoring 
activities and is also a strong incentive for management to take the opinions of 
shareholders seriously. In general, governance by shareholders who own large equity 
stocks is primarily exercised by informal procedures and informal meetings between 
shareholders and managers.  
  If a firm's equity capital is highly dispersed, formalized contacts between 
shareholders and managers are more relevant. The general meeting of shareholders 
votes on a number of issues regarding the condition of the company, like the financial 
decisions and proposals for merger or substantial investments. In addition, the general 
meeting usually elects the board of directors or the supervisory board, which act as an 
intermediary between shareholders and management. Yet, for individual shareholders 
the influence on management through these institutions is small and therefore the cost of 
exercising voice may outweigh the revenues. Moreover, each shareholder is subject to 
the free-rider behaviour of leaving monitoring activities to others. The relatively minor 
significance of direct individual voice in companies with dispersed shareholdings is 
illustrated by the fact that attendance of shareholders at general meetings is usually low. 
  The third and most radical option is to replace a management team through the 
market for corporate control. If the share price of a company is low because current 
management is incompetent or wastes too much resources on managerial empire 
building, competing management teams can obtain a majority stake in the company at a 
relatively low cost, replace the current management team, improve the company's 
performance and benefit from the rise in share price. Current management can use a 
number of anti-takeover defences to protect itself against hostile takeovers. On the one 
hand these defences entrench current management, leave scope for pursuing private 
goals and drive down share prices. On the other hand defences may protect managerial 
discretion to strive for long-term goals from raiders who are only interested in the short-
term benefits from stripping the company. The efficacy of the market for corporate 
control depends on the institutions which affect the functioning of the stock market and 
which have been discussed above. Furthermore, regulations which require disclosure of 
concentrated shareholdings above a certain percentage of a firm's equity capital, prevent 
a secret build-up of a large stock of shares in a company and provide information on a 




  An institution, which can be used to align the interests of shareholders and managers 
is to relate remuneration of managers to the performance of the company (see 0). In 
particular, management stock ownership could generate an incentive for management to 
act according to shareholder preferences. Stock ownership is stimulated by paying part 
of management compensation in the form of stock options (Blair, 1995: 87-92). Stock 
options entail a right to buy a company's shares at a given exercise price at some date in 
the future. At that date the person possessing stock options faces three possible courses 
of action. If the stock price of the company has fallen below the exercise price, the 
manager can refrain from exercising the option. By consequence, the stock option can 
never incur a loss to managers. It provides a skewed incentive in the sense that it 
generates benefits if the share price has risen but does not penalize behaviour which 
affects stock prices negatively. If the stock price exceeds the exercise price, exercising 
the option provides a gain to the manager. The second action is to cash that gain 
immediately by selling the company shares on the stock market. The third alternative, 
not to sell the shares, can be advantageous if the share price is expected to increase 
above alternative returns.  
 
Corporate governance: creditors and managers 
 
By definition, corporate governance institutions do not only pertain to relationships 
between shareholders and managers but also govern relationships between creditors and 
managers (see 0). Before turning to the governance of lending relationships, note that 
according to Hart (1995:  Ch. 6) the existence of debt is part of the shareholders' 
governance structure in companies with dispersed equity capital. If part of the 
company's assets are debt financed, management is forced to use part of the revenues 
from the existing assets to make repayments. Repayment obligations constrain 
management in using these revenues as a source of finance that is completely under 
management control and that might be used to finance managerial empire building. 
Management has to apply to the stock market or creditors to finance new investment 
projects, which enables financiers to screen future projects before granting additional 
finance. 
  A lending relationship itself may give rise to a hold-up problem as well (Van 
Damme, 1994). For instance, management may not use a loan for the purpose referred 
to by application, but instead ex-post finance more risky projects or projects that yield 
high private gains. This problem may result in credit rationing by lenders. Monitoring 
of management by lenders resolves this problem (Diamond, 1984). However, 
monitoring of firms by a large number of small lenders causes private incentive 
problems like high private costs of monitoring and free-rider behaviour. Bank 
intermediation in debt finance is efficient since it resolves some of these private 
incentive problems. Moreover, because the bank diversifies its risk by lending to a large 
number of firms it can offer its depositors a fixed interest on their savings. 
  However, it can be argued that the efficacy and the need of bank monitoring mainly 
applies to lending to relatively small firms (Van Damme, 1994: 21). Usually large firms 
are less susceptible to the hold-up problem. They either can put up collateral and in that 
way reduce the risk to lenders or they possess a number of additional means to signal 
their creditworthiness to potential creditors, like credit ratings or building up a 
reputation in credit markets. By consequence, large firms also directly apply to the 
credit market by issuing securities. 
  If a bank has invested a considerable amount of capital in a specific firm for a long 




whether the long-term relationship encourages a less risk-averse attitude of the bank, 
which raises financing options for management towards projects that carry a higher risk 
but also a higher expected return. Monitoring options associated with the long-term 
relationship provide the bank with an informational advantage over non-monitoring 
competitors. Hence, informational rents motivate banks to perform monitoring activities 
and substantiate the relationship. Management benefits from the long-term relationship 
because it raises long-term financing possibilities and it may offer protection against 
hostile takeovers (Van Damme, 1994: 28). 
  Mutual advantages can turn into disadvantages if power becomes too concentrated. 
The long-term relationship entails the risk that the bank exercises monopoly power over 
the firm. Monopoly power can even lead to a process of adverse selection in which 
strong firms that are good risks do not need the security of the long-term relationship 
and are not prepared to allow the bank to have an informational monopoly. Exactly 
firms that are bad risks are inclined to seek shelter by a bank and pay a somewhat higher 
rate of interest on the loans (Edward and Fischer, 1994:  145). Another undesirable 
feature of the long-term relationship is that occasionally unprofitable projects may not 
be terminated quickly enough. Therefore, long-term relationships between banks and 
enterprises are expected to attract a range of investment projects with a relatively high 
variance but also a relatively higher average return compared to arm's length debt 
financing. 
  Combination of bank lending relationships and ownership of equity by banks can 
have a number of advantages. Firstly, economies of scale and scope can arise in 
information collection and monitoring of management because the monitoring role of 
creditors and shareholders are concentrated in one bank (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). In 
a competitive market economies of scale would lower the costs of finance for 
enterprises. Secondly, according to Stiglitz (1985) the interests of creditors and 
providers of equity are aligned, which reduces the possibility of an attitude towards risk 
which is too heavily skewed in favour of the preferences of one of the two types of 
financiers (Prowse, 1994: 12). The incentive to take large risks with borrowed money to 
benefit shareholders is reduced if shareholders also have debt at risk in the firm. 
Moreover, in times of financial problems conflicts between lenders and shareholders are 
more easily resolved (Kester, 1992: 36).  
  In contrast, some arguments do not favour a combined shareholder-creditor position 
by the same agent. For example, if banks have an equity stake in a company, the 
credibility of a threat to withdraw a loan is reduced since withdrawal would harm the 
bank as well. Hence, the disciplining effect of the lending position of the bank is 
weakened by its participations (Boot, 1994). Moreover, the availability of detailed 
information about the financial situation of the firm in several departments of the bank 
raises the risk of insider trading of the firm's equity. 
 
2.3 Contractual governance: inter-firm relationships 
 
The purpose of contractual governance institutions is to enable firms to invest in 
bilateral relationships, which are beneficial to both parties, and thus to prevent 
expropriation of relationship-specific investments from one company by another 
company. Analogously to 0, 0 presents the actors, their objectives and the relevant 
contractual governance structures. 




The nature of inter-firm relationships 
 
Two main types of inter-firm relationships can be distinguished: vertical relationships 
between suppliers and procuring firms and horizontal relationships between product 
market competitors. Up-stream suppliers of intermediary goods have a market 
relationship to the procuring firm and from that point of view are interested in the 
continuation of the firm's operations to uphold their sales outlets. The market 
relationship raises overall efficiency of production in the supplying and procuring firms 
because of positive incentive effects. 
 
  This relationship can be extended substantially if a supplier and a procuring 
corporation enter into a consultative-cooperative arrangement (Best, 1990). In contrast 
to a market relationship, which concentrates on detailed specifications of standardized 
components and processes in the production chain, a consultative-cooperative arrange-
ment focuses on design and interaction between suppliers and procuring firms. A 
procuring firm does not confront suppliers with detailed specifications of the products 
required and subsequently asks for tenders, but submits the functions a product should 
serve to a supplier together with a considerable amount of technological information on 
the production process in which the product of the supplier has to be incorporated. The 
supplier offers a prototype design and the two firms enter in several rounds of 
consultations until the required product has been developed.  
  Consultation and cooperation with a limited number of suppliers serve several 
purposes for the procuring firm. It enhances learning processes and improves the 
problem-solving capabilities of the firm by exploiting detailed technological knowledge 
of suppliers, which improves product quality and raises efficiency in production. 
Furthermore, the procuring firm in a consultative-cooperative arrangement benefits of 
economies of time. Suppliers who have considerable knowledge about the firm's 
production technology are in a strong position to optimize just-in-time deliveries, which 
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raises productivity. A strong problem-solving capability of the related companies also 
decreases product development times, which is a crucial strategic factor in times of rapid 
technological change or fast shifts in consumer tastes.  
  The supplier can benefit as well from a consultative-cooperative arrangement. Since 
these arrangements generally are of a long-term nature, the supplier can be more 
confident about its future sales potential. Moreover, the supplier can improve its 
technological knowledge base and raise the quality of its products because it learns from 
the technological know-how of the procuring company and from the feedback on its 
prototypes and design given by the procuring company. Improving product quality not 
only is advantageous to the relationship with the procuring firm, but also strengthens the 
competitive position of the supplier on the market.  
  The second type of relationships between companies concerns horizontal 
cooperation between companies.
3 For instance, sometimes consultation and negotiation 
between competitors are needed to establish standards for new products. A stronger 
form of cooperation pertains to coordinated research activity in technology joint 
ventures, which enable companies to share the often large R&D costs required to design 
new products and to benefit from their combined research potential. Firms in technology 
joint ventures become highly dependent on each others' research effort and in that sense 
become mutual stakeholders.  
 
Governance of inter-firm relationships 
 
In consultative-cooperative arrangements suppliers substantially invest in relationship-
specific assets and technologies which are tailored to the needs and specifications of the 
procuring company. By consequence, the supplier raises its stake in the relationship 
since termination of the arrangement will make most of the relationship-specific assets 
unprofitable. Not only the supplier but also the procuring firm becomes dependent on 
the relationship, because it transfers technological know-how about its products and its 
production processes to the supplier and becomes dependent on the technological 
capabilities of the supplier. Investing in the knowledge of the supplier is also costly and 
renders switching between suppliers more difficult. Moreover, in so far as technological 
know-how is confidential, the procuring firm has to rely on the trustworthiness of its 
suppliers. 
  Obviously, the existence of co-specialized assets in the user-supplier relationship 
raises the hold-up problem. In Section 2.1: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., this 
case has been used as an example to explain the features of the hold-up problem. 
Section 2.1: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., also shows that a possible solution to 
the hold-up problem is vertical integration, but that vertical integration eliminates some 
of the high-powered market incentives of a relationship between an procuring firm and 
an independent supplier. Therefore, long-term relationships between companies, 
supported by relational contracts or implicit contracts and partly enforced by reputation, 
may be a viable alternative (compare 0). 
  An analogous argument applies to horizontal relationships between companies. The 
ownership solution to the hold-up problem is a merger of the two partners in the 
relationship, whereas governance of an R&D joint-venture or agreements on product 
standards by relational contracts or implicit contracts support market incentives. 




2.4 Work governance: management and employees 
 
Work governance structures serve a purpose both from the side of management and 
from the side of employees. Managers are interested in monitoring work effort and 
enhancing flexibility and productivity of employees. Employees monitor the way 
management handles their investments in relationship-specific human capital. Again, the 
main objectives of these agents and the relevant governance structures are analyzed. The 
characteristics of work governance structures are depicted in 0. 
 
Objectives of employees and management  
 
 
If workers perceive labour relationships as the market exchange of labour effort against 
wages, they will strive for high wages and low effort. From that perspective, 
management aims at maximum productivity of employees compared to their wage costs.  
  However, the labour relationship between an employee and a firm consists of more 
than merely a market exchange of labour effort against wages. Workers are motivated to 
invest in human capital so as to raise their future market value. Moreover, work 
experience, employee training and worker influence are valuable assets not only for a 
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worker but also for the company. A positive impact on firm productivity arises from the 
ability of workers to handle more complex tasks and from shop-floor suggestions that 
improve production processes or product quality, which surpass the day-to-day work 
responsibilities as incorporated in the labour contract.  
 
Work governance: effort 
 
Assessing work effort of individual workers through monitoring creates a number of 
difficulties (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 403). The contributions of individual members 
to a team can be hard to measure. Furthermore, monitoring can be a costly activity. If 
performance is related to some specific measure, workers can be inclined to devote too 
much of their time to activities related to that measure. For instance, workers may put 
too heavy a weight on quantity compared to quality or devote too little time to 
maintenance. Performance evaluations which are not related to specific measures by 
definition are subjective. Managers often dislike subjective individual performance 
evaluations and may be reluctant to give low ratings to avoid costly disputes. 
  If individual performance evaluation and associated performance pay is difficult and 
costly, more general incentive structures are needed. Prevention of shirking behaviour of 
workers may induce firms to raise the level of wages above the market clearing level.
4 A 
direct way to increase worker engagement with the company is to link compensation to 
the performance of the company by means of profit-sharing arrangements. Theory 
predicts that in a single worker firm profit sharing will optimize work effort (Weitzman 
and Kruse, 1990; Weitzman, 1995). This effect becomes less strong in a firm which 
employs many workers. If part of the income of a group of workers is linked to profits, 
each individual worker faces the option of shirking at the expense of other members of 
the group. Because the contribution of each individual to the profits of the company is 
small, shirking becomes a relatively appealing alternative. This free-rider problem may 
lead to a suboptimal situation in which the work effort of all workers is low. However, a 
long-term relationship between workers reduces the free-rider problem. Besides the 
possibility of some sort of collective shirking equilibrium, mutual monitoring of 
workers by their colleagues can generate an equilibrium in which individual shirking is 
effectively countered and profit sharing raises productivity. In particular, a long-term 
relationship characterized by teamwork, trust and cooperation will raise the likeliness of 
a positive impact of profit sharing on performance of the company through increased 
work effort (FritzRoy, 1995). 
  The use of profit-sharing arrangements is limited by risk aversion of employees 
(Weitzman, 1995: 57). In a period of economic downturn or a drop in sales the fall in 
profits might generate a considerable loss of income, which can be individually and 
socially unacceptable. Hence the optimal profit-sharing contract consists of a mix of 
base wage and profit share. Empirical evidence on the effects of these types of profit-
sharing contracts is diverse and mixed. Yet, on balance it shows that introduction of 
profit sharing raises the productivity level in a company but does not result in an 
increase in the rate of productivity growth (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990: 138; OECD, 
1995b: 160). 
  A specific type of profit-sharing arrangements are employee-ownership arrange-
ments. Because the share price of a company is influenced by its profit performance and 
employees who own shares receive dividends, employee ownership is related to profit-
sharing arrangements. Yet the link is less close since many other factors affect share 
prices. Furthermore, the contributions of companies to employee-ownership 




the link between current income and profits, it generates incentives for employees, 
which are comparable to those of other shareholders.
5 
  Employee share-ownership arrangements, in particular if combined with the 
condition that shares can only be sold after a period of several years, may also 
contribute to the solution of a hold-up problem between management and employees 
related to investment in equipment capital (OECD, 1995b:  157). Investment in 
equipment raises labour productivity, which will increase future wage demands. Before 
management has made the investment it can negotiate a division of rents between 
suppliers of financial capital and employees. However, once the equipment has been 
installed the bargaining position of workers is stronger. Workers can demand higher 
wages for operating the new equipment and appropriate a larger part of the rent of the 
investment. Since management ex ante realizes this danger, it underinvests in equipment 
capital. Employee share ownership makes employees benefit from increased future 
productivity through a higher return on financial capital, which aligns their bargaining 
position closer to that of financiers and reduces the extent of the hold-up problem.  
 
Work governance: human capital investments 
 
Monitoring of managers by workers primarily pertains to the attitude of managers 
towards investments in human capital by workers. Investments in human capital are 
either of a general or a relationship-specific nature. Since workers can easily deploy 
investments in general human capital in other companies, they normally are willing to 
incur the costs of these investments themselves and expect a higher wage rate in return.  
  Investments in relationship-specific human capital are often co-specialized with 
physical capital invested by the firm. Hence, investment in relationship-specific human 
capital makes employees and management vulnerable to the hold-up problem (Blair, 
1995: 252). Consider the case of a training of workers in firm-specific knowledge. Ex-
ante bargaining between workers and management leads to an agreement in which the 
costs and revenues of the training are shared depending on reciprocal bargaining 
strengths. Workers will pay some of the costs of the investment and will receive some of 
the revenues in terms of wages that exceed market wages, often by means of a rising 
wage-tenure profile. If the relative bargaining strength changes after workers have 
completed the training, either workers can threat to move to another firm unless they are 
paid more, or the firm could ex post effectively renege on the promise for higher 
wages.
6  
  Investment in relationship-specific human capital and bargaining over its costs and 
benefits have two main consequences. Firstly, the labour contract, which results from 
the bargain, has many features of a relational contract (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 131). It explicitly specifies a number of distinct agreements, like working hours, 
wage scales, etc. However, often the tasks of the employee are specified in general terms 
only and it is mutually understood that the employer will tell the employee what specific 
acts are required. More importantly, not all the costs and benefits of relationship-specific 
human capital investments can be explicitly included in the contract. For instance, it is 
not feasible to specify in all possible contingencies to what extent an individual worker 
shares the productivity gains from additional work effort or on-the-job learning 
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6 An example is the hostile takeover activity in a number of declining industries in the 1980s. Corporate 
raiders are said to have reneged on implicit contracts with workers to pay high wages in return for firm-




activities in the form of promotion or an extra rise in pay. 
  A second consequence of investment in relationship-specific human capital is that 
bankruptcy of the firm or dismissals because of reorganizations generate a loss to 
employees, which consists of the expected mark-up on future wages. Hence, the return 
to workers on their relationship-specific investments depends on the performance of the 
company. In other words, employees who have invested in relationship-specific human 
capital have a residual claim on the company (Blair, 1995:  238). For an individual 
worker the residual character of this claim can be more important than the residual claim 
of the individual shareholder, because the worker's discounted loss of expected revenues 
on relationship-specific human capital might exceed the loss born by a shareholder. First 
of all shareholders have limited liability, which reduces their residual risks. Secondly, 
shareholders are able to diversify their risks by investing in a portfolio of shares. 
Thirdly, shareholders can easily depart from a company by selling their shares. These 
options are hardly available for a worker who has invested in relationship-specific 
human capital. The worker has all human capital invested in a single firm and looses a 
substantial part of her or his income if the firm is shut down. By consequence, the 
worker has a strong incentive to monitor the management of the company. 
 Worker  participation in decision making is an institutional arrangement which 
supports investments in relationship-specific human capital by workers by providing 
workers with a tool to monitor management. It tackles the hold-up problem by 
addressing its two main consequences: the relational character of the bargain and 
workers' residual claim on the revenues of the company. Worker participation precludes 
unilateral decisions by managers to renege on implicit agreements in relational 
contracts, organizes the flow of information from management to workers and 
strengthens the bargaining position of workers. As such it provides a way to enforce 
implicit agreements in relational contracts and guards the way management handles 
workers' residual claim on the company. 
  In addition, worker participation in decision making can improve managerial produc-
tivity because it restricts managerial opportunism. Smith (1991), in a transaction cost 
analysis of co-determination arrangements, mentions curbing of opportunistic behaviour 
like: arrogating innovative ideas of employees, emphasizing short-term results as a 
productivity signal to enhance managers' upward career mobility, hoarding and misuse 
of information, and authoritarianism. Productivity increases because the quality of 
decision making rises due to the fact that managers constantly have to motivate their 
decisions, because managers plan and organize more effectively, and because 
information flows between management and workers improve (Streeck, 1984).  
  The efficacy of work governance institutions rises if they are combined. Three main 
institutional arrangements enhance the effectiveness of worker participation, viz. profit 
sharing, long-term job security, and group cohesiveness (compare Levine and Tyson, 
1990). Profit sharing and worker participation interact in two directions. On the one 
hand, profit sharing rewards employees for their effort in participation, on the other 
hand participation provides an opportunity to monitor management decisions which 
affect the part of income of employees obtained from profit-sharing arrangements. 
Together with worker participation, long-term job security strengthens incentives for 
workers to invest in relationship-specific human capital, because it raises the probability 
that employees actually obtain future revenues from human capital investments. Group 
cohesiveness manifests itself in small pay and status differentials between employees, 
which supports trust and confidence between workers and managers and spurs effective 
participation. 




2.5 The Anglo-American and German models 
 
The previous sections presented the main concepts used to analyze corporate 
governance, contractual governance and work governance relationships, respectively. 
The various agents, their goals and the governance structures between the agents came 
to the fore. This section takes a first step towards the analysis of stakeholder 
relationships from a national perspective by addressing the characteristics of main types 
of national models of stakeholder relationships using the framework presented in the 
previous sections. Three main categories of models of stakeholder relationships can be 
distinguished, the Anglo-American model, the German model
5 and the Latinist model
7 
(De Jong, 1991; Bishop, 1994; Moerland, 1995; Nickell, 1995). Stylized versions of the 
Anglo-American and German models are used here to set the stage for a more detailed 
analysis of the German and Dutch national characteristics in Sections 3 and 4 of the 
paper. 
                                                           
     
7 Characteristics of the Latinist model of stakeholder relationships are widespread family control, state 
ownership of corporations, large stocks of shares owned by financial holdings, weak disclosure regulation 
and government interference with mergers and acquisitions. To simplify the discussion, the Latinist model is 
not taken into consideration any further. 
Table 1 Characteristics of two stylized models of stakeholder relationships 
  Anglo-American model  German model 
General characteristics market  orientation, 
short-term relationships, 
competition 
inside orientation,  
long-term relationships, 
cooperation 
Corporate governance    
Important shareholders  individuals  non-financial enterprises, banks 






significant for listed companies  not significant, except for firms 
majority owned by individuals 
Creditor control  (threat of) loan withdrawal  share-ownership, monitoring 
Regulation  supports stock market  obstacles to equity finance 
  prohibits bank share-ownership, 
restricts cross holding of shares 
bank share-ownership allowed, 
intercorporate shareholding 
allowed 
Contractual governance    
Relationships  market, vertical integration  networks 
Contracts formal  relational 
Contract enforcement  court  personal reputation 
Work governance    
Labour market  competitive  sizable protection 
Contracts formal  relational 
Work incentives  wages, profit sharing  wages, job security 




  In this section the emphasis is on the distinctive characteristics of the two models. To 
a certain degree, this implies abstracting from real-world realities. Not all US or UK 
enterprises are organized according to the Anglo-American model. In Germany some 
companies may be more close to the German model than others. However, analyzing the 
two archetype models makes it easier to link theories on stakeholder relationships to 
institutions and to assess their impact on enterprise performance. 0 summarizes the main 
features of the models. 
 
The Anglo-American model 
 
Market control and competition characterize the Anglo-American model. In the United 
States and the United Kingdom the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) runs the company as 
highest manager in charge. Shareholders have the right to elect the board of directors. 
Main functions of the board are to select, evaluate and dismiss the CEO and senior 
executives, to review financial objectives and strategies of the company, and to counsel 
top management (Monks and Minow, 1995: 183).  
  Governance of managers by shareholders is a central characteristic of the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance, which has been referred to as the model of 
`shareholder democracy' or `corporate democracy' (Blair, 1995; 68). However, 
possibilities for direct influence are limited. Opportunities for individual shareholders to 
influence management by voice through active participation at the general meeting are 
small and relatively costly in large publicly traded corporations with a highly dispersed 
stock of shares (Blair, 1995: 76). Furthermore, the task of the board of directors as a 
monitor on behalf of shareholders is limited because strong linkages exist between 
board and management, either because the CEO is also chairman of the board or 
because a considerable number of board members are company managers. In 76% of the 
largest companies in the United States and one third of the largest companies in the 
United Kingdom the CEO holds the influential position of chairman of the board of 
directors (Monks and Minow, 1995: 189). The board generally consists of a number of 
executive directors, who are employed by the company, and a number of independent 
non-executive directors. In the United States the number of insiders is relatively small 
and declining, currently executive directors occupy 25% of the seats of boards of 
directors (Monks and Minow, 1995:  203). In contrast, in the United Kingdom a 
substantial percentage, 58%, of the members of the board are executives and 
accordingly part of the company's management (Monks and Minow, 1995: 303). 
  Because of the limited opportunities for shareholders to influence management 
directly or through the board of directors, changes in share prices and takeover threats 
are the main instruments to discipline management. Shareholders use their exit options 
if they do not agree with management strategies or if they are disappointed by the 
performance of the company. Falling share prices signal the necessity for managers to 
improve firm performance. Hostile takeover bids are the ultimate means to replace 
managers. Protective measures against hostile bids are relatively difficult to implement, 
for instance the repurchase of shares by management is tightly regulated and shares with 




  Management stock ownership is a significant element of the Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance. In particular in the United States the recent decade has been 
characterized by increasing use of stock option compensation (Blair, 1995: 92). In the 
United States management ownership of shares in the firms they manage exceeds that in 
other countries (Prowse, 1994: 45). In the United Kingdom management ownership of 
shares is also considerable (OECD, 1995b:  149). Evidence from an international 
comparison of managerial compensation among twelve countries shows that remuner-
ation in the United States is relatively strongly related to performance indicators.
8  
  The regulatory framework in the Anglo-American countries supports the dominant 
position of shareholders in corporate governance (Prowse, 1994: 15-29). For companies 
hardly any legal restriction exists on access to securities markets, which encourages 
equity finance. Moreover, legislation dictates extensive disclosure of accounting 
information to shareholders and puts large fines on the use of insider information in 
stock market transactions. Legislation also prevents the formation of concentrated 
shareholdings, which would reduce the efficacy of the stock market. In particular in the 
United States regulations significantly constrain financial institutions from holding large 
blocks of shares. Banks face the strongest restrictions, because by the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 banks are prohibited to own any shares on their own account (see also OECD 
1995c: 75). Antitrust law is hostile to cross holdings of shares between large companies, 
dividend tax rules discourage these holdings, and securities laws contain a number of 
regulations which restrict investors with concentrated share holdings from active 
involvement in firm policies. 
  The market-oriented character of the Anglo-American model is also manifest in 
contractual governance institutions which pertain to relationships between companies. 
The United States model of contractual governance is characterized by relatively 
extensive vertical integration and formal contracts which can be enforced by law. For 
instance, in the United States automobile industry complex components and 
subassemblies are produced by the main automobile manufactures themselves. A large 
number of suppliers produce parts on a short-term, arm's-length contracting basis. 
Contracts specify in detail the price, quantity and quality of the products purchased and 
the responsibilities of the contract partners (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 131; Kester, 
1992: 28).  
  The United States model is often contrasted as being radically different from the 
Japanese contractual governance institutions. Contracts in Japanese keiretsu are highly 
informal, implicit and long-term. The number of suppliers is smaller than in the United 
States, but supplier-user relationships are of a long-term character and pertain to 
relatively complex components with a high content of technological knowledge and 
design by suppliers. Yet, in particular with respect to contractual governance the stylized 
representation of the national models should be stressed. During the 1980s and the 
1990s many companies in the United States reorganized their supplier relationships and 
adopted many features of the Japanese model (McMillan, 1995: 203, 204, 215). 
 Work  governance institutions deal in different ways with the relational character of 
labour contracts and the existence of residual claims of workers on the company. In the 
archetype Anglo-American model of work governance, workers are promised a fixed 
return on their investment in human capital through wages that exceed market wage 
levels. Labour contracts are relatively extended and detailed in the United States 
(Hashimoto, 1990). The use of profit sharing and employee share-ownership 
arrangements have increased in the recent decade. 
                                                           
     




  In the Anglo-American model workers bear the risk of the loss of human capital in 
the long run. If the performance of the firm weakens and share prices fall, managers 
have an incentive cut costs and lay off employees. Employees have little formal means 
to counter the tendency for dismissal and to monitor the way management handles their 
relationship-specific human capital. In the Anglo-American model worker participation 
institutions are absent (Hepple, 1993; Biagi, 1993). Moreover, long-term job security is 
low and strong labour market competition affects group cohesiveness in a negative way. 
Strong protection of employee rights is lacking (Den Broeder, 1996). Hence, not only 
worker participation institutions are missing in the Anglo-American model of work 
governance, but also institutions that would enhance the positive effects of worker 
participation are largely absent. 
 
The German model 
 
The German model can be characterized by cooperation and long-term relationships 
between stakeholders in the firm. According to Schneider-Lenné (1992) interest in the 
firm as a whole is a key concept of the German corporate culture. Charkham (1994: 10) 
alludes to the values of cooperation and consensus as the cornerstones of the German 
model of corporate governance.  
  The German model is based on a two-tier principle by distinguishing a management 
board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Both shareholders and 
employees are represented on the supervisory board.  
  The stock market plays a relatively unimportant role in the German model of 
corporate governance. The number of listed firms in Germany is about one third of the 
number of firms listed in the United Kingdom and stock market capitalization in 
Germany is low (for more details see 0 in Section 3.1). Banks, other financial 
enterprises and non-financial companies own large blocks of shares of companies listed 
at the stock exchange. Shareholdings are concentrated and block shareholders monitor 
firms through their representation on supervisory boards. Cross holdings of shares, bank 
control of voting rights at general meetings and regulations with respect to the number 
of votes required to replace management at general meetings, make the market for 
corporate control virtually non-existent in Germany. Instead, representatives of the 
relatively small group of shareholders who own large equity stocks influence 
management by voice, to a considerable extent through informal procedures and 
informal meetings. 
  An important aspect of the German model is that creditors, in particular banks, have 
a prominent role in corporate governance. German universal banks both grant loans to a 
firm and own part of its equity. As a ratio to total assets gross debt of non-financial 
enterprises is not extremely high compared to other countries. However, in Germany 
debt mostly consists of bank finance, and in contrast to the United States and the United 
Kingdom securitised debt is hardly used (OECD, 1995a:  92; Prowse, 1994:  31). 
Moreover, some evidence can be found that concentration of debt claims is higher in 
Germany compared to the United States and the United Kingdom (Prowse, 1994: 39). 
  Germany contains a considerable number of firms where a majority of the stock of 
equity is owned by one or a few individuals (Prowse, 1994: 45). This can be explained 
by the fact that in the 1980s and early 1990s a number of family-owned companies went 
public, while the founder or the founding family kept a majority holding of shares in 
these companies. For these companies stock ownership by managers is substantial. 
Corporate governance institutions are not needed because the interest of shareholders 




by individuals, management ownership of shares is low. Moreover, compared to the 
United States and the United Kingdom management compensation is more concentrated 
on basic remuneration (OECD, 1995a:  107). Hence, in particular for large listed 
companies management stock ownership is not a substantial element in the German 
model of corporate governance.  
  While in the United States regulation restricts creditors from holding blocks of shares 
and being active investors, German laws do not impose such constraints. In particular 
the large universal banks are almost completely free to own equity, although specialized 
banks face more restrictive regulation. Germany is characterized by strong anti-cartel 
legislation, but in contrast to the United States competition policy has not been used to 
discourage intercorporate shareholdings. However, German legislation did contain and 
to some extent still contains a number of obstacles which restrict access to non-bank 
sources of finance for enterprises. Until their removal at the end of 1991 authorization 
requirements on issuance of shares and taxation of securities raised the costs of equity 
compared to debt financing (Prowse, 1994: 27). Disclosure requirements are less strict 
and legal requirements make accounting information more relevant to tax policy than to 
the purpose of obtaining a proper insight in the equity value of a company. Legislation 
prohibiting insider trading has only recently been established. Finally, according to 
some authors (Borio, 1990, Prowse, 1994), legal requirements on employee representa-
tion on the supervisory board strongly discriminate against the organisational form of 
public companies, because management opposes worker influence on decision making 
and fears the risk of loss of confidential information.
9 These objections put up a barrier 
to equity financing in Germany. 
 As  to  contractual governance, relationships in German industrial groups are in 
between those in the United States and Japan.
10 Compared to Japan they are based more 
heavily on formal contracts, compared to the United States they are much less formal. 
Hence, where Anglo-American contractual governance institutions can be characterized 
as being largely based on formal contracts and Japanese institutions as being based on 
implicit contracts, German contractual governance is characterized by relational 
contracts (compare 0 and the definitions of types of contracts in Section 2.1: Fehler! 
Textmarke nicht definiert.). 
                                                           
     
9 For more information see the subsection on the performance of the supervisory board in Section 
3.1: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., and 10 on the 1994 German Law on Small Public Companies and 
 Deregulation of Equity Legislation, which aims at increasing stock market access for small and medium-
sized companies.  
     
10 For a description of the main characteristics of the Japanese model of contractual governance see the 
subsection on the Anglo-American model above. 
  In Germany personal reputation forms an important element of contractual 
governance in industrial groups. The group of people who have a seat on the 
supervisory boards of German firms is relatively small and partly consists of members 
of the management board of other companies. This network can be effective to 
disseminate information and impair a reputation in case of opportunistic behaviour 




in German industrial groups are instruments to substantiate long-term relationships 
between companies since they provide means to monitor actions by associated 
enterprises, which makes it difficult to renege on relational contracts. Cross holdings of 
shares also foster long-term relationships by preventing hostile takeovers. By 
consequence, the composition of management teams is relatively stable through time 
and disruptions in trust relationships among management teams of different companies 
are less likely, since there need not be any suspicion that a current partner in secret aims 
at a takeover. 
  The German model of work governance regards employees as one group of stake-
holders in the firm. Co-determination is an essential characteristic of the model. In 
limited liability companies employee representatives hold one third or one half of the 
seats of the supervisory board. The other seats are held by shareholder representatives. 
Thus, employee representatives are in a position to monitor management. Another way 
to monitor management, which is also viable for unlimited liability companies without 
supervisory boards, is through works councils, which have to be consulted on important 
decisions concerning the corporation. Monitoring through co-determination supports 
labour contracts with a larger number of informal elements compared to the United 
States. Hence, analogously to contractual governance institutions, German labour 
contracts can be characterized as being relational contracts. In particular long-term job 
security and institutions concerning protection of employee rights
11 enhance 
effectiveness of worker participation through co-determination in Germany.
12 
 
2.6 Assessment: strengths and weaknesses of models 
 
After reviewing the main features of the Anglo-American and German models of 
stakeholder relationships in the previous section, this section concentrates on an 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the two stylized models. Two main 
assessment criteria are short-term flexibility and long-term orientation. The former 
pertains to the adjustment of factors of production and technology to changing 
circumstances. The latter manifests itself in investment in financial, physical and human 
capital and firm-specific technologies. The discussion is organized along the three 
categories of stakeholder relationships distinguished above: corporate governance, 




It has already been noticed in Section 2.2: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. that in a 
system characterized by long-term relationships between banks and companies 
unprofitable investment projects may not be terminated quickly enough. Moreover the 
disposition towards long-term relationships in the German model of corporate 
governance implies that financial capital is retained in specific projects for a longer 
period of time. By consequence, capital reallocation in the German model is less flexible 
compared to the Anglo-American model (OECD, 1995c: 82). The market-based Anglo-
American model performs better in moving capital out of declining sectors into 
promising new sectors. 
                                                           
     
11 See Den Broeder (1996) for a detailed analysis of labour market regulation in Germany and The 
Netherlands. In this paper the United States is frequently used as a reference case. 
     
12 See the end of Section 2.4: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., for a description of the mechanisms 




  With respect to the Anglo-American model the effectiveness of the market for 
corporate control as a disciplining device for management by shareholders is often 
questioned. Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that in particular shareholders of target 
firms gain from hostile takeovers and that gains to bidding managers are less certain, 
which would reduce incentives to apply takeovers as a disciplining instrument. Nickell 
(1995) cites evidence that rewards to bidding managers are substantial only if the total 
gains of the takeover are at least 30% of the value of the target firm. Hence, 
mismanagement which hampers the value of the firm by less is not disciplined by the 
takeover instrument. Franks and Mayer (1996) empirically investigate the performance 
of target companies in hostile takeovers. Three out of four empirical measures indicate 
that the pre-bid performance of target companies does not differ significantly from 
companies engaged in friendly acquisitions or from companies not engaged in mergers. 
Therefore, on the basis of their empirical evidence Franks and Mayer (1996) conclude 
that the market for corporate control does not function as disciplinary device. 
   Secondly, Pound (1995) emphasises the fact that corporate failure frequently is not 
Table 2 Strengths and weaknesses of two stylized models of stakeholder relationships 
  Anglo-American model  German model 
Corporate governance    
Resource reallocation  quick  slow 
Monitoring management  takeovers partly effective,  
short sightedness 
concentrated holdings effective, 
long-term view 
Technical progress in  start-up firms  mature established firms 
Managerial share-ownership  not very effective  not significant 
Contractual governance    
Marketable technologies 











- market incentives 
- flexibility 




absent (vertical integration) 








Work governance    
Work incentives  high  moderate 
Labour reallocation  fast  slow 
Incentives to invest in human 
capital 
- enforce relational contract 
- monitor management 
- employment stability 
 
weak 
no formal means 







Information flows between 
workers and management 






solved by market power 
reduced 
prolonged 




caused by managerial incompetence or abuse of power but by failures of judgement, 
stemming from general characteristics of human decision making and the way 
organisations operate. The market for corporate control might be effective in curbing 
outright abuses but does not assure effective decision making. The real challenge is to 
devise a system that reduces the probability of well-intended but flawed managerial 
strategic decisions. Hence, it is more effective to improve the quality of the board, to 
shift the focus of the board away from ex-post evaluation towards ex-ante review of 
major decisions and strategies and to encourage investors relations among companies.  
  Thirdly, the takeover mechanism is also less effective in a period of economic 
downturn when funds to finance the takeover are difficult to obtain and by consequence 
the threat of a hostile takeover may not be credible (Prowse, 1994:  65). Fourthly, 
besides being only partly effective, hostile takeovers are a costly instrument both in 
terms of direct costs to launch the takeover and in terms of indirect cost inflicted upon 
the target company in the form of distraction from normal management tasks and of 
turmoil among employees (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). 
  Concerning the disciplining effects of using exit options on the stock market, 
according to Nickell (1995: 32) some empirical evidence indicates that management 
pays too much attention to the short-term in a system with a well-developed stock 
market. In particular short-term behaviour can occur if managers face pressure to put a 
relatively high weight on the current share price by fund-managers of institutional 
investors who themselves are judged on short-term performance. Porter (1992) and 
Blair (1995: 136) reject the argument based on pressure from short-term oriented fund-
managers as theoretically hard to defend and as not being corroborated by the empirical 
evidence. They emphasise the high liquidity of the Anglo-American capital market in 
general as a reason for low monitoring activities and low commitment of shareholders to 
the relationship with managers (see also OECD, 1995c:  83). Instead of supporting 
managers who encounter problems and may need more time, shareholders abandon the 
firm by selling their shares. Furthermore, investors in liquid capital markets do not effi-
ciently use all available information on the strengths and weaknesses of corporate 
investment projects. They only act on summary information like dividend pay-out ratios 
or leverage, but do not take into account the likelihood that strategic investment by 
firms strengthens the market position of the firm in the long run or opens up new 
business opportunities.  
  It should be emphasized that these arguments favouring a short-term orientation of 
shareholders also imply a certain degree of stock market inefficiency (Nickell, 
1995:  23). Investors who take all information into account could make a profit by 
buying shares of firms which future potential is undervalued by the stock market. 
  The institutional characteristics of the German model of corporate governance 
promote a long-term orientation. First of all, the stock market plays a less important role 
in Germany. Secondly, because of the institutional characteristics mentioned in Section 
2.5 hostile takeovers hardly exist. Thirdly, cross holdings of shares and long-term 
relationships between shareholders and firms provide a way to monitor management and 
to obtain information on the long-term potential of investment projects. Hence, on the 
one hand the relationship with shareholders encourages German managers from listed 
companies to pursue long-term strategies and make relationship-specific long-term 
investments in R&D and equipment which can improve the performance of the German 
enterprise sector. On the other hand, the relatively modest importance of the stock 
market reduces the capacity for risk-taking by German enterprises through attracting 
equity finance (OECD, 1995a). Moreover, under the German model investment is low 




research contracts etc (OECD, 1995c). Compared to the market-based Anglo-American 
model which favours marketable assets for innovation, this reduces flexibility in 
directing technological knowledge to new opportunities or shifting consumer 
preferences. 
  Edwards and Fischer (1994) conclude that the existence of economies of scale and 
scope in monitoring by German banks is not supported by available evidence. Concen-
tration of bank representation on supervisory boards is relatively high while concentra-
tion in bank lending to firms is hardly significant because the market for bank loans is 
highly competitive. Representation on supervisory boards does not increase the amount 
of information which can be used for lending decisions nor does it speed up detection of 
financial problems or does it reduce the costs of financial distress or bankruptcy. Hence, 
it cannot be concluded that the German model reduces the cost of capital for German 
enterprises compared to other countries (see also OECD, 1995a: 101). Moreover, lower 
managerial empire building activity under the German system does not so much depend 
on the concentration of the two types of financing in the hands of banks, but on the 
concentration of share ownership as such, since concentrated holdings motivate 
shareholders to monitor management (see also Baums, 1994; Prowse, 1994). The 
empirical results of Gorton and Schmid (1996) corroborate that conclusion. In a 1985 
cross section of 57 of the 100 largest German manufacturing companies, firm 
performance is related to block holdings of all majority shareholders combined, i.e. both 
non-financial enterprises and banks. Neither shareholdings by banks, nor the extent of 
proxy votes exercised by banks exert a separate influence on performance.
6 
  Monitoring of management by owners of considerable blocks of shares, consisting of 
both banks and non-financial enterprises, solves the short-term problems associated with 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. This feature is especially relevant 
for firms in well-established industries with incremental technological change, 
consisting of technological innovations that are incorporated in existing production 
processes. In these companies the risk profile of new investment projects can be 
assessed relatively easy, consensus exists as to the appropriate way to run the firm and 
good governance can assure successful outcomes of investment projects. Risks 
incorporated in these projects are such that firms or banks are willing to put their reputa-
tions at stake by providing equity finance to the firm (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). 
Moreover, these firms frequently own collateral, which can be used to reduce risks of 
bank loans. Firms and banks are less willing to provide substantial equity or debt 
finance for projects of which outcomes are highly uncertain and which therefore carry 
high risks. Also the house bank relationship offers no solution in this case. To the house 
bank the opportunity of future lending possibilities at a somewhat higher rate of interest 
may partly offset the initial default risk (OECD, 1995a: 103). However, at an initial 
lending arrangement the bank cannot be sure that if the firm is successful it will not 
renege on its implicit contract with the bank and turn to other financiers for cheaper 
sources of finance. 
 For  innovative start-up firms with new technologies the risk sharing features of stock 
market finance are well suited, which provides the Anglo-American model with an 
advantage above the German model.
13 Yafeh and Yosha (1995: 22) provide evidence 
                                                           
     
13  Allen (1993) states that the process of debate and exchange of information among a large group of 
stock market investors leads to efficient dissemination of information, implies a checking mechanism on the 
actions of managers and results in the emergence of consensus strategies and risk reduction. In these highly 
uncertain cases monitoring by a limited number of relatively uninformed outsiders, such as bank managers, 




that innovative Japanese pharmaceutical firms tend to rely much less on long-term bank 
and group finance compared to the average chemical firm, but instead opt for arm's 
length financing. 
  Besides stock market finance of innovative new-technology firms, venture capital 
investment firms in the United States are successful in providing funds to these 
companies (Blair, 1995:  278).
14 By investing in a substantial number of high-risk 
companies at a time, venture capital investment firms both spread risks effectively and 
are able to closely monitor the management of these companies. In that way they 
combine the strong points of risk sharing associated with equity finance and the longer-
term commitment of financiers to the firm. Both the stock market and the venture capital 
market in Germany are relatively less developed (OECD, 1995a: 103). Therefore start-
up firms often have to turn to debt finance by banks, which risk-averse characteristics 
and unfamiliarity with new technologies pose a hindrance to the emergence of 
innovative new-technology firms in Germany. 
  A number of arguments exist why the corporate governance instrument of 
managerial stock options, which are used to a significant extent in the United States, is 
not very effective to discipline management. Frequently stock options do not result in 
permanent share ownership because managers cash their options at the moment the 
option expires. This can partly be explained by risk considerations. Managers already 
depend on the firm for their basic wage income and from a risk perspective it may be 
wise to allocate their savings and their non-wage income to other sources. To improve 
its efficacy, the exercise date of stock options can be deferred several years, so that 
during that period income of managers remains contingent on the performance of the 
company. Another reason why a strong impact of stock options on managerial behaviour 
can be disputed, is that the effect of a change in the value of equity that results from 
expenditure on private aims, on the compensation of managers is generally small. In 
such a case the personal cost for a manager to engage in empire building activities is 
small as well (Prowse, 1994: 45; Hart, 1995: 128). Finally, abuses, like re-issuing of 
stock options when the stock price falls below the option price, also make stock options 
a less appealing disciplining instrument for shareholders (Monks and Minow, 
1995: 243). Tax advantages may be an important reason why executives favour stock 
ownership plans (Blinder, 1990: 7). 
 
The discussion above indicates that none of the two models of corporate governance 
performs best in all respects. Risk sharing through the stock market and management 
monitoring and support by investment capital firms create financing opportunities for 
innovative start-up firms in the United States that do not exist to such an extent in 
Germany. When companies mature, the efficacy of the Anglo-American model is 
reduced compared to that of the German model (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). Hostile 
takeovers are a costly and blunt instrument to discipline management. The high liquidity 
of the stock market is a reason for low monitoring activity by shareholders and low 
commitment of shareholders to specific firms. In the German model stable patterns of 
cross holdings of blocks of shares by both non-financial enterprises and banks motivate 
                                                                                                                                                        
through financial indicators, may not be adequate. See also Allen and Gale (1995: 205). However, 
Bhattacharya (1993) raises a number of critical comments on the theoretical and empirical cogency of this 
line of reasoning. 
     
14 OECD (1995c: 82) mentions several other characteristics of the United States 'innovation model' 
which encourage that exploitation of technological opportunities takes place in start-up firms. Examples are 




monitoring of management and encourage long-term relationships between shareholders 
and management. 
  Available evidence does not indicate that German banks obtain considerable 
economies of scale and scope from their combination of equity and debt finance. 
Moreover, restricting managerial empire building activity under the German system 
does not so much depend on the concentration of debt and equity financing in the hands 




The Anglo-American model of contractual governance is characterized by market 
procurement and relatively extensive vertical integration, while the German model is 
characterized by long-term relationships between companies. To compare these two 
models it is necessary to differentiate between marketable technologies and more 
complex relationship-specific technologies (compare 0). Because it is strongly market 
oriented, the Anglo-American model performs well for marketable technologies. By 
definition, with marketable technologies market incentives and external flexibility to 
adapt to changing circumstances are high. A disadvantage of the German model is that 
sometimes long-term relationships between companies take precedence over market 
opportunities (McMillan, 1995: 231). A supplier may have to forgo profitable market 
demand to meet demand by a procuring firm with which it maintains a long-term 
relationship. From the point of view of the procuring firm strong competitiveness 
between suppliers can be cost-effective if supply characteristics do not require large 
investment in relationship-specific technologies. Hence, for marketable technologies 
gains from a long-term relationship are small and a model based on arm's-length 
contracting is more efficient. 
  In the field of relationship-specific technologies the German model of contractual 
governance is stronger. An important reason for the efficacy of the German system is the 
combination of cooperation between enterprises and high-powered market incentives. 
Product market competition between domestic industrial groups and foreign competitors 
is a paramount incentive which prevents cooperative shirking of enterprises that are part 
of industrial groups. Moreover, market competition within industrial groups has not 
been eliminated completely because individual companies have not merged or have not 
completely been taken over. Hence, a strong incentive remains for firms to stay 
competitive and innovative. Yet a complete market-based interaction between firms 
would make the hold-up problem to emerge. Supplementation of market incentives by 
institutions which support relational contracts and implicit contracts, facilitates the 
existence of long-term relationships and investment in relationship-specific assets. By 
contrast, in practice large enterprises can be observed to posses some monopsony power 
vis-à-vis their suppliers, since they sometimes impose substantial price cuts or efficiency 
improvements on supplier firms (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 568, note 14). 
  Another advantage of solving the hold-up problem by an informal long-term contract 
is its internal flexibility to quickly adapt to changing circumstances (Kester, 1992: 28). 
If complex relationship-specific technologies were governed by formal contracts, 
changes in the external environment would necessitate a complex and expensive 
renegotiation of the terms of contract. In extreme cases contract revision might only be 
feasible through very costly lawsuits.  
  Moreover, informal contracts based on reputation reward innovative behaviour. 
High-quality products and innovations strengthen a supplier's reputation, which forms a 




large extent the German model is able to exploit innovative and learning capabilities of 
both the supplier and the procuring firm.  
  Finally, long-term relationships facilitate the flow of information between the 
supplier and the procuring firm (McMillan, 1995). In so far as supplier chains have been 
integrated vertically an efficient flow of information also exists under the Anglo-
American model of contractual governance. However, exchange of information is low 




The highly competitive labour market and the relatively extensive use of profit-sharing 
arrangements in the Anglo-American model of work governance are instruments to raise 
worker productivity and work effort. These instruments are less developed under the 
German model, in particular because less use is made of incentive pay. 
  In the Anglo-American model shareholder pressure to cut costs and lay-off 
employees in times of weak performance of the firm can be a flexible way to move 
capital and labour out of declining industries. However, in periods of a temporary drop 
in activity the pressure for downsizing can destroy relationship-specific human capital. 
Since employees have no formal means to counter the tendency for downsizing, these 
features of the Anglo-American model generate a disincentive to invest in relationship-
specific human capital. In contrast, German co-determination institutions do provide a 
way to enforce implicit agreements in relational contracts and to supervise the 
performance of the firm from the perspective of the residual claims of the employees. 
Hence the German model of work governance can increase incentives for workers to 
invest in relationship-specific human capital by restricting managerial opportunism (see 
also Allen and Gale, 1995: 203).  
  As the primary objective of worker representatives is to protect the position of 
workers within the firm (Koene and Slomp, 1991), it is expected that co-determination 
slackens the adaptation of the employment level to economic conditions. Empirical 
research (Abraham and Houseman, 1993) confirms that the employment level is 
relatively stable in Germany, for example compared to the situation in the United 
States.
15 According to Smith (1994: 308) employment stability is even the main effect of 
a strong works council. Compared to the US model of work governance higher 
employment stability is a disadvantage if labour and capital have to move from 
declining industries to new industries. A positive feature of employment stability is that 
it strengthens long-term relationships between firms and employees. Long-term 
relationships are an additional mechanism to enforce relational contracts and to solve 
the hold-up problem through reputation. 
                                                           
     
15 It is likely that not only co-determination arrangements but also other types of regulation such as strict 
firing rules reduce the responsiveness of employment to output fluctuations. 
  Co-determination stimulates investment in human capital and improves firm 
performance in the long run. Two further aspects can enhance the positive impact of co-
determination arrangements on performance (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Nickell, 
1995:  98). Firstly, co-determination may improve the flow of information and 
knowledge in a company. It provides an option for management to learn from insights of 




to the actual production process. Secondly, work effort and productivity may increase 
because worker participation aligns the goals of workers more strongly with the goals of 
the firm. Workers can be more committed to the goals of the company and work morale, 
job satisfaction and trust in management can increase.  
  Governance of stakeholder relationships concerns the balancing of power of different 
parties. If too much weight is put on co-determination institutions, they may exert 
negative effects on firm performance. Strengthening the position of employees through 
co-determination underscores the need of monitoring worker performance. Reducing 
managerial discretion can increase opportunism by workers. By consequence work 
governance institutions in a human-capital intensive firm have to foster mutual 
monitoring and enhance long-term relationships between management and employees. 
Moreover, co-determination arrangements may entail a loss of short-term flexibility 
because relatively lengthy procedures have to be followed before a decision can be 
taken. Finally, in extreme situations co-determination may have negative consequences 
if a stalemate results from conflicts between management and works councils or 
between workers' representatives and shareholders' representatives in supervisory 
boards. 
 
2.7 Stakeholder relationships and the stylized models in perspective 
 
In sum, sections 2.1 - 2.6 above contain an analysis of the importance of a nation's 
institutions regarding the extent to which stakeholders invest in relationship-specific 
assets; a description of three different types of governance structures; a presentation of 
the stylized Anglo-American and German model; followed by an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two models.
7 This section completes the analytical 
framework by, firstly, taking a short overall view of the main results and, secondly, 
focusing on the use of this framework for the comparison between Germany and The 
Netherlands in Sections 3 and 4. 
  The description of the two stylized models of stakeholder relationships shows that 
the Anglo-American model has many characteristics of a `shareholder society', whereas 
the German model corresponds with a `stakeholder society'. The above analysis argues 
that these features largely follow from differences in national institutions, which affect 
the governance of relationship-specific investments, and not from major differences in 
managerial objectives. Institutions associated with the German model to a larger extent 
support the commitment of managers and other stakeholders to invest in relationship-
specific assets compared to institutions in the Anglo-American model. Hence, under the 
German model's institutions it is rational for managers to take the interests of 
stakeholders into account and to invest in long-term relationships. 
   The assessment of the two models in Section 2.6 (summarized in 0) presents a mixed 
picture. Strong elements of the Anglo-American model, characterized by market 
orientation and competition, are fast reallocation of financial, physical and human 
capital, short-run flexibility and a focus on innovative emerging technologies in 
particular in start-up firms. The German model, characterized by long-term relationships 
and cooperation, is strong on the development of a long-term view, investment in 
relationship-specific physical and human capital, cooperation between companies, and 
promotes technological progress in established enterprises. It also turns out that several 
of the governance institutions are interrelated. For instance, German institutions favour 





  As a result of this mixed picture, superiority of one of the two stylized models of 
stakeholder relationships cannot be established (see also Jenkinson and Mayer 1992: 9). 
Empirical evidence is scarce, since it is very difficult to distinguish the impact of 
stakeholder relationships from a broad spectrum of other factors that affect the 
performance of companies (internal organisation, management style, national 
institutions, educational level of the labour force, etc.). De Jong (1996) reviews the 
performance of large Anglo-American and Germanic companies in the period 1991-
1994 and shows Germanic companies to be stronger on growth of nominal value added 
per worker and employment growth, whereas profitability of Anglo-American 
companies is higher. Irrespective of some methodological considerations,
16 these results 
confirm the above conclusion that the German model is favourable for large established 
companies. 
                                                           
     
16 Some arguments may question the strength of this evidence. Developments at the national level are 
not taken into account and no adjustment is made for differences in price and quantity movements. In 
particular exchange rate movements may blur the results. For instance, Table 2 of De Jong (1996) shows 
that in 1992 nominal value added, measured in ECU, of Anglo-American companies fell by 6%, whereas 
nominal value added of Germanic companies rose by 9%. In 1992 the appreciation of the German Mark 
amounted to 6% vis-à-vis both the dollar and the pound. The entire period 1991-1994 is characterized by 
volatile exchange rate movements (EMS crisis). Hence, exchange rate movements may explain at least part 
of the results. 
        Figure 5  Value added per hour worked in German manufacturing 
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  Another partial piece of evidence pertains to productivity growth in Germany 
compared with that in the United States. 0 shows the process of catching-up of 
manufacturing productivity in Germany in the period 1950-1980. However, when 
Germany approaches the technological frontier productivity growth falls behind and the 
gap with the United States widens. Machinery and equipment, Germany's most 
productive manufacturing sector compared to the United States, overtakes the United 
States in the second half of the 1970s (see 0), but after 1980 the productivity ratio falls 
to levels prevailing around 1970. Van Ark and Pilat (1993) show that the influence of 
capital intensity, skill intensity and composition of the manufacturing sector only 
explain a small part of the productivity gap and conclude that factors of a broader nature 
must cause the difference. The impact of governance institutions on technological 
innovation may be one of them. 
  Recent developments do not point towards increasing importance of one of the two 
models. In general, faster transfer of information generated by the spread of information 
technology reduces the need for relationship-specific technology and skills compared to 
marketable technology and skills (Blair, 1995:  289; Hart, 1995:  53). From that 
perspective the Anglo-American model gains relevance compared to the German model. 
The flexible market-oriented Anglo-American system also is a strong asset in a quickly 
changing environment of enterprises (Hellwig, 1995). Yet, with respect to the core 
technologies of a company relationship-specific human capital and organization become 
ever more crucial to gain a competitive lead. From that perspective management of 
human capital becomes even more important than management of physical assets. This 
explains shifts among some enterprises in the United States towards features of the 
German (and Japanese) models of stakeholder relationships. 
  Governance institutions balance the interests of stakeholders. The risk has been 
emphasized that if the influence of one type of stakeholder prevails, these stakeholders 
may capture returns on firm specific investments by other stakeholders. Too much 
managerial autonomy involves the risk of managers capturing the rents from financiers 
and workers, too much emphasis on shareholder value discourages relationship-specific 
investment in human capital by employees, while giving employees a very large say in 
the firm can be detrimental to financing opportunities. An example of the balancing role 
of governance institutions concerns corporate governance and work governance. Levine 
and Tyson (1990:  219) state that the capital market is inherently biased against the 
participatory institutions of the German model. As another example, both share 
ownership by workers (Blair, 1995: 310) and co-determination arrangements counteract 
the market for corporate control. 
  Interrelations between governance institutions and the regulatory framework which 
supports these institutions, imply that it is difficult or even impossible for a country to 
simply take over institutions from a completely different model. Learning from 
international comparisons and adjusting of institutions in this field may be more relevant 
for countries which are relatively similar. That is why comparing stakeholder 
relationships and governance structures in Germany and The Netherlands is of interest. 
To properly perform this analysis a closer look at institutional details is needed, which 
also enables a further step away from the stylized models towards real-life institutions. 
The framework developed here is meant to serve as a background for this comparison in 
Sections 3 and 4. These sections concentrate on corporate governance and work 
governance, because most institutional differences between Germany and the 








From a broad international perspective, the Dutch model of corporate governance 
resembles the German model described in Section 2.5. In both countries the supervisory 
board monitors management in large limited liability companies. As in Germany, the 
basic philosophy behind the tasks and responsibilities of the Dutch management and 
supervisory board emphasizes cooperation and a holistic view on the firm (Charkham, 
1994; Iterson and Olie, 1992). Management boards in both countries operate as a team 
of equals, carry a shared responsibility, and strive for consensus. 
  However, a closer look reveals that German and the Dutch institutional arrangements 
differ significantly. To analyze these differences this section is structured along the lines 
depicted in 0. Section 3.1 explores the specific institutional arrangements that allow 
shareholders to control management. Section 3.2 analyzes governance structures applied 
by creditors. Section 3.3 turns to the specific role of Dutch pension funds in corporate 
governance. Section 3.4 concentrates on the market for corporate control. Section 3.5 
deals with two institutions affecting stock market performance: first, regulations on 
insider dealing and second, accounting rules. Finally, Section 3.6 assesses the strengths 
and weaknesses of corporate governance institutions in Germany and the Netherlands. 
As a point of reference, 0 surveys the main features of these institutions. 
 
3.1 Relationships between shareholders and management  




This section starts by describing institutional arrangements that allow shareholders to 
govern management in Germany and The Netherlands. Subsequently, it reviews the 
scant empirical information on the division of the enterprise sector with respect to type 
of business organization so as to delineate the part of the enterprise sector to which these 
institutional arrangements apply. Furthermore, it presents empirical information on the 
ownership structure of shareholdings and briefly reviews management compensation. 
Table 3 Overview of corporate governance in Germany and the Netherlands 
  Germany  The Netherlands  









type of company (before 1994) 
election 
fixed quota for shareholders' 
and workers' representatives 
 





- important  shareholders 
- concentration 
 
non-financial enterprises, banks 
concentrated 
 
foreigners, pension funds 
dispersed 
Managerial shareholdings  not significant  recently increasing 
Creditor control    
Bank shareholder position 
-  extent of shareholdings 





substantial, partly linked to 
share ownership of banks 
banks' share ownership  
allowed 
 
small, but increasing 
substantial, not linked to banks' 
share ownership 













proposed new system, run by 
independent organization 
Pension funds' control    
Shareholdings  small  moderate, strongly increasing 
Activism  negligible  supports shareholder position 
Hostile takeovers    
Frequency minimal  minimal 
Anti-takeover defences  concentrated shareholdings, 
75% majority at the general 
meeting required to replace 
supervisory board 
structural model (partly), 
preference shares, priority 
shares, depositary receipts, 
binding nomination  
Current developments  no change in regulation  regulation to lower defences 
Specific regulations    
Insider dealing  strongly prohibited since 1994  prohibited since 1989 
Accounting 
- main  objective 
- international  orientation 
 
comply to tax rules 
low 
 
company's financial position 




The final subsection addresses the performance of the supervisory board in Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
 
German governance institutions 
 
The German model of corporate governance is based on a two-tier principle by 
distinguishing a management board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
(see Section 2.5). This model applies to all public companies (AG, Aktiengesellschaft) 
founded before 10 August 1994, to public companies with more than 500 employees 
founded after 10 August 1994, and to private limited liability companies (GmbH, 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkte Haftung) with more than 500 employees (see also 9). The 
different position of public companies founded before and after 10 August 1994 is due 
to the 1994 Law on Small Public Companies and Deregulation of Equity Legislation. 
This law removed the difference between public and private limited liability companies 
with less than 500 employees in order to improve the access of small companies to 
stock-market finance (see 10). Private limited liability companies with less than 500 
employees generally have a managing director, who is directly responsible to share-
holders. Yet private limited liability companies are free to install an advisory board 
(Beirat). The advisory board can exert shareholder control. However, in practice it tends 
to provide primarily advisory and supporting services to the manager/owner of the 
company (Kaen and Sherman, 1993).  
Box 1  Types of business organization 
Three main types of business organization are limited liability companies, 
partnerships and sole proprietorships (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 72-83). Sole 
proprietors and members of partnerships face unlimited liability for the debt of 
the business. Sources of finance for these types of organizations are equity from 
the owners or from retained earnings of the business and external finance 
through indebtness. Shareowners of limited liability companies can lose only the 
amount they invested in the company. Hence, by reducing the individual risk, 
limited liability companies can access a larger pool of finance. 
    Limited liability companies can be subdivided into public and private 
companies. By law, owners of private companies control the transfer of owner-
ship, for instance they may keep it within a family. In contrast, shares of a public 
company can be transferred freely. However, this does not mean that all public 
companies are listed at the stock exchange. The law provides only an option for a 
public company to turn to the stock exchange for equity financing. For several 
reasons, current shareholders may prefer not to trade shares or to trade shares 
only in private. Attracting capital through the stock exchange can be too 
expensive for relatively small companies. Applying for a listing is also of little use 
for companies that are complete subsidiaries of foreign enterprises. 
    By definition, only public companies can issue shares that are traded at the 
stock exchange. Private limited liability companies normally do not issue shares. 
If share certificates of private limited liability companies exist they are generally 
not freely tradable. For instance, both in Germany and the Netherlands transfer 
of registered shares of private limited liability companies requires a notarial act 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 79; Slagter, 1994: 331). Registration at a notary is 
obligatory for fiscal reasons and to prevent abuse of the legal rights applying to 




  The size and composition of the supervisory board depends on the number of 
workers a company employs (see also Section 4.1 on German co-determination 
institutions, in particular 0). In companies with less than 2000 employees, two thirds of 
the seats of the supervisory board are assigned to shareholders' representatives and one 
third of the seats to employees' representatives. In companies employing over 2000 
workers,
8 seats are divided evenly over shareholders' and workers' representatives. 
Shareholders' representatives elect the chairman of the supervisory board. In case of a 
voting deadlock the chairman has a casting vote. Accordingly, the interests of share-
holders prevail in the rare case of a severe conflict between shareholders' and workers' 
representatives.
17 
                                                           
     
17 This right is laid down in the 1976 Codetermination Act. The only exception to this rule are 
companies in the coal and steel sector (Streeck, 1984: 401). The earlier 1951 Codetermination Act obliged 
supervisory boards of these companies to coopt an additional member to prevent a deadlock of votes. 
Box 2  The German Law on Small Public Companies and Deregulation 
f Equity Legislation 
The German Law on Small Public Companies and Deregulation of Equity 
Legislation aims at increasing access to stock market finance for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and to ease the transfer of ownership of firms 
currently owned by the founder or by families to successors and the transfer of 
management of these firms to professional managers (see Deutscher Bundestag, 
1994a and 1994b; Blanke, 1994; Lutter, 1994). In the coming years the latter 
transfers will have to take place in many German SMEs because the founders or 
current owners / managers will retire. Separation between ownership and 
management can be very attractive if no successor with sufficient management 
capabilities can be found or if successors who inherit ownership rights want to 
diversify their wealth by selling part of these rights.  
    To reach these aims, the legal form of a public limited liability company 
(AG) has been made more attractive to SMEs. The law contains a number of 
deregulation measures that reduce the regulatory burden on SMEs if they opt for 
becoming a public company instead of a private limited liability company 
(GmbH). The number of people needed to found a public company has been 
reduced from five to one. The right of the general meeting of shareholders to 
determine the distribution of profits has been enlarged for unlisted public limited 
liability companies. Formalities associated with convening and administration of 
the general meeting have been simplified. Increases of equity capital of the 
company by 10% or less do no longer require extensive procedures to take into 
account claims of current equity owners.  
    Besides deregulation of equity legislation, the law has eliminated the 
difference between public and private limited liability companies with less than 
500 employees with respect to co-determination legislation and the two-tier 
system. Public companies with less than 500 employees founded after 10 August 
1994 are no longer required to install a supervisory board with a specified 
number of employee representatives. Because the situation for companies founded 
before that date does not change, the legal adjustments will only gradually 
manifest themselves. These adjustments in co-determination requirements are 
regarded as important measures to remove obstacles for SMEs to opt for the legal 
form of a public company. In the past frequently the German criteria have been 
regarded as discriminating against the organisational form of a public company, 
in particular for small and medium sized enterprises (Borio, 1990; Lutter, 1994; 




  The supervisory board exerts control over management. The tasks of the supervisory 
board are to monitor the financial conditions of the company, usually on a quarterly 
basis, to ratify important investment decisions and acquisitions, to approve the annual 
profit-and-loss statement and balance sheet, and to approve dividend pay-outs. The 
chairman of the supervisory board is usually informed and consulted by the 
management at least once a month (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 210). Moreover, in 
large public companies, the supervisory board appoints members of the management 
board (Charkham, 1994: 22) and dismisses them for a major cause, like neglect of duty 
or loss of confidence (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 191). In private limited liability com-
panies, in contrast, the general meeting of owners rather than the supervisory board has 
the right to appoint and dismiss managers (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 79). 
  Despite these rights and duties, management typically does not feel unduly con-
strained by the supervisory board (see Lane, 1992: 78). The board does not posses a 
right of initiative: it can not impose alternative strategies on the management board. 
Moreover, a number of important management decisions are often not presented to the 
supervisory board. According to Gerum et al. (1988), only in less than 20% of the 281 
large public companies the supervisory boards must approve the general product or 
market strategy or investment finance plans. Finally, in 86% of the companies the 




  0 gives an impression of the number and size of the various types of enterprises in 
Germany. Limited liability companies account for a relatively small share of German 
companies: 46.6% of total turnover is produced by limited liability companies. In the 
United Kingdom, by contrast, approximately 75% of private sector GDP is produced by 
Table 4 Different types of business in Germany and the Netherlands 











 mld DM/ƒ   % 
Western Germany 
Unlimited liability  - 46. 53.4 -
Total limited liability  468 466.100
.
54. 100. 46.6 100. 362.6 100.
- of which private  465 660. 99.
4
40. 74. 25.5 55. 208.5 58.
- of which public  2 806. 0.6 14. 26. 21.1 45. 154.1 42.
 
Listed public companies
d 486. 0.1 - 10.5 23. -




Unlimited liability  - 43.
g - -
Total limited liability  97 577.100
.
57.
g 100. - 100. 349.4 100.
- of which private  96 909. 99.
3
41. 72. - 72. 216.8 62.
- of which public     668. 0.7 16. 28.  - 28. 132.6 38.
 
Listed public companies
h 140. 0.1 - -   -
Upper limit two tier system
i 806. 0.8 21. 37. - 48. 250.2 72.
Two tier system present
j 583.
 
a Source: Germany, 1991, Statistisches Bundesamt (1994);  Netherlands, 1993, Statistics 
Netherlands (1995) and additional material supplied by Statistics Netherlands. 
b Source: Germany, 1987, Statistisches Bundesamt (1994) Unternehmen und Arbeitsstatten; 
Netherlands, see note 
a. 
c Source: Germany, 1986, Edwards and Fischer (1994: 75, Table 4.1). Data for 1992 in 
Statistisches Bundesamt (1995) largely confirm these figures: 30% (compared with 25.5% in 
the table) of turnover is produced in private limited liability companies and 20% (21.1% in 
table) in public limited liability companies.; Netherlands, see note 
a. 
d  Source: Germany, 1986, Edwards and Fischer (1994: 87) 
e  Source: Germany, 1981, Streeck (1984) 
f  Source: Germany, 1986, Edwards and Fischer (1994: 83) 
g  Source: Netherlands, 1993, Rough estimate based on CPB (1995: 217) 
h  Source: Netherlands, 1993, Statistics Netherlands (1994) 
i  Companies with subscribed capital at least 25 million guiders and at least 100 employees. 
Upper limit because companies without works council and companies exempted from 
structural model also included. Source: Netherlands, 1993, additional material supplied by 
Statistics Netherlands. 
j Structural limited liability companies. Source: 1992, Information from the Netherlands 




limited liability companies (Edwards and Fischer, 1994:  84). Among the group of 
limited liability companies the number of public companies is relatively small. 
However, their contribution to turnover and equity capital is relatively large. In 1986 
turnover of public companies amounted to 21% of total turnover in Germany, 
approximately half of it being produced by listed companies. Also the employment 
share of public companies is considerable. Companies for which the German two-tier 
system is mandatory, i.e. public and large private limited liability companies, are 
estimated to produce 30% of total turnover.  
 
Dutch governance institutions 
 
Two main types of models can be distinguished in the Netherlands: the structural model 
and the common model. The structural model is mandatory for large public and private 
limited liability companies, which are therefore called structural limited liability 
companies. The 1971 law specifies three criteria to define these companies: a subscribed 
capital of at least 25 million guilders, at least 100 employees employed in the 
Netherlands, and the presence of a works council in the company (Honée, 1986; Voogd, 
1989; Rietkerk, 1992, Van het Kaar, 1995). Subsidiaries of a holding company that fulfil 
the three criteria are exempted from the structural model if the holding company itself is 
governed by the structural model. 
  Four main features characterize the structural model (compare 0). Firstly, the 
presence of a supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen) is obligatory. In contrast to 
the German situation, its members are appointed by cooption, i.e. members of the seated 
supervisory board elect new members. Both the general meeting of shareholders and the 
works council can propose or reject new members of the supervisory board. Only a legal 
procedure can overrule objections by the general meeting or the works council against 
Table  5  Responsibilities of the supervisory board and the general meeting of 
shareholders in the Dutch structural and common model 
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Appointment management board  supervisory board  general meeting 










Approval major decisions  supervisory board  company statutes: general 
meeting or supervisory board 
 
a  For additional information on binding nomination see the description of Dutch anti-takeover 
defences in Section 3.4. 
b Determination of the annual statement of accounts entails the right to adjust its contents, 
approval is restricted to integral acceptance or rejection. 




proposed members of the supervisory board (Koene and Slomp, 1991: 48-50; Honée, 
1986: 9). The management board (Raad van Bestuur) merely has a right to propose new 
members. In practice, however, the influence of management on the composition of the 
supervisory board is considerable (Van der Knoop, 1991: 150; Van het Kaar, 1995: 16). 
Secondly, members of the management board are appointed and, for major causes, 
dismissed by the supervisory board. Yet, also with respect to appointments of new 
members of the management board the influence of current management is substantial 
(Van der Knoop, 1991:  83). Thirdly, the supervisory board determines the annual 
statement of accounts, which however requires approval by the general meeting of 
shareholders (Voogd, 1989:  247). Fourthly, the supervisory board ratifies important 
managerial decisions, like share issues, major investment projects, mergers and 
acquisitions or significant restructuring processes.  
 A  mitigated form of the structural model applies to companies that, while fulfilling 
the three criteria, are majority owned by foreign enterprises. If at least 50% of the shares 
of a Dutch company is owned by a company where a majority of employees works 
abroad, the mitigated structural model applies (Voogd, 1989: 245; Slagter, 1994: 332). 
These companies must still have a supervisory board. Its members are also appointed 
through cooption. However, the competencies of the board are more limited. In 
particular, the general meeting of shareholders rather than the supervisory board 
appoints and dismisses members of the management board and determines the annual 
statement of accounts. The mitigated model ensures a sufficient degree of control for 
foreign companies over their Dutch subsidiaries. 
  Dutch legislation allows companies that do not meet the legal criteria, to voluntarily 
adopt the structural model. A company can opt for the full structural model, the 
mitigated structural model or elements from one of these models.  
 The  common model applies to all other limited liability companies. Here, the 
presence of a supervisory board is voluntary. If a supervisory board is present, its 
competencies are confined to ratifying important managerial decisions: the general 
meeting of shareholders appoints both the members of the supervisory board
18 and the 
management board and also determines the annual statement of accounts. In 1994, 24% 
of a sample of 755 private limited liability companies with 50 - 1000 employees had 
voluntarily installed a supervisory board. The average size of the board was 2.8 seats 
and the main motive for installing a supervisory board was the need for expert advice 
(GITP, 1994). 
  0 shows that the distribution of number of companies, employment and equity 
capital is largely similar in Germany and the Netherlands. The share of public 
companies in turnover is higher in Germany. In 1992, the Dutch structural model 
applied to 583 companies, which consisted of 273 public companies and 308 private 
limited liability companies. To put this number in perspective, 0 presents data on the 
number of companies with a subscribed capital of at least 25 million guilders and at 
least 100 employees employed in the Netherlands. These data indicate that companies 
for which the structural model is potentially relevant are relatively large compared to the 
total of Dutch public companies: the ratio of turnover shares (48/28) exceeds the ratio of 
the number of companies (806/668). Yet, their share in employment and turnover falls 
short of comparable figures for German companies. 
                                                           
     




  In the Netherlands internationalisation causes the mitigated structural model to gain 
importance as opposed to the structural model. According to Corporate Governance 
Committee (1996: 36), in the Netherlands the structural model applies to 64% of the 
public companies listed at the stock exchange. This at first sight low percentage can be 
explained by the fact that holding companies with the majority of employees working 
abroad are exempted from the structural ordering. However, for Dutch subsidiaries that 
fulfil the three criteria the structural model again applies if the holding is Dutch but not a 
structural company. For instance, the holding company of Philips (NV Gemeen-
schappelijk Bezit van Aandeelen Philips' Gloeilampenfabriek) is a common public 
company that is listed at the stock exchange, while the Dutch subsidiary (Philips 





The ownership structure of shares yields further insights about the influence of share-
holders. 0 presents key indicators on shareholdings in Germany, the Netherlands, and, as 
countries of reference, the United Kingdom and the United States. This table reveals that 
the German stock market is relatively small. The number of listed companies per $ of 
GDP in the United Kingdom is nearly six times as high as in Germany. The 
Table  6  Shareholdings in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States 




Domestic listed companies, 1993     
-number
a 664. 140. 1927.  6098. 
-number per billion $ of GDP  0.35 0.45 2.04  0.97 
-capitalization, % of GDP
a 25.1 61.5 132.4  83.5 
-percent of total turnover
b 10.6 - 30.5  - 
Ownership of shares
c  percentage 
-households 16.6 20.0 17.7  50.2 
-non-financial enterprises  38.8 9.6 3.1  14.1 
-banks 14.2 0.7 0.6  0.0 
-investment funds  7.6 1.5 9.7  5.7 
-pension funds  1.9 7.9 34.2  20.1 
-insurance companies  5.2 5.5 17.2  4.6 
-government 3.4 0.0 1.3  0.0 
-foreign 12.2 54.8 16.3  5.4 
Share of largest shareholder
d  percentage of largest firms 
 > 25%  85. - 13.  - 
 > 50%  57. 22. 6.  - 
 > 75%  22. - 1.  - 
 
a  Source: CEPS (1995: 7). 
b  Source: Germany and the United Kingdom 1986, Edwards and Fischer (1994: 86, 87). 
c  Source: Germany, 1993, Deutsche Bundesbank (1994: 68, 69) and CEPS (1995: 31, 32); the 
Netherlands, 1993, CPB extension of Swank et al. (1989); United Kingdom, 1993, CEPS 
(1995: 13) and OECD (1995c: 88); United States, 1990, Prowse (1994: 21). 
d Source: Germany and the United Kingdom, Franks and Mayer (1993); the Netherlands 
Cantrijn et al (1993: 47). 
        Figure 6  German  largest  100  enterprises  distributed  by  the  percentage  of 
shares owned by other enterprises among the largest 100 
0




corresponding ratio between the United States and Germany equals about three. 
Comparison of stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP yields the same 
picture. Measured in terms of turnover, listed companies are three times more important 
in the United Kingdom than in Germany.  
  0 shows that also the ownership structure of shareholdings differs considerably 
between the four countries. The United States stands out as the country with the highest 
percentage of shares owned by households. The percentage of shares owned by 
insurance companies and pension funds in the United Kingdom exceeds that in the 
Netherlands and especially that in Germany. Share ownership of Dutch pension funds is 
increasing. Therefore Section 3.3 pays more attention to the corporate governance role 
of institutional investors. 0 shows also the relatively large shareholdings by banks and 
cross holdings between non-financial enterprises in Germany. Accordingly, companies 
and banks are represented on each others' supervisory boards. 
  The relatively high concentration of shareholdings strengthens the influence of banks 
and non-financial enterprises in Germany: In 57% of the 180 largest German 
companies, the largest shareholder owns more than 50% of the shares. With a 
corresponding figure of 22%, shareholdings in the Netherlands are less concentrated, 
while in the United Kingdom shareholdings are widely dispersed. 0 presents additional 
information on the cross shareholdings among the largest 100 enterprises in Germany in 
1992. In 46 out of the largest 100 German companies, part of the stock of shares issued 
by that company is in the hands of banks or other non-financial companies belonging to 
the same group of 100 largest companies. In 11 of these 46 companies shareholdings of 
other large companies are relatively small. They do not exceed 10% of the stock of 
shares. Yet, for a substantial number of companies (24) the percentage of shares in the 
hands of other large companies lies in the range of 20% to 50%. Four companies are 
almost completely owned by other companies from the largest 100. 
 
The performance of the supervisory board 
 
The supervisory board has to be consulted on important decisions like major invest-
ments, mergers and acquisitions, it can intervene in times of a financial crisis or a 
confidence crisis in the management board, and it appoints and, if necessary, dismisses 
members of the management board. In this respect the German and Dutch models have 
much in common. However, several substantial differences can be identified as well, 




  Both in Germany and the Netherlands the performance of the supervisory board is 
under discussion. The discussion in the two countries pertains to weaknesses of different 
institutional arrangements, in particular the co-determined supervisory board in 
Germany and cooption of members of the supervisory board in the Dutch structural 
model. Yet, to some extent the discussion suggests comparable remedies. These 
remedies do not aim at completely abolishing or replacing the institutions, but instead 
aim at moderate institutional adjustments and at improving the functioning of the board, 
in particular by enhancing information flows between management and supervisory 
board. 
  Some recent developments in Germany have initiated the discussion on the weak 
points of monitoring management by supervisory boards. The near collapse of Metall-
gesellschaft in 1994 is the most well-known example (Fisher, 1995), but large financial 
problems with several other companies have also reduced confidence in the ability of 
the supervisory board to adequately monitor firm performance. These experiences partly 
explain proposals to reform the German two-tier system.
19 Yet, proponents of the 
German model emphasize that these incidents are not appropriate to disqualify the entire 
system, since no monitoring system is able to deal with outright misleading of 
supervisors by management.  
  As a result of the large financial problems in some German companies, members of 
supervisory boards are becoming more alert at properly executing their task 
(Goudzwaard, 1994). In the Netherlands, a comparable development is taking place, 
partly also caused by financial crises. In addition, members of Dutch supervisory boards 
increasingly run the risk that they personally will be held liable if a company fails 
because of mismanagement (Tamminga, 1995c). In some recent bankruptcy cases the 
Dutch court has convicted former members of the management board and of the 
supervisory board for mismanagement. The conviction creates opportunities for 
aggrieved shareholders to submit claims for compensation.
20 In several other cases 
                                                           
     
19 At the same time the Anglo-American model features some opposite tendencies. Crises in some 
Anglo-American companies (for example: abuse of pension fund capital at Maxwell Corporation; the 
collapse of Barings Bank) have induced reform proposals that advocate a more independent position of non-
executive directors in the board to improve monitoring of management (see also Bishop, 1994). 
     
20 Boot (1995) warns against proposals to further increase personal liability of members of the 
supervisory board, because personal liability encourages risk-averse behaviour of board members. 
Table 7 Presence, composition and tasks of the supervisory board 
  Germany    Netherlands (public, private) 














Presence obligatory  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  no 
Composition elected  elected  elected  coopted  coopted  elected 
Tasks            
- appoint management  yes  no  no  yes  no  no 
- statement of accounts  yes  yes  no  yes  no  no 
- monitor and ratify  yes  yes  advisory  yes  yes  yes 
 
a  Large: over 500 employees. Small: less than 500 employees. 




official receivers decided not to enter a lengthy court procedure, but to agree on a 
financial settlement with the former management board and the supervisory board.  
  An institutional difference between Germany and the Netherlands, affecting the 
efficacy of the board, is that in Germany by law the composition of the supervisory 
board is divided between a fixed number of seats for representatives of shareholders and 
for representatives of employees. In the Netherlands the influence of shareholders and 
workers on management through the supervisory board takes place more indirectly, 
since members of the supervisory board are not elected by shareholders and workers, 
although both parties do have a say in its composition.
21 Moreover, Dutch workers 
cannot become a member of the supervisory board of their company (Van der Knoop, 
1991: 51; Van het Kaar, 1995: 9). 
  Advantages of the co-determined German supervisory board are that employee 
representatives are generally well-informed about developments taking place at the 
work floor, which enhances information flows to management. Furthermore, 
management is able to communicate its views, including unpopular measures, to 
employees more effectively (Schilling, 1994). However, critics also state several 
disadvantages. Firstly, in their statutes a number of companies have reduced the 
responsibility of the supervisory board to the legal minimum in order to limit the 
influence of worker representatives, in particular of union members (Schröder, 1995). 
Moreover, executives from other companies or from banks, who occupy a seat on a 
supervisory board as shareholder representative, regard the managers of the companies 
as their peers. Therefore, they do not like to criticize the management in front of 
employee representatives and do not raise controversial issues. Instead, some 
shareholder representatives use informal meetings with managers to discuss 
controversial issues. Another reason for not raising controversial issues is the risk of 
dissemination of confidential information. According to answers given by members of 
supervisory boards, scientists and politicians to a questionnaire about the functioning of 
supervisory boards, employee representation entails a risk of loss of confidentiality of 
information presented to the board (Schilling, 1994). These reasons also explain why 
meetings of the supervisory board in Germany are often characterized by the absence of 
debate and by consensus; the subjects brought before the board are hardly ever 
controversial.  
  A specific feature of the supervisory board in the Netherlands concerns the system of 
cooption of members of the board. The fact that members of the supervisory board are 
appointed by cooption and not elected by the general meeting of shareholders limits the 
powers of shareholders through the general meeting (Rietkerk, 1992). The expression 
that the efficacy of corporate governance institutions significantly depends on the 
people that administer these institutions (Schneider-Lenné, 1995), in particular applies 
to the Dutch model. Cooption largely shields the Dutch supervisory board from 
influences outside the company. In well-managed companies, members of the 
supervisory board and directors recognize the necessity of a competent supervisory 
board. Therefore, they look for capable candidates to fulfil a vacancy on the board. 
Moreover, the quality of the present board constitutes an incentive for capable people to 
agree to join the board. However, in companies with an incompetent supervisory board, 
which primarily aims at not disturbing the status-quo with management, members of the 
                                                           
     
21 At the end of the 1970s left-wing political parties proposed the introduction of joint representation of 
employees and shareholders on Dutch supervisory boards comparable to the German system. In 1984 a 
majority of the Dutch Social Economic Council opposed these ideas. They have never resulted in an 




board will select congenial candidates.
22 These arguments indicate that as a result of 
cooption the Dutch supervisory board may be of less uniform quality compared to 
Germany: both at the lower end and at the upper end the mass of the Dutch distribution 
may exceed that of the German distribution.  
  Cooption may, furthermore, increase risk-averse behaviour of companies (Boot, 
1995), because the Dutch model puts too much weight on disciplining management by 
creditors. By selecting relatively unrisky strategies, management will try to reduce the 
risk of loosing control to creditors in case of financial difficulties. If members of the 
supervisory board too closely identify themselves with management or are too little 
involved in the companies' strategies, incentives to oppose risk-averse behaviour are 
small. 
  As a final difference members of the management board in Germany are appointed 
for a limited period of usually five years (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 191), while in the 
Netherlands appointments generally are permanent (Iterson and Olie, 1992: 101). This 
feature makes it slightly more easy to dismiss German managers. 
 
German and Dutch participants in discussions on the performance of the supervisory 
board have suggested various possibilities for reform.
23 Most of these do not entail 
substantial adjustment in legislation. Instead, proposals for reform require changes in 
company practice and call for modest institutional adjustments. Although they state that 
employee representation weakens the control function of the supervisory board, German 
critics do not want to abolish the institutional model of employee representation on the 
supervisory board. After the difficult and lengthy political struggle in the 1970s to 
introduce the co-determined supervisory board, most participants in the debate consider 
abolishing it politically infeasible.
24  
  Boot (1995) proposes to adjust the nomination procedure for members of the 
supervisory board in the Netherlands, so as to increase stakeholders' influence on the 
board's composition. According to Boot's proposal a selection committee nominates 
members for 60% of the seats on the supervisory board, the other 40% of the members 
is elected by cooption. Shareholders, employees and possibly other stakeholders elect a 
fixed number of their representatives in the selection committee. The selection 
committee has to make a unanimous nomination, so that conflicts of interest between 
stakeholders must be solved in the selection committee. Partial cooption, for 40% of the 
seats, enables the supervisory board to elect a number of independent outside experts. In 
addition, Boot (1995) puts forward the option to increase the responsibility of the 
selection committee by making elected members of the supervisory board accountable 
to that committee.
25  
                                                           
     
22 Slagter (1993: 196) states: `...The current system has a contrary effect: a member of the supervisory 
board who wants to intervene is looked upon as a rebel and forced to resign. The failing members hold their 
positions whereas they should be dismissed instead of the innovating member.'  
     
23 See Slagter (1993) for a review of an extensive discussion in 1993 about options for reform of the 
Dutch structural model and the papers in De Naamloze Vennootschap 73, december 1995.  
     
24 For the same reason a reduction in size of the supervisory board is also difficult to accomplish. In the 
largest companies the board consist of 20 persons, which is large to reach efficient decision making and to 
motivate individual members to participate actively. Yet, reduction of its size would require adjustments of 
the co-determination agreements, which no one advocates in order to avoid the risk that the entire agreement 
will be called into question. Reducing the size of the supervisory board is also difficult for companies with 
several shareholders with substantial equity holdings, because these shareholders generally expect all to 
occupy a seat on the board. 
     




  Recent policy advice by an independent Corporate Governance Committee (1996) 
does not recommend that the system of cooption needs to be abolished. Rather, the 
committee proposes a gradual improvement of the functioning of the supervisory board 
within the current institutional system, for instance through greater independency from 
the management board, more careful (re-)appointment procedures for board members 
and a more active role of shareholders at the general meeting. 
  A point of attention relevant to both countries concerns the number of supervisory 
board seats per person. If individual members do not take up too many appointments 
and if companies examine the number of appointments upon nomination, a tightening of 
the legal limit on the number of supervisory board seats a person can occupy is not 
necessary.
26 Alternatively, instead of increasing the frequency of supervisory board 
meetings, which most probably will increase absenteeism, improving the quality of 
information flows from management board to supervisory board is more useful. Some 
German authors propose to reserve a part of the seats on the supervisory board for 
independent professionals (Schilling, 1994). Others suggest to abandon the practice in 
some companies that the chairman of the management board is nominated as chairman 
of the supervisory board after retirement (Schneider-Lenné, 1995). 
  In order to improve the effectiveness of the supervisory board's activities, both 
German and Dutch discussants advise companies to install committees such as an audit 
committee, a nominating committee or an investment committee (see also Corporate 
Governance Committee, 1996). An audit committee enhances monitoring of a 
company's financial position by raising the quality of financial information to the 
supervisory board.
27 Generally the audit committee consists of the general director and 
the financial director, several members of the supervisory board, and the internal and 
external accountant (Deloitte & Touche, 1995). The audit committee allows specialized 
members of the supervisory board to increase their contacts with the company's 
accountants. Compared to German companies, more audit committees feature in Dutch 
companies. Yet, there is ample room for improvement. Deloitte & Touche (1995) has 
conducted interviews with 50 members of supervisory boards of Dutch companies. Only 
about half of the interviewed companies has an audit committee.  
  In a nominating committee, members of the supervisory board can discuss the 
quality of the management board on a confidential basis. Subject of discussion in 
investment committees are strategies of the company and major investment plans. 
Investment committees can support the supervisory board to develop a view on the 
strategy and mission of the company. Deloitte & Touch (1995) concludes that Dutch 
supervisory boards generally discuss the financial position of the company, market 
developments and major investments. Identification and control of important strategic 
risks facing the company are less frequently on the agenda. 
  The presence of an audit, nominating or investment committee may alleviate some of 
the problems companies perceive with respect to confidentiality of information 
presented to the co-determined supervisory board. For instance, currently in many 
German companies members of the supervisory board can only consult the accountant 
report at the offices of the company. They do not receive a personal copy because 
                                                                                                                                                        
emerge. The enhanced selection committee will closely resemble a German-type supervisory board, 
including the associated problems of parity representation mentioned above.  
     
26  The Dutch Corporate Governance Committee (1996) also recommends that the number of 
supervisory board seats per person should not be too large. 
     
27 In the United States an audit committee is even required for a company to obtain a listing at the stock 




management is concerned that employee representatives disclose confidential 
information to competitors (Goudzwaard, 1994). Confidentiality is more easily secured 
in a small committee than in a 20 person supervisory board. Yet, to further guarantee 
confidentiality, Schilling (1994) advocates that a company should be able to install 
committees without joint representation. A verdict of the German court currently 




Data on managerial compensation in Germany and the Netherlands are scarce. Section 
2.5: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., concluded that management stock ownership 
is low in German companies that are not majority owned by individuals. The results of 
Abowd and Bognanno (1993) in OECD (1995a:  107) show that in 1992 long-term 
performance-related compensation was negligible also in the Netherlands. According to 
this study, management compensation in the Netherlands, together with Sweden, is 
lowest among twelve countries compared. Compensation of Dutch managers is 15% 
below the German level and even 50% below the level in the United States.
28  
                                                           
     
28 Management compensation in the United States is very high compared to other countries. It exceeded 
the second highest country, France, by 30% and consisted for over 30% of long-term performance related 




  Although differences among remuneration of top-managers in international 
companies are less extreme and the application of stock options has increased recently 
in the Netherlands, information from business consultants confirms that the 
performance-related part of managerial remuneration is still relatively small in Germany 
and the Netherlands compared to Anglo-American countries (Crooijmans, 1995; 
Economist, 1995; Tamminga, 1995b). Together with the experience from the United 
States, discussed in Section 2.6: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., that stock options 
are not very effective to discipline management, it can be concluded that managerial 
share ownership is no significant institution to align interests of shareholders and 
managers in Germany and the Netherlands.
29  
 
3.2 The corporate governance role of banks 
 
Section 2.2:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., addressed the creditor position of 
banks in corporate governance. Banks intermediation in debt finance is effective 
because it resolves the private incentive problem related to monitoring by small 
individual lenders. This argument of bank monitoring efficacy mainly applies to small 
and medium-sized companies. Large companies can put up collateral or can build up 
credit market ratings as signals of creditworthiness. Long-term relationships between 
banks and companies reduce banks' risk aversion, but also raise banks' monopoly power 
and reduce the speed of capital reallocation. Section 2.6:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht 
definiert., argued that in Germany concentration in bank lending to firms is not very 
significant, because the German market for banks loans is highly competitive.  
  From an international perspective, the position of German banks in corporate 
governance is rather special because they combine a creditor and a shareholder position. 
The shareholder position is strengthened by the system of proxy voting, which under 
certain conditions permits a bank to vote at the general meeting of shareholders for 
shares it holds in custody. Partly as a consequence of their share ownership, banks are 
represented on supervisory boards of companies. Section 2.6 concludes that the specific 
role of German banks in corporate governance follows from their shareholdings, which 
add to the concentrated shareholdings among non-financial enterprises. 
  The combination of a creditor and a shareholder position constitutes the background 
for further analyzing the position of Dutch banks in corporate governance and for 
comparing Dutch banks to German banks. Therefore, share ownership of banks, proxy 
voting and supervisory board representation constitute the core of this section. The 
analysis shows that the role and ambitions of Dutch banks in corporate governance 
differ considerably from their German counterparts. Dutch banks currently increase their 
historically low equity investments, but do not aim at active shareholder monitoring of 
companies. Equity is mainly regarded as one of the investment alternatives. In contrast 
to German banks, Dutch banks emphasize their creditor position. 
 
Share ownership of banks  
 
Shareholdings of German banks are relatively large compared to those in other 
countries. 0 shows that in 1993 German banks owned over 14% of the stock of shares. 
Comparable figures are negligible in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and zero 
in the United States, where the law prohibits universal banks. 
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  For several reasons bank influence on non-financial companies through share 
holdings is smaller than the figure of 14% might suggest. Not all of the German banks' 
shareholdings pertain to participations in non-financial companies. A substantial part 
consists of participations in other financial companies such as insurance companies, 
mortgage banks or other subsidiaries. From the total stock of shares owned by banks, 
only 40% are shareholdings in German non-financial enterprises (Schröder, 1995). 
Moreover, public limited liability companies constitute a relatively small part of the 
enterprise sector in Germany (see 0). Including the private limited liability companies, a 
study of the Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (1995) shows that the ten largest private 
German banks in 1994 owned 0.4% of the nominal capital of all limited liability 
German companies. Over time this percentage has fallen from 1.3 in 1976 to 0.7 in 1986 
and 0.4 in 1994. These figures illustrate that the creditor position of banks is most 
important, in particular for the small and medium-sized companies. The relevance of the 
shareholder position increases for listed public limited liability companies. The ten 
largest private banks own 4.1% of the equity capital of the 30 largest German listed non-
financial companies.  
  Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (1995) also shows that in the period 1986-1994 
banks have reduced the size of their shareholdings in individual companies. Equity 
capital of domestic non-financial companies owned by banks, associated with 
participations of over 25%, falls, while equity capital of participations of 10% to 25% 
rises. Banks reduce large shareholdings in individual companies because they aim at a 
better diversification of shareholdings over branches of industry and over countries 
(Schröder, 1995: 12). Reduction of large holdings became interesting after the lowering 
of the threshold, above which double taxation on corporate income from municipal 
taxes and wealth tax can be avoided (Schachtelsteuerprivileg) from 25% to 10% in 
1977. Since 1977, a shift from participations of 25% or over towards participations of 
10% or over has taken place. By consequence, share ownership of banks changed from 
very large dominating blocks towards blocks which are still substantial but to a larger 
extent require coalitions with other block shareholders, if influence on firm policy or 
offering protection against hostile takeovers is desired.
9  
  In 1993 Dutch banks owned 0.7% of the total stock of shares (see 0). Amounting to 
14.2%, the percentage owned by German banks is twenty times as high. To some extent 
Dutch regulation has discouraged share ownership of banks. Firstly, in the past 
regulation prohibited strong cooperation between banks and insurance companies, 
including participation of banks in the equity capital of insurance companies. However, 
in the 1980s these regulations have been liberalized and since then a number of banks 
and insurance companies have merged. Secondly, a banks' participation of over 10% in 
the equity capital of a non-financial company requires approval by the Dutch Ministry 
of Finance, assisted by the central bank.
30 In the decision to grant permission or not, the 
ministry and the central bank judge whether the participation would lead to excessive 
power concentration in the hands of banks. The 1980s also witnessed a relaxation of this 
policy; since then permissions are granted more easily. The focus of Dutch banks on 
trade finance constitutes another reason why shareholdings are relatively small. This 
focus differs considerably from German banks, which have a long-standing history of 
industry finance. 
 
                                                           
     






Although the direct influence of German banks as a result of their shareholdings is not 
strong, the shareholder position of banks in corporate governance is strengthened by the 
system of proxy voting. Usually, owners of shares deposit their shareholdings with a 
bank. These shareholders can authorize the bank to exercise votes at general meetings 
on behalf of them. The purpose of the system is to increase the representation of share-
holders at the general meeting so as to ensure that decisions taken comply with the 
views of the majority of shareholders and to prevent that unstable and random 
minorities at the general meeting strongly influence company policy (Kümpel, 1995; 
Schneider-Lenné, 1992; Schröder, 1995). 
  The scope of these proxy votes can be quite substantial. In 1988 banks themselves 
owned 8.1% of the total shareholdings, while another 53.5% of the total stock of shares 
had been deposited with the banks (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 112). Moreover, 45% of 
the shares deposited with the banks were held by the three German large banks 
(Deutsche bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank). Baums and Fraune (1995) show 
that among the largest firms without a majority owner proxy votes provide banks with a 
considerable voting majority at the general meeting (see also OECD, 1995a: 96). 
  Since many private share owners do not instruct banks as to their voting preferences, 
this voting system seems to justify the conclusion that banks are very powerful by being 
free to vote according to their own insights and priorities. Yet, three qualifications need 
to be made in this respect. First of all, proxy voting does not apply to all the shares 
deposited with the banks. From the 53.5% of shares deposited in 1988, the shares 
owned by non-financial enterprises amounted to 17.5 %-points and the shares owned by 
the government to 4.3 %-points. Since it is likely that large companies and the govern-
ment will instruct the banks as to their voting preferences, the maximum percentage of 
proxy votes directly under the banks discretion diminishes to 31.7%. According to 0, for 
1993 the ownership of shares by households provides an estimate of 16.6% of the stock 
of shares for which proxy voting is relevant. Secondly, concentrated shareholdings, as 
depicted in 0 above, reduce the dominance of bank influence through proxy voting 
among the largest companies, because block shareholders dominate the general meeting. 
The evidence by Baums and Fraune (1995) on large voting majorities of banks refers to 
only 24 of the largest companies. Thirdly, the bank's discretion is restricted by a formal 
procedure on proxy voting that has to be followed. In anticipation of the general 
meeting the bank must inform each depositor on its intended voting behaviour and ask 
for instructions. In case of no response, the bank has to stick to the voting strategy 
outlined to the depositor, except when new information becomes available at the general 
meeting and the bank is convinced that the depositor would have changed her 
preferences. The depositor must always be informed of a change in voting. 
  Despite these qualifications, compared to the Netherlands the viability and extent of 
proxy voting in Germany is remarkable. Proxy voting does hardly exist in the 
Netherlands, although in both countries no legal impediments to proxy voting exist. 
Moreover, in both countries nearly all equity capital consists of bearer shares. Since 
only banks that hold bearer shares in custody are able to contact shareholders, it seems 
natural that these banks administer the system of proxy voting.  
  Differences in incentives or behaviourial characteristics of individual shareholders or 
banks must offer an explanation for the contrast. Section 2.2: Fehler! Textmarke nicht 
definiert., states that incentives are small for individual shareholders to monitor firms 
with a widely dispersed stock of shares. For that reason, an individual shareholder has 




procedure encourages the shareholder to do so. Indeed, deliberate action of shareholders 
to get in touch with the bank and ask the bank to cast a proxy vote hardly occurs in 
Germany. The basic procedure is that some months before the general meeting banks 
approach shareholders, alert them to the possibility to attend the shareholders meeting 
and already include the relevant documents to grant a proxy vote if attendance is not 
preferred. Hence, it can be concluded that the initiative to solicit a proxy vote lies with 
the bank. 
  The soliciting procedure also reduces the efficacy of both the option for shareholders 
to select non-bank representatives and of the 15 month duration of proxy rights, which 
is frequently referred to as a restriction on the discretion of banks (Bundesverband 
Deutscher Banken, 1995; Schröder, 1995). A shift towards non-bank organizations like 
shareholders associations will occur only if these organizations employ comparable 
procedures to obtain proxy votes. However, in general shareholders associations do not 
posses sufficient resources to organise proxy votes. The share of the votes cast by 
shareholders associations in widely held public companies is lower than 0.3% in 
Germany (Baums, 1996). The 15 month limit is not very effective, because an 
alternative procedure can be used, which consists of granting the proxy right for each 
specific general meeting separately (Kümpel, 1995).  
 
What are the motives for German banks to spend resources for soliciting proxy votes? 
Bank representatives argue that they do not adhere to proxy voting at all means, that the 
system is a reflection of the relationship of trust between banks and their customers, and 
that banks provide an important service through contributing to a stable majority at the 
general meeting (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 1995; Schneider-Lenné, 1995; 
Schröder, 1995). Yet, why do banks not charge the substantial services they provide? 
According to Baums (1996: 13), the most important reasons are the lack of shareholder 
monitoring incentives and competition on the market for share custody. The absence of 
shareholder incentives implies that the majority of individual shareholders is not willing 
to pay for the proxy voting services of banks. Competition prevents banks from 
imposing a general surcharge on the cost of keeping shares in custody because 
shareholders can switch to competing banks that do not provide proxy voting services 
and therefore charge lower costs.  
  If imposing costs on shareholders is not feasible, banks could abstain from providing 
these services or they could reduce their proxy voting activities to the bare minimum. 
Some smaller banks indeed can be observed to act in such a way. In contrast, the larger 
banks actively perform proxy voting activities, which suggests that the system also 
contains some advantages for the banks.  
  Baums (1996) suggests three types of benefits to banks from the system of proxy 
voting, which explain why banks would actively engage in proxy voting activities 
without charging costs to shareholders (see also Baums and v. Randow, 1995). Firstly, 
banks can obtain more easy entry to firms to sell financial services. For instance, 
empirical evidence shows that banks with large blocks of voting rights at the general 
meeting to a significantly higher extent are involved in share issue activities of the 
companies concerned compared with other banks. Secondly, proxy votes may provide a 
channel to stronger monitor companies in order to reduce the risk on credit or equity 
supplied by the bank. Thirdly, most of the large banks themselves are public companies 
with widely dispersed equity capital and proxy voting provides the management of 
banks with a substantial voting power on their own general meeting of shareholders.
31 
                                                           
     




For example, voting shares controlled by a bank on its own general meeting were 32% 
for Deutsche Bank, 44% for Dresdner bank, 18% for Commerzbank, 32% for 
Bayerische Vereinsbank and 24% for Bayerische Hypothekbank (Baums, 1996:  14). 
Adding the votes controlled by the other four banks give these five banks a combined 
majority vote at each of their individual general meetings. 
  The advantages of proxy voting to banks and the alleged influence of banks on 
enterprises has sparkled a debate in Germany on reform options for the system of proxy 
voting. Recent reform proposals range from completely abolishing the system to having 
independent agents administer and execute the voting system
32 (see Baums, 1996; 
Baums and v. Randow, 1995). It would take too far to thoroughly review that discussion 
here (see for instance Hammen, 1995; Peltzer, 1996). Some arguments raised against 
reform of proxy voting are that some proposals will be less effective because they 
require additional effort by individual shareholders to get informed on company policies 
or voting proposals by independent agents, that interests of banks and individual 
shareholders do not differ to such an extent that adjustment of the system is needed, that 
a considerable risk exists of a concentration of power by authorized agents and that 
reform proposals are costly. 
 
A reason why proxy voting is rare in the Netherlands concerns the restricted power of 
the general meeting of shareholders compared to that in other countries (De Vijver, 
1980). Under the Dutch structural model the supervisory board is appointed by cooption 
and opportunities for the general meeting to influence the composition of the 
supervisory board are restricted to proposing or rejecting future members (see Section 
3.1). Moreover, Dutch companies utilize a considerable number of anti-takeover 
defences that shield managers from shareholders (see Section 3.4). These restrictions on 
the influence of shareholders on management imply that the revenues of a system of 
proxy voting would be relatively moderate. For the same reason, the risks are also small 
that shareholder minorities at the general meeting affect a company's policy to a large 
extent, which reduces the need for a system of proxy voting. 
  Three recent developments in the Netherlands have induced representatives of 
companies and the Stock Exchange to reconsider the usefulness of a proxy voting 
arrangement. Firstly, Dutch companies, shareholder associations and the government 
discuss proposals to lower anti-takeover defences (see Section 3.4). This will make a 
system of proxy voting in the Netherlands more effective. Secondly, institutional 
investors, which aim at increasing their shareholdings and their involvement in 
monitoring of companies (see Section 3.3), favour introduction of proxy voting in the 
Netherlands. Thirdly, some large internationally-oriented Dutch companies, headed by 
Akzo Nobel and Royal Dutch Shell, advocate proxy voting. Increasingly, large 
international companies turn to foreign capital as a source of finance. Foreign investors 
demand that they are represented through proxy votes. For instance, occasionally the 
Dutch Association of Equity Owners already acts as authorized voter for foreign 
                                                                                                                                                        
compared to proxy votes applying to other companies. Instead of granting the bank a general authorization, 
a shareholder has to inform the bank how to vote on each separate issue on the agenda. If shareholders do 
not explicitly specify their preferences their votes are lost. In practice banks ask shareholders to state their 
voting instructions two or three times if a shareholder does not respond. 
     
32 An alternative suggestion, raised in the United Kingdom and the United States, to oblige institutional 
investors to vote at the general meeting would not be very effective in Germany because share ownership of 
pension funds is low (compare 0). This alternative would be more viable for the Netherlands, although it 
may be doubted whether increasingly activist Dutch pension funds really need a voting obligation (see 




shareholders. Hence, Dutch companies favour proxy voting because it will increase their 
access to foreign capital markets.  
  These developments considerably raise the probability that proxy voting will be 
introduced in the Netherlands in the near future. However, it is unlikely that Dutch 
banks will become as active as German banks in administrating the system. Current 
thoughts involve a system in between the German and the Anglo-American model, in 
which a company itself contacts its shareholders and solicits proxy authorization 
(Tamminga, 1996b).
33 The Corporate Governance Committee (1996) proposes that an 
independent organization will administer the system and will act as an intermediary 
between companies and the banks. A reasonable financial compensation has to be 
charged to finance proxy solicitation. 
 
                                                           
     
33 In the United States and the United Kingdom equity capital in general consists of registered stock. 
This enables companies to be active in proxy solicitation (for more details see De Vijver, 1980; Blair, 1995; 
Monks and Minow, 1995). The United States stock exchanges even require companies to administer proxy 
solicitation, but have strongly regulated the soliciting procedures to prevent abuses. Before the general 
meeting shareholders may authorize a specific member of the board of directors of a company to represent 




Bank representation on supervisory boards 
 
Apart from holding voting rights at the general meeting of shareholders, German bank 
representatives participate on the supervisory board of companies. Yet, the number of 
seats on supervisory boards held by bank representatives is lower than might be 
expected on the basis of the voting power of banks at the general meeting on account of 
their own shareholdings and the proxy votes under their discretion. From 0 an estimate 
of shareholder votes under direct control of the banks in 1993 is at least the sum of 
14.2% from banks own shareholdings and 16.6% through proxy voting on stock owned 
by households, which yields a total of 30.8%. According to Monopolkommission 
(1992: 235), in 1988 the number of private bank representatives on supervisory boards 
of the 100 largest companies equalled 6.4% (see also 0). After a rise to 8.3% in 1990, 
the percentage of private bank representatives has fallen to 7.2% in 1992 
(Monopolkommission, 1994:  232) and 6.3% in 1993 (Bundesverband Deutscher 
Banken, 1995).
34 Even considering that shareholder representatives occupy half of the 
seats on the supervisory board (see Section 3.1: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.) 
these numbers are still relatively low compared to the voting power of the banks. 
  Despite the fact that because of their expertise bank representatives on supervisory 
boards may be influential, the data above indicate that their number is too small to 
completely determine decision making on the board, even if they act in concert. Yet, it is 
by no means self-evident that bank representatives act in concert. Edwards and Fischer 
(1994) cite several pieces of evidence showing profound competition between banks on 
the market for bank loans to enterprises.
35 The representation on supervisory boards is 
seen to provide no opportunities for banks to supply additional loans to firms. 
Moreover, data show that companies often invite representatives of competing banks to 
take a seat on the supervisory board (see also Schneider-Lenné, 1992:  19).
36 For 
example, besides Deutsche Bank, which owns nearly a quarter of the total stock of 
shares of Daimler Benz, also Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank are represented on the 
supervisory board, although the latter banks do not own any Daimler Benz equity 
(Schröder, 1995: 5). 
  Finally, to put the influence of private banks in perspective, the power of the 
supervisory board itself should not be exaggerated. It has been concluded above that the 
supervisory board is an influential body, but it does not posses a right of initiative and is 
not involved in all management decisions. 
                                                           
     
34 For 1979 Gerum et al. (1988) find a comparable figure of 8% among the supervisory boards of all 
281 public companies with more than 2000 employees.  
     
35 Edwards and Fischer (1994: 234) also conclude: `This detailed analysis of the evidence provides no 
support for the claim that institutional features of the German system of finance for investment allow firms 
greater access to external finance at lower cost than in the UK'. Amongst others, the evidence analyzed by 
Edwards and Fischer concerns the relatively modest importance of enterprises with the two-tier system for 
bank lending, the lower share of equity finance compared to loan finance in Germany than in the United 
Kingdom, and banks' response when firms are in financial distress. 
     
36 Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (1995: 28) presents additional quantitative information on bank 
representatives on supervisory boards. In 1993 supervisory boards existed in 89 of the 100 largest German 
companies. The other 11 companies had organisational forms that differed from a public or private limited 
liability company and therefore had no supervisory board. In 52 of the 89 companies private banks were 
represented on the supervisory board. From a total of 99 bank representatives it follows that on average two 
bank representatives are seated on a supervisory board, which generally contains 20 members. In 28 out of 
the 52 companies with bank representation, representatives of at least two competing private banks belong 




  0 shows that the percentage of supervisory board seats occupied by representatives 
Table 8 The structure of supervisory boards in large German and Dutch companies 
 Netherlands  Germany 
Year of data   1984 1986  1993 
Number of companies  85. 84.  89. 
Number of seats  650. 1466.  1561. 
Average number of seats  7.6 17.5  17.5 
Composition of supervisory board (%)   
Non-financial companies  36. 25.  27. 
Block shareholders  14. -
a -
a 
Former directors  7. -
a -
a 
Banks and insurance companies  13. 11.
b 10.
b 
Employee representatives  11. 49.  49. 
Politicians and civil servants  11. 5.  4. 
Lawyers, professors  8. 10.  10. 
 
a  Data included in other categories: non-financial companies and banks 
b  Of which private banks: 8% in 1986, 6% in 1993. 
Source:  Netherlands: Van der Knoop (1991: 164), Table 2, independent Dutch companies 




from banks and insurance companies is largely comparable in Germany and the 
Netherlands. In the table the Dutch figure (13%) is even somewhat higher than the 
German percentage (11% in 1986). Disregarding the number of employee 
representatives the figures change to 15% (13/(1-.11)) in the Netherlands and 22% 
(11/(1-.49)) in Germany.  
  A difference between the two countries is that bank representatives in the 
Netherlands do not occupy a seat on a company's supervisory board because the bank 
owns a stake of the company's equity capital. Yet, frequently the bank does have a 
creditor relationship with the company concerned, also because Dutch managers do not 
prefer to have representatives from competing banks in the supervisory board (Van der 
Knoop, 1991: 131). In some companies the creditor relationship was the main reason to 
offer the bank a seat on the supervisory board. However, most companies value bank 
representatives because of their financial know-how and because they are knowledgable 
about specific sectors from their lending relationships with many companies. The latter 
argument is also a motivation for banks to take seats in supervisory boards, it broadens 
the view of the bank's directors on the enterprise sector. Another reason is that 
incidentally in case of large financial distress a bank, who has a large debt claim on a 
company, claims a seat on the supervisory board to guard its financial interests.  
  Several non-bank members of Dutch supervisory boards oppose the admission of 
bank's representatives because financial problems may cause conflicts between the 
interests of the bank and those of the company. That is one of the main reasons why the 
number of banks representatives on supervisory boards has fallen over time in the 
Netherlands. Van der Knoop (1991) presents slightly adjusted data from De Boer 
(1957), which show that in 1955 23% of supervisory board seats were occupied by 
banks' representatives. According to 0 this figure has fallen to 13% in 1984. 
 
Conclusion on bank governance 
 
The above evidence on bank voting power and representation on supervisory board 
leads to the conclusion that banks play an important role but do not control the German 
public enterprise sector. Proxy voting strengthens the shareholder position of banks and 
enhances the monitoring role of banks from a shareholder perspective. Edwards and 
Fischer (1994) state that the position of banks in corporate governance fits into the 
general view of extensive cross holdings between enterprises in Germany. Gorton and 
Schmid (1996) empirically corroborate that conclusion. Firm performance is related to 
block holdings of majority shareholders in general, including banks, but no additional 
influence exists of share holdings by banks or through proxy voting (see Section 
2.6: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.).  
  In the Netherlands, the role of banks and non-financial enterprises as shareholders is 
clearly much more limited. Dutch banks primarily monitor companies from a creditor 
perspective and in that sense are closer to Anglo-American banks. Consequently, Dutch 
banks do not face the risk of a weakening of their creditor position due to their 
shareholder position, as may be the case with German banks (see Section 2.2: Fehler! 




  Recent developments indicate that the creditor position of Dutch banks in corporate 
governance is shifting to some extent (see for instance, Tamminga, 1996a). Because 
companies expect a liberalization of legislation on anti-takeover protection,
37 they pay 
more attention to investor relations and attempt to raise the interest of large banks in the 
equity capital of the company. At the same time Dutch banks become more engaged in 
equity finance. In some cases banks appear willing to take a minority position of 5% to 
10% of the stock of shares, yet they emphasize that their creditor position is 
predominant and are reluctant to become strongly involved with the policy of the 
company. Share ownership is no reason for the banks to require a seat on the 
supervisory board, to want a say in the appointment of company directors, or to concern 
themselves with strategies of the firm. Banks consider their shareholdings mainly from a 
longer-term investment perspective. Dutch banks do not intend to sell their stock of 
shares if profits temporarily fall, but strive for an adequate rate of return on their equity 
investment over a longer-term period. Hence, selling shares becomes an definite option 
if longer-term perspectives of a company worsen. 
 
3.3 Corporate governance by pension funds 
 
0 shows that the percentage of shares owned by Dutch pension funds (7.9%) 
considerably exceeds the percentage of shares owned by German pension funds (1.9%), 
while share ownership of insurance companies is largely comparable. The substantial 
extent of their shareholdings and the role of pension funds in corporate governance need 
further clarification. To what extent do Dutch pension funds influence decision making 
in large companies and how does their role compare to that of German banks?  
 
Pension funds' share ownership 
 
Shareholdings of German pension funds are small for three reasons. Firstly, the private 
pension system is relatively small because of the extensive public pension system. 
Secondly, the size of private pension funds is even smaller because on average two 
thirds of pension contributions are retained in companies. Assets of German pension 
funds and life insurance companies amount to only 5% and 16% of GDP, respectively. 
Thirdly, pension funds are risk averse to such an extent that they invest less than 10% of 
their cover stock in shares, despite the fact that the legal room for investment in shares 
equals 30% of their cover stock (Schneider-Lenné, 1992: 13).  
  In the Netherlands, a comparatively larger part of total shareholdings is in the hands 
of pension funds, because of the elaborate private pension system. Total assets invested 
by Dutch pension funds amount to 73% of GDP in 1992 (CS First Boston, 1993). The 
civil servant pension fund (ABP) is already worth nearly half of this sum. Adding 
another 40 %-points assets of life insurance companies yields total assets of institutional 
investors of 113% of GDP in the Netherlands. The comparable figure for the United 
Kingdom is 103% of GDP, divided into 59 %-points assets of pension funds and 
44 %-points in the hands of life insurance companies. 
  However, in spite of the elaborate Dutch pension system, the part of equity capital 
owned by pension funds is much smaller compared to that in the United Kingdom 
(34.2%) and the United States (20.1%). Related to the total cover stock, shareholdings 
by pension funds in the Netherlands merely comprise 14% of total assets, while the 
comparable figures for the United Kingdom and the United States are in the order of 
                                                           
     




65% and 45% respectively (CEPS, 1995). Since the former legal restriction for the civil 
servant pension fund that no more than 20% of the cover stock of the fund can be 
invested in shares has not been binding, this is mainly due to a risk-averse investment 
policy by the funds. 
  Currently, the investment policy of Dutch pension funds is changing. An example is 
the civil servant pension fund, which has been privatized in 1996. The civil servant 
pension fund aims at raising the average return on its investments by one percentage 
point through an increase of its total equity investment from 13% of the cover stock in 
1995 to 30% in 2000 (Barentsen, 1995b).
10 Holdings of equity issued by Dutch 
companies are planned to increase from 7% to 10% of the cover stock. This implies that 
a number of the current participations of just below 5% of equity capital in about 40 
Dutch companies will increase to some 8 to 10% (Bakker and Schlaghecke, 1995). 
Another aim of the fund is to participate in smaller securities and in venture capital. 
However, the main increase in shareholdings of the civil servant pension fund stems 
from foreign equity which is intended to increase from 6% to 20% of the cover stock. 
  The target of 30% equity investment does not imply that on a relative basis the civil 
servant pension will be among the highest equity investors of Dutch pension funds. For 
long the Shell pension funds has large equity investments. In 1993 57% of its cover 
stock consisted of equity. The pension fund for health care workers (PGGM), after the 
civil servant pension fund the second largest in the Netherlands, is increasing its equity 
investment at a vast rate (Barentsen, 1995a). In 1990 14% of that fund's cover stock 
consisted of equity. Equity investment has risen to 30% in 1995 and is planned to 
increase to 50% or 60% in the coming years.  
 
Pension fund activism 
 
The relatively large shareholdings of institutional investors in the Netherlands and the 
rising investment in equity by Dutch pension funds suggest that Dutch institutional 
investors might perform a role in corporate governance which is comparable to that of 
the German banks and non-financial enterprises. Indeed, developments in the United 
Kingdom and the United States indicate that institutional investors become stronger 
involved in monitoring management performance (Bishop, 1994; Blair, 1995; Crist, 
1995). A comparable development can be observed in the Netherlands. Pension funds 
oppose the cumulation of anti-takeover defences applied by Dutch companies (for more 
details see Section 3.4), pay more attention to shareholder value of enterprises, and 
show an increasing interest in corporate policy and nomination of members of supervis-
ory boards (Frijns et al., 1995).  
  In particular the civil servant pension fund has thoroughly reconsidered its role as 
shareholder (Barentsen, 1995b). Exit options, i.e. the selling of shares if the performance 
of the company is disappointing, are not very attractive, because the stake of the fund in 
a specific company is so large that exit would drive down the share price. Therefore, the 
fund aims at increasing the use of voice as a governance instrument to promote the 
interests of shareholders by exerting influence on the composition of the supervisory 
board and the management board, on major mergers, takeovers or investments and on a 
companies' dividend policy. It will not confine itself to financial data to develop an 
opinion on the performance of the company, but also wants to become knowledgable on 
corporate strategies and the quality of management. 
  A comparison with Section 3.2 learns that the pension funds' stance in corporate 
governance differs markedly from that of Dutch banks. Both aim at long-term 




reluctant to become involved with company policy. In contrast, pension funds more 
actively seek involvement in a company's strategic decisions. 
  The role in corporate governance of pension funds in the Netherlands also differs 
from the role of banks and non-financial companies in Germany. Firstly, the link 
between shareholdings and supervisory board representation in the Dutch structural 
model is much weaker compared to Germany. By consequence, pension funds have less 
direct means available to convince management of their views and will therefore 
frequently seek more informal contacts with management. Secondly, although Dutch 
pension funds do hold a long-term view and do not easily sell shares for short-term 
profits only, their interest in a company primarily follows from an investment 
perspective. This differs from the perspective of German firms, which also have 
commercial and technological links,
38 and from the perspective of German banks, 
which are also associated to enterprises through their borrowing relations. Hence, 
increased pension fund activism primarily strengthens shareholder control of 
management in the Netherlands.  
  Experiences in the United States provide some insight in the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance role of pension funds. In the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, increased shareholder activism of pension funds in the United States 
improved management in some poorly performing companies (Blair, 1995:  170). 
According to proponents of pension fund activism, two important structural advantages 
of monitoring by pension funds are the solution of the free-rider problem and returns to 
scale (Blair, 1995: 173). The pension fund's equity stakes are large enough to make 
monitoring effective, which solves the free-rider problem that confronts small 
shareholders (see Section 2.2: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Moreover, pension 
funds achieve returns to scale if they are able to spread learning experiences with 
specific governance instruments over the broad range of companies in which they have 
invested.  
  In contrast, opponents raise two objections against active involvement of pension 
funds in corporate strategies: fund managers are no company directors and monitoring 
costs are excessive. Generally, fund managers have little entrepreneurial experience and 
face different incentives from company directors. Their career progress is less related to 
the performance of a specific company compared with that company's director. 
Involvement of the pension fund with corporate strategies invokes high monitoring costs 
because for each individual company the fund has to amass detailed knowledge of 
strategic variables such as product development, production processes, internal 
organization, technology, market opportunities, worker motivation, etc. (Blair, 
1995: 183). Because these variables differ substantially between companies, returns to 
scale hardly exist.  
  Dutch pension funds recognize the boundaries between entrepreneurship and 
finance. Fund managers do not strive to take the place of company managers. For 
instance, the aim of the civil servant pension fund is to have a relatively small group of 
specialists monitor the companies in which the fund participates. These specialists will 
gather sufficient information on the performance and strategies of the companies to 
support the position of shareholders vis-à-vis management and other stakeholders, while 
maintaining the scope for management to control corporate strategies. The civil servant 
pension fund also does not aim at direct representation of fund managers in supervisory 
boards of companies (see Bakker and Schlaghecke, 1995). 
 
                                                           
     




3.4 The market for corporate control 
 
Section 2.5 showed that hostile takeovers are one of the devices to discipline 
management in the Anglo-American model, while they are virtually non-existent in 
Germany. The first part of this section takes a closer look at concentrated shareholdings 
and institutions that shield German companies from hostile takeovers. The second part 
analyzes the position of the Netherlands and shows that intensive use of anti-takeover 
devices explains the absence of a market for corporate control. However, in the 
Netherlands parties involved have reached an agreement on measures to lower anti-
takeover defences. 
 
Germany's concentrated shareholdings discourage hostile takeovers 
 
Hostile takeovers, in the sense of a stock market bid on the shares of an enterprise 
without the consent of its management, are rare in Germany (Charkham:  34). One 
obvious reason is that the stock market is relatively unimportant in German corporate 
governance (see Section 2.5: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Yet, also for listed 
companies hostile takeovers are difficult to effectuate in Germany. Large concentrations 
of shareholdings are in the hands of founding families, other enterprises or banks which, 
because of their long-term attachment to the company, choose the side of management 
and refuse to sell to a hostile bidder. In addition, the proxy-voting rights of banks imply 
that banks control a substantial number of votes on the annual general meeting, which 
also functions as a defence against a raider.  
  Moreover, various types of regulation thwart hostile take-overs. The most important 
of those is that 75% of the votes at a shareholders' meeting is required to replace share-
holders' representatives on the supervisory board before their term of appointment ends 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 191). The requirement of a 75% majority at the general 
meeting is the most important barrier to the control of the management of a firm. If all 
shareholders' representatives on the supervisory board favour the take-over, either 
voluntary or after being replaced by a raider owing 75% of the shares, replacement of 
the management board is no significant obstacle, since it can be effectuated by majority 
decision. Because shareholders' representatives constitute at least half of the supervisory 
board and because the chairman is a shareholders' representative with a casting vote, 
shareholders can always effectuate a majority vote. 
  As an additional barrier to hostile take-overs, some public companies have a cap on 
voting rights at a shareholders' meeting, which means that the number of votes cast by a 
single share owner is restricted, regardless of the size of the stock of shareholdings. 
According to Baums (1990) 23 of the large public companies had limited voting rights, 
eleven of these were companies with a large dispersion of shares. However, voting caps 
offer no absolute protection because they can be circumvented by share owners acting in 
concert. 
  In the past a cap on voting rights has been justified as a protective measure against 
the gradual secret build-up of a large stock of shares in a company. In the second 
Financial Markets Promotion Act (Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) of August 1994, 
German legislation on the disclosure of significant stocks of shares has been adjusted. 
Heretofore, disclosure was only required if stakes exceeded 25% of the total stock of 
shares. Under the revised legislation holdings above 5% have to be made public.
11 The 
change in German disclosure regulation is likely to increase pressure on firms to 
abandon caps on voting rights (Bishop, 1994). In that case, protection against hostile 





The structural model and anti-takeover defences in the Netherlands  
 
Hostile takeovers are uncommon in the Netherlands as well. The Dutch structural model 
of corporate governance acts as one of the defensive devices. The position of the 
supervisory board and the appointment of its members by cooption shield management 
from shareholders (Rietkerk, 1992). However, under certain conditions the structural 
model can be overruled in case of a hostile takeover or pressure can be exerted on the 
supervisory board to give in to the raider, for instance by objecting to the appointment 
of new members of the supervisory board or by refusing to approve the annual 
statement of accounts (Voogd, 1989: 249-269; Van der Grinten, 1990).
39 
  Two types of companies attempting a takeover and which have obtained 50% or over 
of a target company's equity capital, are able to render the target company's structural 
model inoperative. The first is a Dutch takeover company for which the structural model 
applies. Because the takeover company owns at least 50% of the target's equity capital, 
the target becomes a subsidiary of the takeover company. The structural model is not 
mandatory for subsidiaries of a holding that itself is covered by structural model. The 
second is a foreign takeover company that acquires a majority of the equity capital of a 
Dutch target company. If a company, where a majority of employees works abroad, 
owns 50% or over of the equity capital of a Dutch company the mitigated structural 
model applies (see Section 3.1:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Under the 
mitigated model the supervisory board is still appointed through cooption, but the 
supervisory board neither appoints nor dismisses management. Therefore, the 
supervisory board cannot prevent the foreign takeover company to use its voting 
majority at the general meeting of shareholders to replace management.  
  Compared to Germany, Dutch companies turn out to be more vulnerable to hostile 
takeovers. The cases described above show that the structural model offers no absolute 
defence against hostile takeovers. Furthermore, for a number of Dutch companies the 
common model is relevant, which offers no defence at all. Finally, holdership of shares 
is more widely dispersed in the Netherlands. Hence, as additional ways of defence 
Dutch companies utilize a range of other anti-takeover devices (Cantrijn et al., 1993). 
Besides voting caps, these devices are not used in Germany. 
                                                           
     
39 After a hostile takeover a majority shareholder may also exert considerable pressure on the 
management board and the supervisory board by deciding at the general meeting to pay out the difference 
between the companies stock market value and the nominal value of the stock of shares (Van der Grinten, 
1990). Pressure turns into absolute power if as a consequence of that decision the value of the company's 
equity capital falls below the threshold of 25 million guilders, since this lifts the legal requirement to apply 
the structural model. The shareholder may also decide to liquidate the company. Upon liquidation 
management is dismissed and the shareholder receives all assets and liabilities. However, these threats can 
relatively easily be countered by changing the articles of association and transferring the rights to pay out 
equity or liquidate the company from the general meeting to the management board or the supervisory 




  0 indicates that preference shares are most widely applied as defence mechanisms. 
Preference shares carry the same voting rights as ordinary shares but in addition give a 
right to a fixed dividend percentage before ordinary shareholders become entitled to 
dividend. Issuing preference shares discourages takeovers by reducing the voting power 
of ordinary shares at the general meeting. Often specific foundations, for instance aimed 
at protection of continuity of the company, own the stock of preference shares. The issue 
of preference shares can be temporary, after the threat of a hostile takeover has vanished 
preference shares can be withdrawn. 
  The second important anti-takeover device in the Netherlands, which also operates 
by curbing the voting power of ordinary shares, is issuing priority shares. The articles of 
association of a company can assign special rights to holders of priority shares, like 
proposing or preventing the appointment of particular new members of the management 
and supervisory boards, approving the issue of ordinary shares, liquidation of the 
company or changing the articles of association.  
  Thirdly, also relatively wide-spread in the Netherlands is the issue of tradable 
depositary receipts against the stock of shares. The company deposits its share capital at 
an administrative office, which instead trades depositary receipts on the stock market. 
Even if a raider obtains the majority of these depositary receipts, voting power at the 
general meeting still rests with the administrative office. Because the administrative 
office usually is a business connection of the company, a substantial anti-takeover 
defence has been raised. 
Table 9 Anti-takeover defences of Dutch listed companies 
Anti-takeover defences in 1992  Number of defences  Percentage 
Preference shares  105. 32.3 
Priority shares  79. 24.3 
Depositary receipts  70. 21.5 
Binding nomination  64. 19.7 
Voting caps  7. 2.2 
Total 325. 100. 
  
Number of defences  Number of companies  Percentage 
 1992  1995  1992  1995 
Zero 16. 18. 9.1  11.1
One 52. 64. 29.4  39.5
Two 62. 67. 35.0  41.4
Three 39. 13. 22.0  8.0
Four 8. 0. 4.5  0.0
Total 177. 162. 100.  100.
 
Source:   1992: Cantrijn et al. (1993: 28-29); 




  Fourthly, Dutch legislation permits public limited liability companies under the 
common model to insert the clause in their articles of association that members of the 
supervisory or management board are to be elected by the general meeting from a 
binding nomination of at least two persons for every seat. Only a two-third majority at 
the general meeting can overrule the binding nomination. Because current members of 
the boards draft the nomination, their control of the composition of the boards is 
strengthened. For the structural model this anti-takeover device is irrelevant, since 
members of the supervisory board are elected by cooption and subsequently appoint the 
management board. 
  As a fifth option, within certain bounds, voting caps are also allowed in the 
Netherlands. However, 0 shows they are only implemented by 7 out of 177 companies. 
The relatively modest use of voting caps is in accordance with the German situation. 
Voting caps have proven to provide insufficient defence because they can be circum-
vented by using straw-men at the general meeting. Bloemsma (1973) mentions the 
example of a large Dutch company, which founded 860 small limited liability 
companies to undermine the voting caps of a company it intended to take over. 
  Finally, anti-takeover devices like poison pills, crown jewels and greenmail are less 
common in the Netherlands. These became prevalent in the United States during the 
1980s. Poison pills give shareholders certain conditional rights, which become effective 
in times of a takeover and significantly raise the costs of a takeover. An example is the 
right of the company to sell additional shares to current shareholders at a low price, 
which a raider subsequently has to buy against the much higher market price (Jacobs, 
1991: 93). Devices directed at crown jewels aim to cut the chain between the firm and 
its most valuable business unit, the crown jewel, which often is one of the main targets 
of a raider. For instance, a crown jewel of a company threatened by a takeover can be 
sold to a `white knight' or protected by preference shares. Greenmail, i.e. sending the 
raider an envelope filled with dollars, entails the repurchase of the stock of shares 
already in possession of the raider at a higher price. It is not very effective in the Nether-
lands because repurchase of shares is only allowed up to a maximum of 10% of the 
share capital. 
  Comparing the number of anti-takeover defences to the number of companies in 0 
shows that a considerable number of companies apply several defences. The second part 
of 0 gives some additional information on the cumulation of anti-takeover defences in 
the Netherlands. About 90% of the companies listed at the stock exchange use at least 
one means of defence. In 1992 over 25% of the companies have implemented three or 
four anti-takeover devices. In 1992 the Amsterdam stock exchange sharpened its 
regulations somewhat and prohibited the cumulation of more than two anti-takeover 
defences. 0 shows that as a consequence the cumulation of defences decreased in the 
period 1992-1995.  
 
Initiatives to lower Dutch anti-takeover defences 
 
For a long time the wide-spread use of anti-takeover devices in the Netherlands has been 
in dispute. In the past, EU initiatives emphasized the necessity of increasing shareholder 
influence. Recently, Dutch policy makers have issued a policy proposal to lower the 
high defensive walls around Dutch companies.  
  Former EU initiatives, aimed at enhancing the position of shareholders in takeover 
cases, have recently been weakened considerably. The Bangemann proposals of May 
1990 advocated banning of cooption, preference shares, priority shares and voting caps, 




(Coopers & Lybrand, 1990). Germany would be affected to a less extent because proxy 
voting, the power of the supervisory board to change the management board and stocks 
of shares owned by companies and banks would remain possible. The proposals faced 
strong opposition in the Netherlands by both employers' organizations and unions 
(Iterson and Olie, 1992: 102), because in their view the revision of EU directives would 
not reach a level playing field across EU member countries. The Dutch equity market 
would become very close to the free market in the United Kingdom, whereas in many 
other countries non-juridical defences would remain effective. In 1992, the EU summit 
in Edinburgh effectively withdrew the Bangemann proposals. Regulation of takeover 
activity was considered the responsibility of national governments under the subsidiarity 
principle. February 1996 proposals for the thirteenth EU directive contain a set of 
minimum conditions, which provide much room for EU member states to define 
detailed regulations themselves. 
  In 1994 the discussion intensified. The Ministry of Finance signalled the parties 
involved that it would adjust legislation to diminish the use of anti-takeover devices 
unless the parties would present acceptable alternatives themselves. After lengthy 
discussions, in February 1996 the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the Association of listed 
companies (Vereniging van Effecten Uitgevende Ondernemingen) and the Ministry of 
Finance agreed on the contents of new regulations that still have to be put forward to 
Parliament. The agreement opens the possibility that under specific conditions a 
company's barriers against hostile takeovers can be removed.  
  Two main features typify this agreement: a substantial waiting period until a 
takeover procedure starts and an important role for the Chamber of Company Law 
(Ondernemingskamer), the Dutch court specialized in corporate law. A majority 
shareholder must own 70% of a firm's equity capital for a successive period of one year 
before being allowed to start a legal procedure to pull down anti-takeover defences. 
After that period, the majority shareholder appeals to the Chamber of Company Law. 
The court tests the shareholder's request both against procedural and intrinsic criteria. 
Procedural criteria concern the way the shareholder has obtained a majority holding and 
the integrity of the majority shareholder. Intrinsic criteria relate to the financial, 
economic and legal consequences of planned policies by the majority shareholder and 
by current management. The court asks a commission of three experts for advice on all 
relevant facts and intentions in the fields of business, finance and the social aspects of 
the takeover. The court will ordain the removal of the company's anti-takeover defences 
if the planned policies of the majority shareholder are not essentially incompatible with 
the interests of the target company. Important criteria specifying the interests of the 
target company are the continuity of the company and the position of employees. The 
court may reject the majority shareholder's request if in the past the shareholder has 
liquidated a company without an economic justification or if the shareholder plans to 
reduce employment without an economic justification. 
  As a response to these initiatives, increasingly Dutch companies pay more attention 
to investor relations and turn to institutional investors to place blocks of their equity 
capital. An example is KNP BT, with 29,000 employees the fifth largest manufacturing 
company in the Netherlands and active in paperware, packaging, and office supplies. 
KNP BT aims at strengthening the long-term relation with block shareholders. Over 
50% of its stock of shares is owned by insurance companies, pension funds and 
multinational companies (Tamminga, 1995a). In February 1996 Ahold (retailing) and 
DSM (chemicals) placed blocks of preference shares with several large institutional 
investors. Other companies led the way; during the preceding years ABN-Amro, 




  Investment in block shareholdings indicates that a shift is taking place in the 
Netherlands towards more concentrated shareholdings. At first sight this seems 
comparable to the German model, yet a substantial difference remains. Dutch companies 
issue preference shares, while in Germany banks own ordinary shares. Preference shares 
are attractive for Dutch banks and insurance companies, because they carry a high and 
nearly guaranteed dividend, which is free from dividend taxation if the block of shares 
at least equals 5% of a companies' equity capital.
40 In a sense, investment in preference 
shares is in between debt financing and pure equity financing. This may be an additional 
attractive feature for Dutch banks-insurance companies, which emphasize their creditor 
position in corporate governance. However, some features of these preference share 
issues seem less attractive. Preference shares of Hoogovens and DSM are not easily 
transferable on the market. These preference shares carry the condition that if an 
institutional investor wants to sell them, they have to be offered to the company first. In 
this way an additional juridical takeover barrier has been raised and block shareholders 
lack the disciplining instrument of threatening to sell their block of equity on the 
market. The high dividend is needed to offset this disadvantage from the perspective of 
the shareholder. Apparently, companies are inclined to pay a mark-up for additional 
protection. Yet, according to the intentions of the February 1996 procedure to remove 
anti-takeover barriers, the Chamber of Company Law has to be able to overrule these 
juridical barriers. Under the agreement only block shareholdings that are freely 
tradeable on the market can offer protection against hostile takeovers. In that case there 
always is a final option for institutional investors to sell stock of a company with 
incompetent management and allow management to be replaced. 
 
3.5 Institutions affecting stock market performance 
 
The two additional corporate governance institutions addressed in this section affect the 
performance of the stock market. Strong regulations on insider dealing enhance 
credibility of stock market transactions. Accounting rules and practice affect the 
possibility for shareholders to derive an accurate view on the financial position of the 




In the past, little attention has been paid to insider dealing on the stock market in 
Germany. Hardly any formal sanctions existed and self-corrective actions only occurred 
after a deal had been exposed to publicity in the press. Since August 1994 heavy fines, 
up to five years of imprisonment, have been put on insider dealing in Germany. These 
legal reforms aim at enhancing the attractiveness of German stock markets to foreigners 
and to raise their efficiency. A Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel) has been founded to monitor share 
transactions and publication of information by companies relevant to shareholders. If 
necessary, the Office can demand confidential information from banks or companies to 
track down insider dealings. Besides the Federal Supervisory Office, every German 
Land with a regional stock market has its own supervisory body for stock market 
transactions (Börsenaufsichtsbehörde) and every market place its own trade supervisory 
body (Handelsüberwachungsstelle). This division of authorities on the one hand 
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prevents organizational blindness but on the other hand entails the danger of a lack of 
coordination (WirtschaftsWoche, 1995). Activities of the Federal Supervisory Office for 
Securities Trading resulted in some recent convictions for insider dealing in Germany. 
  A 1989 legal provision in the Dutch criminal code prohibits insider dealing 
(Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 1994). Since 1992 this provision is part of the more 
general Act on Supervision of Securities Trading. Implementation of the Act is based on 
the system of self-regulation. The independent Office on Supervision of Securities 
Trading monitors transactions on the stock exchange and can commission the Bureau of 
Control of the stock exchange to investigate specific cases. Yet, in some recent cases 
prosecution was not very successful. The Dutch government and the Office on 
Supervision of Securities Trading consider measures to increase the effectiveness of 
investigation of insider deals. The measures will streamline the investigation procedure 
and will expand the investigation department at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
  Preventing insider dealing also gains importance because of the increasing use of 
management stock option plans (compare Section 3.1:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht 
definiert.). In the United States and the United Kingdom managers must disclose their 
transactions in shares issued by their own company. Such openness does not exist in 
Germany and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands disclosure of personal transactions 
does not comply with privacy legislation. Current regulation and increased effectiveness 




Accounting practices are related to corporate governance because differences in 
accounting rules influence the insight outsiders can obtain in firm performance. German 
and Dutch accounting practices differ considerably. Nobes (1992) distinguishes two 
main classes of accounting measurement systems and various subclasses (see Beckman, 
1993; Offeren and Wanders, 1993). He categorizes Germany and the Netherlands in 
different main classes. The Dutch system fits within the class of Anglo-American coun-
tries. Accounting is micro-based and commercially driven. The main purpose is to 
present a `true and fair view' of the financial position of the company and its profits. 
Within this class a dividing line can be drawn between the United States, where the 
`generally accepted accounting principles' (US-GAAP) of the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) comprise a detailed and strict set of regulations, and the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, where regulation only offers a general framework with 
much room for own interpretations. In particular in the Netherlands the high degree of 
accounting deregulation leads to a substantial diversity of practices (Beckman, 1993). 
The class to which Germany belongs is characterized by a macro orientation driven by 
government rules, in particular related to taxation. The main purpose of accounting is to 
comply with these rules. In Germany financial and fiscal accounting have to correspond. 
Fiscal regulations considerably drive accounting practices, which consequently can be 
typified as adhering to the principle of commercial prudence (Offeren, 1992; Charkham, 
1994:  31). Firms create reserves for commercial risks and reduce taxable profits by 
reducing the value of their assets through quick depreciation or by adding reserve 
amounts to their balance sheets.  
  International differences in accounting practices to a large extent blur the information 
provided by the companies annual report and substantially complicate an international 
comparison between firms. Wanders (1992) shows depreciation rates for buildings, plant 
and equipment of Volkswagen (Germany) to be 2-4%, 5-12.5% and 12.5-16%, 




2.5 and 4-8%) and depreciation practice at Akzo (the Netherlands) is in between (3-5, 3-
5 and 10%). Offeren and Wanders (1993) present some insight in the large reserves of 
German companies. Excluding pension provisions reserves of the German firms Veba, 
Daimler-Benz and BMW comprise respectively 29.7, 26.1 and 20.6 percent of their 
balance sheet total. For the Dutch firms Philips and Akzo and the Anglo-Dutch Unilever 
the corresponding figures are 12.5, 8.8 and 5.3%. Charkham (1994: 31) cites an Ernst & 
Young accountant, who estimates that German accounting rules give rise to 30% lower 
profits in comparison to United Kingdom accounting regulations. If the information on 
reserves and rates of depreciation would be entirely transparent to the stock market, 
relatively high retained profits would manifest themselves completely in high share 
prices. However, the main difficulty is that it is impossible for outsiders to adjust the 
figures from companies seated in different countries and to make them comparable 
(Offeren and Wanders, 1993). The scant information provided by the companies annual 
report is insufficient for this purpose. And, although by German law shareholders have 
the right to ask for information at the general meeting, information on reserves and 
taxation are excluded from this right (WirtschaftsWoche, 1994).  
  German accounting regulations and practice can be regarded not only to pay 
attention to shareholders' interest but also to the interest of other stakeholders in the 
firm. From the perspective of shareholders who are mainly interested in the current 
stock market value of the firm, lower profits reduce the value of their shareholdings. 
Insufficient knowledge about the extent of undervaluation of a company because of high 
reserves and high depreciation rates applied at present and in the past, distorts the infor-
mation of an outsider and raises the risk of a hostile bid not being in accordance with the 
real value of the firm. From the perspective of block shareholders and employees who 
have an insight in the financial position of the company through their representation on 
the supervisory board, the emphasis on the longer term instead of current profits is a 
valuable aspect of German accounting practice. However, these advantages heavily 
depend on the competence of the supervisory board to monitor financial performance, 
because opaque accounting information strengthens the power of management and 
raises the risk of late notification of financial distress signals. 
  Recent shifts in German accounting towards more adequate disclosure of 
information to shareholders, are driven by the internationalization of German companies 
and by a reorientation towards the stock market as a source of investment capital. The 
accounting standards of the United States SEC are extremely rigorous. The accounting 
practice of ten Dutch companies satisfies the SEC standard (Wall Street Journal, 1995). 
In contrast, only one German company, Daimler-Benz, has met this standard and has 
obtained a listing at the New York Stock Exchange. This number is not only low 
compared to the Netherlands but also compared to that in other European countries.
12 
Currently, a number of German companies such as Schering, Bayer, Hoechst, Siemens, 
Veba, are adjusting their accounting practice towards the international standard, which is 
less demanding compared to the SEC standard,
41 and are trying to convince the SEC to 
accept this standard for obtaining a listing in the United States. The objective to appeal 
to the international stock market for the privatization of Deutsche Telekom has been a 
further factor and has also contributed to a change in attitude of the German Ministry of 
Justice towards more shareholder-oriented accounting. 
 
                                                           
     
41 The international standard was devised in London in 1987. In contrast to the German accounting 
practice, it requires disclosure of reserves and pension fund commitments. The SEC standard is still more 






0 summarizes the main features of corporate governance institutions in Germany and the 
Netherlands. 0 presents an overview of the strong and weak elements of German and 
Dutch corporate governance institutions. 
 
Effectivity of specific governance structures 
 
Concentrated shareholdings in Germany imply that primarily representatives of block 
shareholders monitor management. Section 2.6: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., 
shows that such a shareholder structure is suited for monitoring long-term relationships 
in well-established industries with incremental technological change. The dispersed 
holdings of Dutch firms' equity capital, in contrast, offer few incentives to effectively 




  The influence of shareholders on Dutch companies is small also because the 
structural model shields the supervisory board from shareholders, while the supervisory 
board elects the management board. A system of cooption determines the composition 
of the supervisory board, i.e. current members elect new members of the board. 
Consequently, the future quality of the supervisory board primarily depends on the 
quality of the current board and of the management board. Accordingly, shareholders 
have very little means to change incompetent behaviour of supervisory and management 
Table 10  Strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance in Germany and 
the Netherlands  
  Germany  The Netherlands  
Shareholder control    
Structure of shareholdings concentrated holdings promote 
long-term view 
dispersed holdings, no monitoring 
by block shareholders 
Supervisory board  co-determination reduces 
effectivity 
shareholders little influence 
on quality 
Managerial shareholdings  not significant  not very effective 
Creditor control    
Creditor position  constrained by share owner-
ship 
strong 
Bank shareholder position  part of monitoring by block 
shareholders 
small 
Proxy voting  enhances monitoring by block 
shareholders 
no role aspired 
Governance by pension funds  
Monitoring  negligible  institutions constrain effectivity 
Activism  negligible  active in strengthening share-
holder position 
Hostile takeovers    
Anti-takeover defences  highly effective, 
based on cross holdings, 
no juridical barriers 
highly effective, 
removal of juridical barriers 
requires a complex procedure 
Specific regulations    
Insider dealing  some convictions  no convictions since 1989 
Accounting  blurs shareholder information  largely shareholder oriented 
General assessment    
Corporate governance  maintained by concentrated 
shareholdings 
weak shareholder control,  
strongly dependent on quality of 
supervisory board 
Future developments    
Regulation  reform proxy voting  strengthening shareholder 
influence by 
-  lowering anti-takeover barriers 
-  introduction proxy voting 
Enterprises  supervisory board committees 
improve accounting 
aim at block holdings 





  For a high-quality company with a competent supervisory board, the Dutch model 
may dominate German model. In particular, the presence of employee representatives 
reduces the effectivity of supervisory board activities in Germany. Companies are 
inclined to reduce the responsibilities of the board towards the legal minimum to limit 
the influence of worker representatives, because shareholder representatives do not like 
to criticise management in the presence of employee representatives and because 
management fears a loss of confidentiality of information presented to the supervisory 
board. 
  The position of German banks in corporate governance fits the concentrated share-
ownership structure of German corporations. Banks' concentrated shareholdings add to 
those of other companies. However, bank share ownership diminishes the efficacy of 
creditor control (compare Section 2.2:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Dutch 
banks do not own substantial blocks of shares. Instead they monitor management from a 
creditor perspective. Monitoring by creditors mainly is relevant for small and medium-
sized firms (see Section 2.2:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Large firms can 
more easily attract debt finance through signalling their creditworthiness on the capital 
market. 
  Dutch pension funds already own relatively large amounts of equity capital in a 
number of Dutch companies and are enlarging their equity investments. Hence, pension 
funds' role in corporate governance is expanding in the Netherlands. Evidence from the 
United States shows that pension fund activism can improve poorly performing 
management. Dutch pension funds aim at moderate involvement in corporate strategies 
and specialist monitoring of company performance to strengthen the shareholder 
position in companies in which they participate.  
  Anti-takeover barriers take different forms in Germany and the Netherlands. In 
Germany, concentrated shareholdings constitute an effective anti-takeover barrier. Also 
in the Netherlands anti-takeover defences are highly effective. However, defences are 
mainly of the juridical type. Cooption of the supervisory board makes the structural 
model act as an anti-takeover defence. The structural model is supplemented by various 
other defences, including preference shares, priority shares and binding nominations. In 
February 1996, an agreement has been reached between the Ministry of Finance, the 
stock exchange and the association of listed companies that enables the court to remove 
anti-takeover barriers if a majority shareholder held 70% of a company's equity capital 
for at least a year and if the business plan of the majority shareholder is compatible with 
the interests of the target company. This agreement will allow juridical barriers against 
hostile takeovers to be removed, albeit at considerable effort. 
 
Overall assessment and future developments 
 
In the Netherlands, the position of shareholders is relatively weak, since neither large 
stakeholders nor the stock market control management. In Germany, representatives on 
the supervisory board of non-financial firms and banks that own considerable cross-
holdings of equity monitor management. Share ownership in the Netherlands is 
dispersed. Consequently, monitoring by block shareholders is largely absent. In that 
respect the Netherlands is similar to the United States and the United Kingdom. In 
contrast to the Anglo-American model, however, the market for corporate control is 
virtually absent in the Netherlands as well. Cooption of members of the supervisory 
board and extensive use of anti-takeover defences substantially limit the influence of 




only way shareholders of Dutch companies can oppose company policy. 
  Hence, the Dutch institutions neither encourage potential stakeholders to engage in 
active long-term financial relationships with Dutch companies, nor do they strongly 
enhance a flexible reallocation of financial capital and risk-sharing finance through the 
stock market. Consequently, Dutch corporate governance institutions do not support 
incremental technological change in established companies, the main strength of the 
German model. They also do not strongly promote the financing of innovative emerging 
technologies, the main strength of the Anglo-American model. 
  Corporate governance of Dutch enterprises depends primarily on the quality of the 
supervisory board. The quality of the average Dutch board does not seem to be lower 
than the average German supervisory board. The variance of the quality distribution in 
the Netherlands may be larger, because shareholders have little means to change 
incompetent management and supervisory boards.  
  Although direct shareholder control is weak in the Netherlands, competition in the 
product market may serve as an additional disciplinary device. The Dutch economy is 
very open to foreign competition. Many large listed companies compete on the world 
market. Thus, product market competition may prevent management from engaging in 
empire building activities. 
   Recently proposals have been put forward that will lead to some improvements of 
corporate governance in the Netherlands. Several large institutional investors demanded 
adjustment of Dutch legislation to improve shareholder control. Also foreign investors 
pressed for larger influence of shareholders on company policies. Recently, the Dutch 
government has reached an agreement with the parties involved on a proposal for new 
legislation. According to this agreement, juridical anti-takeover defences can be 
removed by court order, but only after a lengthy and complex procedure. Companies 
have responded by investing in longer-term relationships with block shareholders. This 
will remain a viable defence mechanism under the new legislation. However, block 
equity holdings mainly consist of preference shares, some of which are not freely 
tradable on the market. Insofar as the latter category of block holdings comprise new 
anti-takeover defences, they are against the intention of the new regulations. Moreover, 
the Corporate Governance Committee (1996) aims at a greater efficacy of shareholder 
influence within the current institutional setting through enhanced information flows, 
presence of shareholders at the general meeting and a more independent supervisory 
board. The committee tries to persuade companies to effectuate these changes through 
self regulation. 
  The German corporate governance institutions also contain some weak elements. 
Information flows constitute a weak feature of corporate governance in Germany. Joint 
representation hampers information flows between management and the supervisory 
board. Moreover, accounting standards do not adequately present information to 
shareholders. However, German companies are improving accounting information in 
response to internationalization of product markets and financial markets. Also the 
performance of supervisory boards is under discussion. Performance may be improved 
by installing subcommittees, such as an audit committee, a nominating committee and 
an investment committee. These subcommittees may resolve some of the problems 
caused by joint representation of shareholders and employees on German supervisory 








German workers have a strong voice in managerial decision-making. Workers' repre-
sentatives have access to firm-specific information, advise employers on business policy 
and co-decide on personnel matters. German co-determination or `Mittbestimmung', 
which is defined here as the institutionalized influence of worker representatives on 
management, takes place through two different channels. At the enterprise level, worker 
representatives are present on the supervisory board of most public or private limited 
liability companies. In addition, workers in many firms are represented at the work-floor 
level through works councils.  
  In comparison to the lack of co-determination arrangements in the United States, the 
Dutch system of co-determination is broadly similar to that in Germany. The interests of 
American workers at the firm level are, if at all, protected by trade unions. Works 
councils are not compulsory and direct employee representation on the board of 
directors does not exist (Hepple, 1993; Biagi, 1993; see also Section 2.6:  Fehler! 
Textmarke nicht definiert., for a comparison of work governance institutions in 
Germany and the United States). From a European perspective, Dutch co-determination 
is relatively close to the German system as well, since co-determination is extensive in 
both countries (Turner, 1993: 73). However, a closer look reveals that both systems 
differ. In the Netherlands, workers are not represented on the supervisory board and 
works councils are not compulsory in small firms (see 0 for a summary). On the other 
hand, Dutch works councils have more influence on managerial financial-economic 
decisions regarding reorganisations, mergers, etcetera. 
  The organisation of this section is as follows. Section 4.1 and 4.2 focus on German 
and Dutch co-determination institutions, respectively. Section 4.3 compares German and 
Dutch co-determination institutions, whereas Section 4.4 examines profit-sharing 
arrangements that can promote the functioning of co-determination. Based on an 
assessment of worker influence on management and its impact on performance, Section 
4.5 draws conclusions and provides mutual lessons to be learned. 
 
4.1 The German system of co-determination 
 
The first and second subsections of this section describe the two types of German co-
determination institutions: worker representation on the supervisory board and co-
determination at the work-floor level. The third subsection addresses the integrated 
character of German co-determination and the position of trade unions. 
 
Table 11  Indicators of co-determination 
 United  States  Germany
a Netherlands
b 
  in % of workers 
Workers represented on supervisory board   _  26.5   _  
Presence of works council is employee right   _   85.2  68 
 
a  1980. Streeck (1984: 404), Niedenhoff (1990: 14). 
b  1995. Statistics Netherlands, rough estimate, private sector workers in firms with 35 workers 




Co-determination at the enterprise level 
 
Co-determination at the enterprise level is closely related to corporate governance, since 
it takes place through worker representatives on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
who supervise management together with shareholder representatives. The size, sector 
and legal form of enterprises determines which part of the supervisory board consists of 
workers' representatives (0). Worker representatives on the supervisory board have two 
main tasks: they control management together with shareholders, but also promote the 
interests of the workers they represent (Section 3.1).  
  Co-determination through workers' representation on supervisory boards was first 
introduced in 1951 (Co-determination Act of 1951) for the coal, iron and steel 
industries, where arrangements are still most strict: parity representation is required, 
which means that half of all board members consist of workers' representatives and the 
other half of shareholders' representatives. One additional member, the chairman, is co-
opted by the entire supervisory board in order to prevent a deadlock of votes (Streeck, 
1984: 393). Moreover, the management board needs to contain a worker representative, 
i.e. the labour director or `Arbeitsdirektor', whose appointment is approved by the 
worker representatives on the supervisory board (Streeck, 1984 or Smith, 1994). 
However, this particular Co-determination Act is now of limited importance because 
employment in this industry has declined (Jacobi et al., 1992). 
  Soon after the introduction of co-determination in the coal, iron and steel industries, 
participatory management was extended to other industries: The Works Constitution Act 
(WCA of 1952) required worker influence on the supervisory boards. However, 
requirements were less strict compared to those in the coal, iron and steel industries, as 
only one third of seats was allocated to worker representatives (0). The main principles 
of this Act are still valid today (WCA of 1972).  
   Co-determination rights were further expanded during the 1970s. In particular, near-
parity representation on the supervisory board and the presence of a labour director 
became obligatory for very large firms in all sectors (Co-determination Act of 1976). 
Small differences to the parity model according to the Co-determination Act of 1951 
(which still applies to the coal, iron and steel industries) remained: the casting vote of 
the chairman is held by a shareholder representative, which implies near-parity instead 
of parity. Moreover, the labour director is appointed in the same way as other managers, 
namely through voting of the entire supervisory board (Streeck, 1984: 401). 
  The importance of the different co-determination arrangements depends on the 
number of workers in different types of enterprises. By the end of the 1970s, 26.5% of 
Table 12  Worker representation on the German supervisory board 
Legal form  Firm size (number of workers)   
 1-500  501-1000  1001-2000  2001- 
Public limited liability company   _
a 1/3  1/3  (1/2)
b 1/2 
Private limited liability company   _  1/3  1/3 (1/2)
b 1/2 
Unlimited liability company   _   _   _   _ 
 
Sources:  Gurdon and Rai (1990), Streeck (1984), Koene and Slomp (1991), 
     Niedenhoff  (1990) 
a  Founded after August 10, 1994. 




all workers (or approximately 30% of all private sector workers) was employed by a 
company that required worker representation at the enterprise-level (0). The one third 
formula applied to 4.3% of all workers, near-parity representation to 19.6% and parity 
representation to 2.6% (Streeck, 1984: 404). 
 
Co-determination at the work-floor level 
 
Co-determination at the level of the work-floor involves daily management issues and is 
therefore considered to be more influential than enterprise-level co-determination 
(Turner, 1993:  63). Moreover, in contrast to enterprise-level co-determination, the 
advancement of worker interests is the only objective of worker representatives at the 
work-floor level. Institutionalized participation at the work floor takes place through 
works councils. These councils are particularly influential regarding social or personnel 
policies (with the exception of wage formation), but weaker in relation to business 
strategies (Jacobi et al., 1992: 243).  
  Workers in private-sector plants that usually employ six or more workers have the 
legal right to start a works council. The employer is required to support the 
establishment of a works council (Jacobs, 1993: 167). This right applies to approximate-
ly 85% of the total number of employees
13 (0). The works council is elected by all 
employees of minimal 18 years old. Only workers who have worked within the firm for 
a period of at least six months can be elected (Jacobs, 1993: 168).  
  The regulations on works councils stem from the 1950s (Works Constitution Act of 
1952).
42 During the 1970s, the influence of works councils slightly expanded, for 
instance through enlargement of the works councils (Works Constitution Act of 1972). 
Nowadays, works councillors have information, consultation and co-decision rights, but 
these rights are related to the obligation to work with managers in a way which benefits 
both the workers and the company. For instance, works councillors are not allowed to 
organize a strike (Niedenhoff, 1990).  
  Compared to information or consultation rights, co-decision rights give workers 
most influence, because management cannot implement particular changes without 
approval of the works council. Co-decision rights apply to personnel policies related to 
hiring and firing, transfers, employee training, work environment, working hours, 
holiday arrangements, performance monitoring and remuneration policies, e.g. bonuses, 
piecework rates (Turner, 1993; Jacobs, 1993: 174). If an agreement cannot be reached, 
an internal settlement board (`Einigungsstelle') provides binding arbitration. These 
rights are combined with access of councillors to the relevant firm-specific information.  
   As regards financial and economic matters (such as re-organisations or the introduc-
tion of new technologies) the influence of the works council is confined to information 
and consultation rights. These rights apply to works councils in firms with 20 or more 
workers (Koene and Slomp, 1991:  116). Influence of the works council is limited 
because the worker representatives on the supervisory board are viewed as the main 
institution for worker influence on financial and economic decisions. Consequently, 
consultation rights are restricted to the social consequences of managerial decisions 
(Jacobs, 1993: 173). Management should inform the works council in advance and has 
to listen to comments and suggestions of works councillors. For instance, in the case of 
mass lay-offs the works council has to be informed in advance and has the right to give 
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advice about alternative solutions. Once this procedure has been followed, the works 
council is entitled to negotiate a social plan for redundant workers. These negotiations 
can be very detailed and often include compensation schemes and retraining measures 
(Niedenhoff, 1990). 
 
Integration and interaction with trade unions  
 
The two channels of co-determination can be seen as an integrated system of worker 
representation. Communication between works councillors and worker representatives 
on the supervisory board is common practice (Streeck, 1984; Koene and Slomp, 1991). 
Moreover, worker representatives on the supervisory boards are often also members of 
works councils. The relationships between the supervisory board and the works council 
improve the access of works councillors to information regarding investment strategies 
and of the supervisory board to work-floor information. 
  Co-determination affects worker influence through trade unions and vice versa. 
Firstly, trade-union power has facilitated the development of co-determination 
institutions, since trade unions generally favoured worker influence at firm and plant 
levels. According to Turner (1993), legal co-determination rights cannot easily be 
developed in countries with little trade-union power. Secondly, the various channels of 
worker influence are intertwined. Formally, works councils are independent of trade 
unions, but in practice they are dominated by trade-union members. Consequently, trade 
unions have an indirect say at the work-floor level. In large firms, one or more worker 
representatives work full-time for the works council, and these councillors are often 
trade-union members (Jacobs, 1993: 170). In contrast, the direct representation of trade 
unions at the work floor is only weak. Trade unions attempted to set up a distinct system 
of work place representation through local trade-union representatives, but in many 
cases this was not successful (Smith, 1994: 301). Therefore, a major work-floor task of 
trade unions is to support the functioning of works councils (Biagi, 1993). 
  The degree of integration of trade unions and co-determination arrangements poses 
the question which objectives predominate: general trade-union objectives or the 
interests of workers in a particular firm. As works councils are dominated by trade-
union members, they are often "vehicles for the expression of union interests" (Turner, 
1991: 96). However, councillors tend to "identify with their company" and to protect the 
position of insiders. Therefore, in case of discrepancies between general trade-union 




4.2 The Dutch system of co-determination  
 
This section compares the Dutch institutions regarding co-determination at enterprise 
and work-floor level to those in Germany. 
 
Co-determination at the enterprise level 
 
Dutch co-determination at the enterprise level is virtually absent. Members of the 
supervisory board are elected by the general meeting of shareholders (common model) 
or appointed through cooption (structural model), but are not elected by workers directly 
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(see Section 3.1:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.). Members of the supervisory 
board can be shareholders but, in contrast to the German situation, employees of a firm 
are prohibited to occupy a seat on the firm's supervisory board (Van het Kaar, 1995).  
  Only in large firms to which the structural model applies,
14 employees have an 
indirect say in the composition of supervisory boards. In particular, works councillors 
are allowed to advise on the appointment of new members (Van het Kaar, 1995: 16). If 
the works council in these large firms disagrees with the appointment of a particular 
supervisory board member, the appointment is cancelled, unless the opinion of the 
works council is overruled in court at the Chamber of Company Law 
(Ondernemingskamer), the Dutch court specialized in corporate law. Moreover, it is 
common practice but no legal right, that at least one member of the supervisory board 
has somewhat closer connections to the works council. This member is concerned with 
social aspects or is recommended by the works council (Koene and Slomp, 1991: 48-49; 
Van het Kaar, 1995). 
 
Co-determination at the work-floor level 
 
Regulations concerning co-determination at the work floor stem from 1950 (Works 
Council Act or WOR). At that time, works councils became compulsory for firms with 
25 workers or more (Vanwersch et al., 1993). They had an advisory task and were 
directed at the interests of the entire enterprise. In 1979 their influence was 
strengthened. Works councils became an instrument directed at the protection of 
workers' interests (WOR 1979). As in Germany, they obtained co-decision rights on 
social and personnel policies (Albers, 1995; SER, 1991: 106), for instance regarding 
hiring and firing,
44 transfers, employee training, work environment, working hours, 
holiday arrangements, performance monitoring and remuneration policies (e.g. profit 
sharing, pension plans). As in Germany, co-decision rights do not apply to wage 
formation. 
  The employer has to consult the works council in advance on matters of business 
policy, such as important organisational changes and investments (SER, 1991: 104), as 
well as on the appointment and dismissal of directors and higher staff (SER, 1991: 108; 
Teulings, 1987). The advisory rights of work councils are more extensive than those in 
Germany. A Dutch employer must consult the works council on any `important' econ-
omic decision (Jacobs, 1993; Teulings, 1987: 2; Biagi, 1993; Vanwersch et al., 1993). In 
contrast to the situation in Germany, the advisory rights not only pertain to the social 
consequences of a decision but also to the decision itself.  
  From an international perspective, legal advisory rights are strong. The works 
council can appeal at the Chamber of Company Law if it is not rightly consulted, 
presumes that the interests of all stakeholders in the firm are not carefully taken into 
account, or is convinced that managers should not have disregarded its advice (SER, 
1991:  105). If management has neglected advisory rights or if managers did not 
sufficiently consider the interests of all stakeholders, the Chamber of Company Law 
often prohibits implementation of a particular management decision. In contrast, if the 
works council has been consulted but its advice has not been followed, appeals by the 
works council are hardly ever successful. Accordingly, advisory rights rarely stop an 
investment plan, although the works council sometimes succeeds in changing business 
policies, especially in case of reorganisations (Teulings, 1987; Koene and Slomp, 1991).  
   The reach of works councils has changed over time. Nowadays, all firms in the 
                                                           
     




private sector that usually employ 35 workers or more
45 are obliged to have a works 
council (SER, 1991: 90). Members of the works council must have been employed by 
the firm for at least one year, whereas workers with a minimum tenure of half a year are 
allowed to vote (SER, 1991: 92). The influence of works councils is larger in firms with 
100 workers or more. For instance, in firms with 35 to 100 workers consultation rights 
apply only to matters that affect the labour market position of at least 25% of all 
employees, whereas this restriction does not apply to large firms (Koene and Slomp, 
1991: 35). 
  The right to start a works council does not apply to very small companies. Workers 
in small firms, with 10 to 35 workers, merely have limited advisory power via obliga-
tory biannual personnel meetings. According to a rough estimate, approximately 68% of 
Dutch workers have the right to start a works council, whereas this right applies to 
approximately 85% of German workers (0). However, in both countries a considerable 
number of workers, especially in those in small firms, do not use their co-determination 
rights because they do not start a works council.  
  Dutch co-determination is still gaining ground (Tweede Kamer, 1996a and b). Firstly, 
the law regarding works councils (WOR) is extended to the public sector, which will 
strengthen co-determination in this sector after the implementation of the new 
regulations in May 1997 (Vanwersch et al., 1993). Evidently, government policy is 
excluded from co-determination rights. Secondly, the influence of works councils will 
strengthen in some areas. Co-decision rights will also apply to instruments of 
performance monitoring and to the registration of personal information of employees. 
Advisory rights will be extended to technological changes (instead of being limited to 
new technologies that correspond with important investments), to systems of 
environmental care as well as to important granting of credit.  
  Thirdly, firm-level agreements between management and employees will get a more 
formal status. This change is related to the increasing importance of the works council 
as a bargaining partner at the firm level. Within the boundaries of the contents of a 
collective agreement, the works council in many firms negotiates with management over 
firm level issues, and lays down the outcome in a firm-level agreement. Such an 
agreement involves not only co-decision rights but often also other issues, since the 
influence of the works council can be extended through provisions in a collective 
agreement or by management. The more formal status of these agreements implies that 
management cannot easily change the contents of this type of firm-level agreements 
without involving the works council. However, firm-level agreements do not have the 
same status as collective agreements, as is the case in Germany.  
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  Fourthly, a EU-directive obliges member countries (except the United Kingdom) to 
implement co-determination requirements for multinationals in their national legislation 
(Berentsen, 1995). Hence, international co-determination by a European works council 
or similar committee will become obligatory for multinationals.
46 The influence of this 
institution will be confined to information and consultation rights related to 
management decisions at the international level (Sanders, 1995). Of course, this 
directive will also alter the German legislation. Fifthly, the scope of co-determination 
will be enhanced in the near future, because part-time workers as well as workers 
through employment agencies will obtain the same status as full-time workers with 
respect to co-determination regulations. Nevertheless, the requirement of a minimal 
tenure, before voting and membership rights become effective, remains intact.  
  These changes all imply a stronger influence of workers, but do not result in a 
convergence to the German system on all aspects of co-determination institutions, since 
the status of firm-level agreements remains different in the Netherlands, Dutch advisory 
rights of works councils are more extensive, and co-determination through the 
supervisory board is absent. 
 
4.3 Comparison of institutions and worker influence 
 
This section analyzes the main institutional differences between both countries and their 
effect on worker influence. Most German co-determination institutions imply similar or 
stronger worker influence compared to the situation in the Netherlands. Only as regards 
the advisory power of works councils, legal provisions in the Dutch system are more 
influential. However, in some firms legal co-determination rights are expanded through 
collective bargaining agreements or through decisions by management. In other firms, 
employees do not fully use their legal co-determination rights. Hence, a comparison of 
Germany and the Netherlands has to take both the strength of legal rights and the actual 
worker influence into account. 
  For three reasons, worker influence is relatively strong in Germany. Firstly, the 
potential influence of works councils is relatively small in the Netherlands, since small 
firms are not required to have a works council, whereas this is a legal requirement in 
Germany. However, in practice many small firms do not establish a works council. 0 
shows that currently German workers are relatively more organized in medium-sized 
firms, while activity is similar in large firms. This implies that works councils are still 
more common in Germany (see also 0). However, activity rates are likely to converge in 
                                                           
     
46 The new regulations will apply to multinationals (private or public sector companies) with 1000 
employees or more, and at least 150 workers in two or more membership countries. 
Table 13  Presence of a works council in Germany and the Netherlands 
 Germany  The  Netherlands 
  % of firms 
Small firms, 6-10 workers  10   _ 
Medium-sized firms  
50 to 100 (Germany), 35 to 100 workers (Netherlands) 
60 41 
Large firms, 100 workers or more  80  83 
 




the future, since activity in medium-sized Dutch firms is increasing (Van der Burgh and 
Kriek, 1992). 
   Secondly, many aspects of German worker influence are more concentrated within 
the firm. Hence, works councillors do not need to share influence with external 
institutions. Firing procedures provide an example: a German employer informs the 
works council in advance in case of an individual dismissal, since works councillors 
have advisory rights. Moreover, in case of mass lay-offs, the works council negotiates 
about the contents of a social plan. In contrast, in the Netherlands the regional 
employment office determines whether individual dismissals are appropriate. In case of 
mass lay-offs, trade unions negotiate with the employer about a social plan. As another 
example, internal settlement boards arbitrate if the German works council and 
management disagree. In contrast, Dutch works councillors can make use of non-
binding arbitration by committees in matters related to co-decision rights 
(Bedrijfscommissies). However, if arbitration is not successful they need to appeal in 
court. If disagreement is related to advisory rights, the Chamber of Company Law 
decides.  
  Thirdly, the legal basis of worker influence is stronger in Germany because some 
instruments of works councils are formalized in Germany but not in the Netherlands 
(Jacobi et al., 1992). For instance, works councillors in Germany can conclude formal 
agreements that have a similar status as collective agreements. As another example, the 
internal settlement boards that solve disputes between managers and works councillors 
are required by law (Koene and Slomp, 1991:  250). Legislation is not a sufficient 
condition for worker influence at the work floor, because the government cannot control 
work-floor activities. The absence of works councils in smaller firms clearly illustrates 
this. However, legislation does provide workers with a powerful means to ensure that 
co-determination is effective in case of disagreements with management.  
  There is one aspect of Dutch co-determination institutions that is comparatively 
strong, namely the advisory rights of works councils. Works councillors can advise 
management to cancel a major investment project. Their advice can be enforced through 
the Chamber of Company Law, although this rarely happens in practice. Only if 
management has made procedural mistakes or has not carefully considered the position 
of all stakeholders, investment plans or re-organisations sometimes have to be cancelled, 
postponed or amended. Therefore, advisory rights do mainly imply that managers need 
to operate carefully in case of major investment plans or reorganisations. 
  The integrated character of German co-determination presents a mixed picture. 
Worker representation on the supervisory board facilitates access of employee 
representatives to information on the companies' financial and strategic planning 
(Turner, 1993: 63). Moreover, compared to the Netherlands, communication between 
supervisory board members and works councillors is more common in Germany, where 
members of works councils are often also representatives on the supervisory board (Van 
het Kaar, 1995 or Koene and Slomp, 1991). In the Netherlands, works councillors, 
management and supervisory board members are required to organise meetings on a 
regular basis, but informal contacts between the works council and the supervisory 
board are much less common (Van het Kaar, 1995; Koene and Slomp, 1991: 26, 48). 
  However, the German situation shows that enterprise-level co-determination does not 
constitute the main channel for the advancement of worker interests. Firstly, the 
objectives of worker representatives on the supervisory board are potentially conflicting. 
In particular, business policies that are in accordance with the long-run strategy of the 
firm may not agree with the protection of worker interests. Secondly, many companies 




influence of worker representatives (see Section 3.1:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht 
definiert.). Hence, joint representation improves information flows between the 
supervisory board and works councils, but at the same time diminishes the efficacy of 
the board. 
  These shortcomings are one reason not to introduce directly elected employee 
representatives in Dutch supervisory boards. A second reason involves the limited 
influence of shareholders on Dutch companies (see Section 3.6). Increasing the power 
of employees on supervisory boards entails the risk of generating a bias in board 
decisions towards employee interests, because the countervailing power by shareholders 
is more limited in the Netherlands. 
  Many other aspects of institutional co-determination are similar in both countries. 
Co-decision rights are alike, since they apply to many matters of personnel policy 
except to wage bargaining. Moreover, in both countries the works council mainly has a 
passive role; initiatives are exceptional. In Germany, the right of initiative is somewhat 
stronger because internal arbitration is required. In the Netherlands, a more limited form 
of arbitration will probably be implemented in the near future, but it is not expected that 
this will make the position of the Dutch works council regarding initiatives much more 
stronger. Another similarity is that both systems enhance the influence of core workers, 
as opposed to that of peripheral workers. A minimum duration of tenure is required 
before a worker can be elected for the works council. In this respect, regulations with 
respect to tenure are more strict in the Netherlands.  
  In summary, based on an analysis of the stronger, weaker and similar aspects of legal 
co-determination arrangements the conclusion can be drawn that some aspects of legal 
provisions result in a stronger potential influence of workers in Germany. In addition, 
Dutch workers are still less active compared to their German counterparts in fully using 
their co-determination rights. In contrast, the advisory rights of works councils are 
stronger in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the integrated German system enhances 
information flows to employees but reduces the effectiveness of the supervisory board. 
Nevertheless, in some firms works councillors exert more influence than is required by 
law. For instance, in some multinationals legal institutional arrangements are so broadly 
interpreted that actual worker influence between German and Dutch subsidiaries has 
converged. 
 
4.4 Profit sharing 
 
Section 2.4:  Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert., concluded that profit sharing 
enhances the effectiveness of co-determination. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests 
that the introduction of profit sharing raises the level of productivity in a firm (see also 
Section 2.4). To analyze these issues this section briefly reviews profit-sharing 
arrangements in Germany and the Netherlands. 
  Together with Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, Germany and the Netherlands are among the countries where profit 
sharing covers at least 5% of the employees (OECD, 1995b). In particular, cash-based 
informal schemes are wide-spread in the Netherlands. These schemes involve a direct 
cash payment related to current profits. They may be part of a collective labour 
agreement or of a voluntary agreement between a specific company and its employees. 
In the early 1990s, on average 4% of total gross earnings of 10 to 20% of business 
sector employees consisted of a cash-based payment out of companies' profits. In 
Germany the coverage of cash-based schemes is less extensive, since only 6% of the 




gross wages and thus exceeds that in the Netherlands. Neither in Germany nor in the 
Netherlands does legislation substantially encourage cash-based profit sharing.  
  Legal support for employee share ownership is more elaborate in Germany. An 
employee is allowed to receive annually up to DM 936 in company shares tax-free 
(Seeger, 1995). Yet, only few companies use this way of profit-sharing, because the 
associated regulation and administration is expensive and burdensome. Companies and 
employees use an alternative arrangement more extensively. According to this 
arrangement, companies are allowed to offer their shares to their employees at a price 
that is 50% below the market price at the maximum. The price discount is free from 
taxes and social security contributions up to a ceiling of DM 300. Recently, this ceiling 
has been lowered from DM 500 to DM 300. Hence, the fiscal stimulus is relatively 
modest. In both schemes shares can be only sold after a period of six years. The number 
of employees that make use of the price discount scheme has doubled since 1985 to 
approximately 5% of total employment in 1995 and covers some 200 out of 650 listed 
German companies. Rising equity value of these shares due to higher share prices is not 
subject to capital gains taxes in Germany, which increase the attractiveness of employee 
share ownership. 
  In the Netherlands, tax concessions pertain to employee share-ownership schemes 
that are open to 75% of a company's workforce and that are approved by the works 
council (IDS, 1995). When the stock option is granted, 7.5% of the equity value of the 
option right is liable to income taxes. Recall from Section 2.2:  Fehler! Textmarke 
nicht definiert. that a stock option entails a right to buy the company's shares at a given 
price at a future date. Hence, the option valued by the price given at the moment the 
option is granted is completely subject to income taxes and social security contributions. 
The attractiveness to an employee stems from the fact that the option rises in value if 
share prices increase. Because 7.5% of the option right is liable to income taxes, 
employees with a 50% marginal tax rate benefit from the stock option if the share price 
rises by more than 3.75%. Any further increase of share prices is exempt from taxation 
because in the Netherlands capital gains from rising share prices are not subject to 
taxation.  
  Income taxes on an option right are due only above an allowance of about ƒ1500, if 
the shares are not sold for a period of four years. Hence, under the four year constraint, 
stock option rights up to ƒ20 000 (ƒ1500 / 0.075) are exempt from taxation and the 
option becomes attractive to employees if the share price does not fall. As yet, no data 
on coverage of these tax provisions are available, because the complete legislation only 
exist since 1994 and detailed information on stock option arrangements does not have to 
be published.  
  In comparison, the coverage of cash-based profit-sharing arrangements in the 
Netherlands exceeds that in Germany. The extent of tax provisions on employee share 
ownership is difficult to compare because these differ considerably and data on the use 
of employee stock options are lacking for the Netherlands. The absence of capital gains 
taxes makes both German and Dutch tax incentives relatively large from an international 
perspective. By consequence these institutions, which may enhance the effectiveness of 
employee participation and the level of productivity (Section 2.4), are present in both 
countries, although their effect is not expected to be large. 






The analytical framework (Section 2.4: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.) shows that 
co-determination can be viewed as an employee control mechanism restricting 
managerial opportunism, and guarding the way in which management handles 
employees' residual claims on the company. Co-determination enforces the realization 
of implicit agreements in relational contracts, because it precludes unilateral decisions 
by managers to renege implicit agreements. In other words, stronger mutual 
commitment of workers and managers alleviates the hold-up problem. In this way, co-
determination encourages workers to invest relationship-specific assets. 
  The comparison of the Anglo-American and German models in Section 2.6: Fehler! 
Textmarke nicht definiert. provided several additional arguments to assess the impact 
of co-determination on firm performance. Co-determination enhances employment 
stability, which strengthens long-term relationships between management and 
employees and as such supports reputation and mutual commitment to reduce the hold-
up problem. The semi-fixed character of core-employment forces enterprises to invest in 
the quality and internal flexibility of workers. Works councillors are inclined to accept 
the demand by employers for recurrent investments in the quality and internal flexibility 
of the workers they represent, because they recognise the need for a high quality and 
flexible labour force in order to maintain the employment level of the firm. Accordingly, 
the works council often supports management decisions regarding rationalisation and 
modernization, as long as the employment level remains unaffected (Jacobi et al., 1992). 
Moreover, besides supporting managerial decisions that increase worker quality and 
internal flexibility, the works council can also strengthen the quality of managerial 
decision-making by providing management with work-floor information.  
  However, co-determination rights suffer also from disadvantages. In particular, if 
worker representatives become too influential, workers may pursue opportunistic 
objectives as well. Co-determination may slow down decision-making within 
established firms by requiring extensively lengthy procedures before decisions can be 
taken. In extreme cases, conflicts between management and works councils may result 
in a deadlock. Moreover, co-determination may reduce the flexibility of employment 
adjustments across firms and industries. By succeeding in maintaining the current level 
of employment within the firm, co-determination may hamper the re-allocation of 
labour towards newly emerging sectors with strong growth perspectives (see also 
Section 2.6). Through strong insider protection, new hirings may be hampered as well 
(Streeck, 1984). 
  Quantitative empirical evidence on the effects of co-determination in Germany on 
firm performance and employment adjustments is scarce. Regarding firm performance, 
it is difficult to disentangle the effects of co-determination from other factors, such as 
the quality of the schooling system or of other business strategies. Moreover, empirical 
studies suffer from methodological problems, such as measuring long-run firm 
performance, and from data problems (Nickell, 1995; Smith, 1994: 307). Hence, it is not 
surprising that empirical findings are mixed (see also Addison et al., 1996: 565). To 
illustrate, Gurdon and Rai (1990) find a positive influence of co-determination on firm 
performance (profitability), whereas FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) find that co-
determination increases private costs, but recognize that it is hard to quantify potential 
benefits.
15 Making use of a larger dataset Addison et al. (1996) find that the presence of 
a works council lowers profitability, but does not discourage innovative activity. Hence, 
rent seeking of works councils does not appear to spill over to other performance 




councils on firm performance. 
  As to the effects on employment adjustments across firms and industries, empirical 
evidence generally confirms that co-determination reduces external labour market 
flexibility. Fitzroy and Kraft (1993) relate increased private costs to labour hoarding 
during periods of economic downturn. Houseman (1991) finds that down-ward 
adjustments of employment in the European steel industry took place comparatively 
slow in Germany. However, the contribution of co-determination is difficult to separate 
from that of other institutions, notably short-time working arrangements and work-
sharing. Frick (1996) estimates that the presence of a works council significantly lowers 
both quit and dismissal rates. He suggest that the voice instrument may replace the exit 
option of workers and that a higher training incidence further lowers the incidence of 
separations. 
  Qualitatively-oriented studies have reached more consensus, by emphasizing the 
beneficial effects of worker participation on firm performance in many German 
industries (for example Biagi, 1993; Jacobi et al., 1992; Turner, 1991; Nickell, 1995). 
As an example, during the 1980s West-German firms in the car industry were able to 
recover from intensified international competition with the United States and Japan 
without mass lay-offs. Hence, "the stability of workers' interest representation in the 
industry has been consistent with successful industrial adjustment" (Turner, 1991: 152).  
  In conclusion, theoretical arguments and case-studies support the view that co-
determination can improve firm performance in the long run, whereas mixed empirical 
information neither supports nor contradicts this view. This suggests that the future 
extensions of Dutch co-determination, which imply partial convergence to the German 
system, will probably not hamper but support the performance of established firms. The 
German evidence contradicts the view that the present degree of worker influence leads 
to internal inflexibility within firms because of sluggish decision-making. However, the 
reallocation of labour through the external labour market may slow down, because co-
determination reduces external flexibility by protecting the position of insiders within a 
firm. In this way, co-determination hampers efficiency of reallocation of labour between 
firms or industries. The scarce empirical evidence for Germany confirms the theoretical 
argument that co-determination delays the adaptation of employment. 
  The analysis of differences between the German and Dutch co-determination 
institutions moreover leads to the conclusion that is not advisable to introduce the 
integrated German system, which combines works councils with formalized supervisory 
board representation of employees, in the Netherlands. The German experience shows 
that such a system may promote more efficient information flows from management to 
employees, but reduces the overall effectiveness of the supervisory board. Moreover, the 
Dutch system lacks a countervailing shareholder power to balance the increased 
representation of workers on the supervisory board. Furthermore, introduction of joint 
supervisory board representation is also less needed as a way to strengthen worker 
influence in the Netherlands, because the advisory rights of Dutch works councils 
exceed those of German works councils. In contrast to their German counterparts, Dutch 
employers must consult the works council not only on the social consequences of 
important economic decisions, but on the economic and financial consequences as well. 
  No univocal assessment can be made on the efficiency of work-floor co-
determination procedures in Germany and the Netherlands. On the one hand German 
worker influence is more concentrated within enterprises, which can enhance the 
efficiency of procedures. Yet, on the other hand, German co-determination regulations 
are more detailed, which requires more effort from participants to comply with the 












Institutions affect investments in relationship-specific assets 
 
Shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, competing firms and con-
sumers can all have a stakeholder relationship with a firm. The distinctive feature of a 
stakeholder relationship, in contrast with a market transaction, is the existence of 
investments in relationship-specific assets by stakeholders. These investments can be 
hampered by partly diverging interests or conflicting objectives of stakeholders. 
Comprehensive contracts cannot align conflicting interests because economic agents are 
boundedly rational, which implies that contracts are always incomplete. Incomplete 
contracts and opportunism of economic agents give rise to the hold-up problem, which 
states that it is not possible to commit agents to keep to an agreement. Agents have the 
possibility to renege on an agreement and opportunistically pursue their own goals. In 
this way, the hold-up problem curbs relationship-specific investments. The function of 
governance institutions is to reduce the hold-up problem by strengthening the 
commitment of parties not to renege on an initial agreement. To enhance commitment, 
governance institutions promote monitoring capabilities of parties, reallocate revenues 
so as to align differing incentives, increase co-decision powers, or support long-term 
relationships between economic agents. 
  Countries differ in the way in which their governance institutions succeed in 
supporting investments in relationship-specific assets. Although managers are hired to 
maximize the equity value of the company, their behaviour differs across countries. 
Institutional differences between countries imply that managers to various degrees take 
the interests of other stakeholders into account. Therefore, governance institutions have 
a crucial impact on the extent of a nation's investments in relationship-specific assets.  
 
The Anglo-American and German models of stakeholder relationships 
 
Two stylized models of stakeholder relationships can be distinguished, the Anglo-
American model and the German model. Market orientation and competition 
characterize the Anglo-American model. The stock market is well-developed so that 
changes in share prices and takeover threats can discipline managers. Management stock 
ownership is an additional governance institution that aligns interests of managers and 
shareholders. Relationships between companies are governed by relatively extensive 
vertical integration and formal contracts. The labour market is competitive, labour 
contracts are formal to a considerable extent. Profit sharing acts as an incentive for 
workers. Workers largely bear the risk of relationship-specific human-capital losses, 
since long-run stable worker relationships are not common.  
  Long-term relationships and cooperation are distinctive features of the German 
model. Block shareholdings and cross-representation of companies on supervisory 
boards support long-term relationships between companies as well as between 
companies and banks. Personal reputation strengthens the ties between companies in 
industrial groups. Co-determination enables employees to monitor management and 
supports relationship-specific investments of workers. 
  Institutions associated with the German model to a larger extent support the 
commitment of managers and other stakeholders to invest in relationship-specific assets 




model has many characteristics of a `shareholder society', whereas the German model 
corresponds with a `stakeholder society'. Strong elements of the Anglo-American model 
are fast reallocation of financial, physical and human capital through the market. Short-
run flexibility facilitates a shift of resources towards innovative emerging technologies, 
in particular towards start-up firms. The German model is strong on the development of 
long-term commitment, investments in relationship-specific physical and human capital, 
and cooperation between companies. This model promotes technological progress and 
re-allocation of resources within established enterprises. Superiority of one of the two 
stylized models of stakeholder relationships cannot easily be established. The models 
are valuable as a point of reference for the comparison of the German and Dutch 
governance structures regarding corporate governance and work governance.  
 
Corporate governance in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Corporate governance institutions, which pertain to governance of relationships between 
financiers and managers, differ between both countries. In Germany representatives of 
non-financial firms and banks in the supervisory board monitor management. 
Supervisory board representation by banks and firms is related to the considerable cross-
holdings of equity among companies. In addition, cross-holdings function as a 
protection against hostile take-overs. In the Netherlands, share ownership is dispersed, 
so that monitoring by block shareholders is largely absent. In this respect the situation in 
the Netherlands is comparable to that in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However, in contrast to the Anglo-American model, the market for corporate control is 
virtually absent in the Netherlands. Cooption of members of the supervisory board and 
extensive use of juridical anti-takeover defence mechanisms substantially restrict the 
influence of shareholders on management. The only alternative available to shareholders 
of Dutch companies is the exit option, i.e. selling their stock of shares if they oppose 
company policy. In conclusion, the position of shareholders in the Dutch model is weak 
since neither large shareholders nor the stock market control management. 
  Being shielded from direct shareholder influence, corporate governance of Dutch 
enterprises primarily depends on the quality of the supervisory board. There are no 
reasons to assert that the quality of the average Dutch board is lower than the average 
German supervisory board. However, the variance of the quality distribution in the 
Netherlands is expected to be larger, since shareholders have little means to change the 
composition of incompetent supervisory boards once management and the supervisory 
board conspire. 
  The main types of shareholders also differ, which intensifies the differences between 
the German system of cross-holdings and the Dutch system of weak shareholder 
influence. The position of German banks in corporate governance corresponds with the 
concentrated share-ownership structure of corporate Germany. In contrast, bank share 
ownership diminishes the efficacy of creditor control. Dutch banks do not own 
substantial blocks of shares. Instead Dutch banks monitor management from a creditor 
perspective. In contrast to Dutch banks, pension funds in the Netherlands own relatively 
large amounts of equity capital in a number of Dutch companies and are enlarging their 
equity investments. Combined with their rising shareholder activism, pension funds' role 
in corporate governance is expanding in the Netherlands. Evidence from the United 
States shows that pension fund activism can be effective to improve poorly performing 
management. The aim of Dutch pension funds is to strengthen the shareholder position 
in companies. 




Work governance in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Work governance, which concerns the governance of relationships between 
management and employees, also features different characteristics in both countries. Co-
determination is the main work governance institution in Germany and the Netherlands, 
although it is supported by institutional arrangements such as dismissal protection or 
profit-sharing. German co-determination operates through two different channels. At the 
enterprise level, worker representatives are present on the supervisory board. In 
addition, workers in many firms are represented at the work-floor level through works 
councils. In the Netherlands, workers are not represented on the supervisory board and 
works councils are not obligatory in small firms. However, Dutch works councils have 
more influence on managerial financial-economic decisions regarding reorganisations, 
mergers, etcetera.  
 
Lessons and future changes 
 
It can be concluded that Dutch institutional characteristics of corporate governance do 
not encourage potential stakeholders to engage in long-term financial relationships with 
Dutch companies, since potential stakeholders have no strong means to govern the long-
term relationship. In this respect the German system performs better. Moreover, Dutch 
corporate governance institutions do not enhance flexible re-allocation of capital or risk-
sharing finance through the stock market to innovative start-up firms because of an 
extensive use of anti-takeover defence mechanisms. In this respect the Anglo-American 
model performs better.  
  Policy changes in the near future will lead to some improvements of the Dutch 
system of corporate governance. Recently the Dutch government has reached an 
agreement with the parties involved on a proposal for new legislation that will 
strengthen the influence of shareholders. According to this agreement, which still has to 
be put forward to Parliament, juridical anti-takeover defence can be removed by court 
order, although this is only possible after a lengthy and complex procedure. Moreover, 
the introduction of a system of proxy voting is currently put forward in the discussion 
on Dutch corporate governance institutions.  
  Dutch companies anticipate these changes by investing in longer-term relationships 
with block shareholders, which will remain a viable defence mechanism under the new 
legislation. Enactment of the new proposals will strengthen the position of institutional 
investors and may enhance long-term financial investment relations in the Netherlands. 
Hence, lowering anti-takeover defence mechanisms will sooner lead to a shift towards 
the German model than to the Anglo-American model, although institutional investors 
instead of banks will have a stronger position in the Netherlands.  
  In contrast, German governance institutions to a larger extent support long-term 
financial relationships. However, information flows constitute a weak feature of the 
German system of corporate governance compared to the Dutch system. Accounting 
standards do not adequately present information to shareholders to develop a detailed 
view on the financial position of the firm. In addition, the joint representation of 
shareholders' representatives and workers' representatives on the supervisory board 
hampers information flows between management and the supervisory board. However, 
German companies are reacting to internationalization of product markets and financial 
markets by improving accounting information. Moreover, installing supervisory board 
subcommittees might resolve some of the problems caused by joint representation on 




  With respect to work governance institutions, theoretical arguments and case-studies 
support the view that co-determination can improve firm performance in the long run. 
Therefore, the lesson can be drawn for the Dutch situation that some future extensions 
of co-determination will not hamper but support the performance of established firms. 
Yet, the improved internal performance of established firms corresponds with a slower 
reallocation of labour through the external labour market, because co-determination 
reduces external flexibility by protecting the position of insiders within a firm. In this 
way co-determination hampers efficiency of reallocation of labour between firms or 
industries, compared to the Anglo-American work governance institutions. 
  For the Netherlands it is not advisable to introduce the integrated German system, 
which combines works councils with formalized supervisory board representation of 
employees. The German experience teaches that such a system may promote more 
efficient information flows from management to employees, but at the same time 
reduces the overall effectiveness of the supervisory board. Moreover, the Dutch practice 
lacks a countervailing shareholder power to balance increased representation of workers 
on the supervisory board. Introduction of joint supervisory board representation is also 
less needed as a way to strengthen worker influence in the Netherlands, because 
advisory rights of Dutch works councils exceed those of German works councils. 
  No univocal assessment can be made on the efficiency of co-determination 
procedures in Germany and the Netherlands. On the one hand, German worker 
influence is more concentrated within enterprises, which can enhance the efficiency of 
procedures. On the other hand, German co-determination regulations are more detailed, 
which requires more effort from participants to comply with the regulations.  
 
A recapitulation of the main findings on the position of Dutch governance institutions 
yields the following main conclusions. Dutch corporate governance institutions have a 
particular position compared to both the German and the Anglo-American models of 
stakeholder relationships between financiers and management. This position does not 
stand out as favourable compared to the German and the Anglo-American model. Dutch 
corporate governance institutions neither strongly encourage investments in 
relationship-specific assets, nor strongly enhance flexible reallocation of capital or risk-
sharing finance. Recent policy changes will probably lead to a moderate shift to the 
German model.  
  In contrast, work governance institutions more closely resemble those in Germany, 
whereas they differ strongly from the Anglo-American institutions. This implies that the 
performance within large established firms is enhanced through worker influence, but 
external allocation through the labour market is less efficient compared to the 
functioning of markets in the Anglo-American model. Future policy changes that 
strengthen Dutch worker influence will be beneficial for performance in established 
firms, and are in accordance with the gradual shift towards German governance 
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Countries' governance institutions to a varying degree support stakeholders to invest in 
relationship-specific assets. The function of governance institutions is to strengthen the 
commitment of parties to keep to an initial agreement. Thus, international differences in 
governance institutions affect relationship-specific investments. 
  Two stylized models of stakeholder relationships can be distinguished, the Anglo-
American model and the German model. Market orientation and competition 
characterize the Anglo-American model. Long-term relationships and cooperation are 
distinctive features of the German model. Strong elements of the Anglo-American 
model are fast reallocation of financial, physical and human capital through the market. 
Short-run flexibility facilitates a shift of resources towards innovative emerging 
technologies, in particular towards start-up firms. The German model is strong with 
respect to the development of long-term commitment, investments in relationship-
specific physical and human capital, and cooperation between companies. This model 
promotes technological progress and re-allocation of resources within established 
enterprises. 
  The position of Dutch corporate governance institutions, which govern the 
relationships between management and financiers, does not stand out as favourable 
compared to both the German and the Anglo-American models of corporate governance. 
In the Netherlands, share ownership is dispersed, so that monitoring by block 
shareholders is largely absent. In this respect the situation in the Netherlands is 
comparable to that in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in contrast 
to the Anglo-American model the market for corporate control is virtually absent in the 
Netherlands. Cooption of members of the supervisory board and extensive use of 
juridical anti-takeover defence mechanisms substantially restrict the influence of 
shareholders on management. Therefore, Dutch corporate governance institutions 
neither strongly encourage investments in relationship-specific assets, nor strongly 
enhance flexible reallocation of capital or risk-sharing finance. Recent policy changes 
will probably lead to a moderate shift to the German model. 
  Dutch work governance institutions, which concern the governance of relationships 
between management and employees, more closely resemble those in Germany. This 
implies that worker influence enhances the performance within large established firms, 
but that external allocation through the labour market is less efficient compared to the 
functioning of markets in the Anglo-American model. Future policy changes that 
strengthen Dutch worker influence will be beneficial for performance in established 
firms, and are in accordance with the gradual shift towards German governance 
structures.   
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1. On Transaction Costs Economics see Williamson (1985). Lazonick (1991: 206-227) provides a brief overview of the main concepts of Transaction Costs
Economics and a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. 
    
2. See the subsection on ownership in Section 2.1: Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. for a definition of these two crucial ownership rights. 
    
3. A third type of cooperation are long-term financing relationships between banks and non-financial companies. These type of inter-firm relationships have been
discussed in the previous section. 
    
4.This argument is based on the efficiency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The mark-up over market-clearing wages is higher the lower the level of unem-
ployment. See also Blanchard and Fischer (1989).  





    
5. On its main characteristics the Japanese model resembles the German model of stakeholder relations, although specific institutions can differ considerably.  
    
6. These results differ from a 1974 sample in which Gorton and Schmid (1996) find bank equity holdings to positively affect performance, but in which they do not
find a separate influence of total block holdings or proxy voting. The authors relate the shift between 1974 and 1985 to disintermediation, falling bank equity ownership
and increased competition between banks. 
    
7. A summary overview of types of stakeholder relationships can be obtained from 0. 0, 0 and 0 summarize the main characteristics of corporate governance,
contractual governance and work governance respectively. The main features of two stylized models of stakeholder relationships can be found in 0, while 0 summarizes
the strengths and weaknesses of these two models. 
    
8. By law the total number of seats on the supervisory board equals 12 for companies with 2000 - 10,000 employees, 16 for companies with 10,000 - 20,000
employees and 20 for companies with over 20,000 employees (Edwards and Fischer, 1994: 78). 
    
9. See Zwiebel (1995) for a theoretical analysis of the impact of the size of blocks of equity of a firm and control benefits to shareholders on the resulting shareholder
structure within and across firms.  
    
10. Privatization also implies that regulations facing the government pension fund are identical to those of company pension funds. Hence, the 20% restriction on
equity investment does not apply any more. 
    
11. Since 1992 a comparable law exists in the Netherlands. Investors must disclose shareholdings of 5% or over and changes in participations. 
    
12. In comparison, the number of SEC registered companies equals 52 in the United Kingdom, eight in France, seven in Italy, and Spain, and six in Ireland an Sweden.
    
13. This figure includes the public sector, where parallel legislation exists regarding "staff councils" that have somewhat less influence: co-determination over social
issues is similar but there is no right to information on business policy (Jacobi et al., 1992). 
    
14. Section 3.1 describes the specific conditions that pertain to the structural and the common model in the Netherlands. 
    
15. Empirical evidence on the effects of co-determination (defined as joint decision making) in the United States is also mixed. Miller and Monge (1986) and Wagner
and Gooding (1987), performing a meta-analysis on a large number of empirical studies, conclude that results strongly depend on the methodology adopted.  